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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a critical examination of social work discretion within adult 
Social Services. The topic is explored through a critical analysis of Lipsky's 
examination of discretion within street-level bureaucracies. The thesis 
first outlines Lipsky's analysis of discretion and subsequent research 
within the street-level bureaucracy perspective, identiýý the limited 
analysis of the role of managers and the influence of professionalism on 
discretion as areas for further consideration. The thesis explores debates 
about management control and professionalism with regards to social 
workers' discretion, and how these relate to the continuing relevance of 
Lipsky's work on discretion. Two key alternative accounts of discretion in 
contemporary social work are identified: domination managerialism, 
arguing that managers have achieved control over social work and have 
extinguished discretion; and the discursive managerialism perspective, 
which sees managerial control and professional discretion intersecting in 
different ways in different settings. The thesis examines these arguments 
in terms of their descriptions of different regimes of discretion, that is: 
how discretion is characterised; claims about the nature of management 
control; and the role of professional status. These issues are examined 
through a study of an older persons team and a mental health team within 
the same local authority. The study suggests that'management' is not 
monolithic, but is an internally differentiated group, and that local 
managers exercise significant discretion themselves and contribute to 
practitioner discretion. Furthermore, professionalism as a formal principle, 
in structuring discretion continues to be significant, but to different 
degrees in the two different teams. The thesis concludes that the street- 
level perspective is usefiA in identifying limitationson managers' ability to 
control discretion. However) this perspective is also criticised as offering a 
limited account and neglecting the role of managers and professionalism in 
explaining the nature of social work discretion in Social Services. 
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CHAPTERI 
INVESTIGATING DISCRETION 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an exploration of how social work discretion can be 
understood in the context of contemporary Social Services. This question 
is approached through a critical examination of Michael Lipsky's account 
of discretion in his seminal study of street-level bureaucracies (Lipsky 
. rg8o). The thesis seeks neither to defend nor to dismiss the street-level 
perspective, but rather aims to use it to stimulate critical thinking about 
the extent and basis of professional discretion within social work, as the 
starting point for an empirical study of discretion. There is a growing 
recognition that social policy research needs to be grounded in street-level 
experience (McDonald and Marston2005, Mead 2oo5) and, accordingly, in 
undertaking empirical research the goal has been both to evaluate ideas of 
discretion in the field and, recognising the role of serendipity in research, 
to be sensitive to: '... the complexity of what one learns in the field [and to 
be open tol ideas ... that fall outside the existing literature' (Mead2005: 
543)- 
In undertaking this approach, it is necessary to examine the following 
questions: what is discretion? Why is it an important and relevant topic 
for research? Why use Lipsky's work as a starting point for this study.? 
What is Discretion? 
Discretion is a difficult idea to pin down. The term is used in different 
ways in different contexts (Smith igg-i, Evetts, 2. ooi). One possible 
approach would be to examine the fiffl range of definitions and to choose 
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one as 'coffectý-though this raises the further problem of how to 
determine what a correct definition is. Furthermore, Smith warns against 
attempts at extended apriori definitions of the term, pointing out that the: 
4... apparent supposition that we can settle upon a definition, before 
research begins in social work, fisl unheIpU' (Smith, rgSr: 6o). Within the 
different uses of the term, he argues, there is a general sense of concern 
with the freedom to make decisions in a work role, but beyond this it is 
difficult to provide a robust or precise definition Ubid 47-48). Avoiding 
defulitional debates, then, Smith prefers to see discretion as a topic for 
exploration. Rather than using it as a conceptual tool to be specified and 
applied to all situations, he looks at'... the language of discretion in 
relation to the action of discretion' (ibid. 6o). As a topic, discretion is 
concerned with the extent of freedom a worker can exercise in a specific 
context and the factors that give rise to this freedom in that context (ibid). 
VVhy iis Social Work Discretion an Important and Relevant Topic 
for Research? 
In this thesis my concern is with examining the discretion of qualified 
social workers working within statutory British Social Services for adults. - 
Discretion-as freedom-is seen as a key characteristic of professional 
workers (Freidsonr994). Social work as a profession is relatively new in 
Britain. While its origins can be traced back to the late 19th century 
G. ymbery igg8a: 19q, Parry and Parry 1979: 26), its creation and 
recognition as a professional role are often associated with the Seebohm 
reforms and the creation of Social Services Departments in the early 1970s 
(Marshal and Rees 1985, Lymbery iE998a: 207, Foster and Wilding 2000: 
1151, HarriS2003: chapter2). Almost since the point of social work's 
professional consolidation, the idea of social work discretion has been 
I British social work and Social Services are identified in contrast to the North American 
context of much Street-level Bureaucracy research. The empirical Study reported in this 
thesis is of English social work teams within this broader British context. 
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contested, because of the close link between Social Services as an 
Organisation and the idea of the professional status of social work (Parry 
and Parry 1979, Jones 1983)- Paradoxically, what might be seen as the 
apotheosis of the social work professional project, in terms of the 
consolidation of social work and Social Services, was quickly followed by 
the increasing criticism of professional discretion, including that of social 
workers (Langan 1998: 14-10. In a post-war welfare state professionals 
were recognised as playing a significant role, not only in delivering services 
but also in developing and implementing service policies (Marshal and 
Rees 1985). However, from the 1970S professionalism within the welfare 
state was increasingly subject to a range of criticisms (Foster and Wilding 
200o). Academic analysis questioned the functionalist view of 
professionals as ethically driven experts, pointing instead to their self- 
interested occupational strategies. This analysis was also related to a 
radical critique which saw professional collusion with dominant forces in 
society (ibid. 144). The developing consumer movement was critical of 
perceived professional arrogance, and the resurgent New Right offered an 
economic analysis of the producer power of professionals, restricting 
efficiency and choice, capturing public services and operating them in 
their own interest. The election of a Conservative government in ýý979 gave 
particular emphasis to this latter analysis which regarded professionalism 
as a problem (ibid 146), the solution to which was the introduction of 
more focused techniques and market disciplines derived from the business 
world into public services as a means of controlling professional freedom 
(Alaszewski and Manthorpe 19go, Clarke 1996, Harris 1998a, Jones 1999). 
Over the past2o years the debate within the social work literature On 
discretion has largely focused on the decline of discretion (Evans and 
HarriS2004a)- This literature, which will be discussed in Chapter III, has 
emphasised the rise of managers and managerial ways of thinking and the 
increasingly intense and effective control of welfare professionals. 
However, alongside this picture of the decline of professional discretion, 
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there has also been a developing literature influenced by Lipsky's work on 
street-level bureaucracy, arguing that social work discretion continues to 
be significant (Baldwin 1998,2000ý 2004, Ellis et al. 1999). This literature 
contests the view that the impact of managerialism is all-powerful and 
pervasive and points to the need for fiu-ther investigation of discretion in 
terms of how much discretion social workers stiff exercise, the form 
discretion takes and the means by which it is structured and controlled. 
THE STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY PERSPECTIVE AND 
DISCRE, TION 
The core of Lipsky's argument is that discretion is inevitable. Public 
service organisations are necessarily complex and unwieldy bodies with 
vague and conflicting policy goals and limited resources; discretion arises 
from the need to turn broad goals into practical policy, and to decide how 
to use limited resources to achieve those goals (Lipskyig8o). In presenting 
this argument, Lipsky challenges formal accounts of policy implementation 
as clear policy issued from the centre and carried out locally, without 
problems, by street-level practitioners. 
Lipsky developed his theory in the context of urban politics in North 
America in the lateig6os and . 1970s 
(Hawley and Lipsky 11976). His 
approach reflects both his disciplinary perspective-political science-and 
the range of issues within urban politics. He examines street-level 
bureaucracies-public organisations delivering services to citizens-in 
relation to street-level bureaucrats' interaction with citizens receiving 
services and their relationship with politicians and the electorate. 
However, the focus of his analysis of discretion, as the subtitle of his 
book-Dilemmas ofthe Individual in Public Services-suggests, is on the 
relationship between street-level bureaucrats and their managers within 
public organisations and the dynamics of discretion which it generates. 
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This is also the focus of the treatment of Lipsky's work in this thesis. 
Why Start with Lipsky? 
In Britain Lipsky's work was initially well received and seen as an insightful 
account directly applicable to the analysis of social work practice (Hill 
1982). After this initial interest, the street-level bureaucracy perspective 
received little attention (Hudson 1993), but there has been renewed 
interest in the last few years, particularly in relation to social work (Evans 
and HarriS2004a). Lipsky's account shares the general view found in the 
social work literature of the increasing significance of management's 
attempts to direct and control day-to-day street-level practice. However, it 
also offers a counterbalance to the main body of this literature, which 
tends to characterise managers as omnipotent and capable of suppressing 
discretion (ibid 873). Accordingly, his work has been subject to criticism 
by some of the authors who adopt this stance (Howe iggia and Cheetharn 
1993)- 
Lipsky's work has largely been used to underline the continuation of 
practitioner discretion, while acknowledging the increasing role of 
managers (Baldwin. 20oo, Ellis etal. 1995). This thesis identifies Lipsky's 
scepticism about managerial control as an important contribution to the 
debate about professional social work discretion but points to its 
limitations in terms of its characterisation of management, particularly 
front-line management, and its general disregard of the role of professional 
claims in the construction of discretion for some street-level bureaucrats. 
Lipsky's work continues to be relevant to debates about discretion in 
social work, and, as such, offers a useful starting point in examining the 
topography of professional discretion in Social Services. In line with 
Smith's emphasis on approaching discretion as a topic for investigation, 
5 
Lipsky's analysis is useful because of both its strengths and its weaknesses. 
It provides a set of hypotheses about discretion that facilitates 'the 
uncomfortable process of moving from theory to data and back again', 
which Smith sees as a crucial process in the analysis of discretion (Smith 
198-T: 48)- 
Any exploration of such an issue inevitably brings ideas and presumptions 
to the investigation (Gadamer 1975)- In embarking on this research I have 
used Lipsky's work as my starting point. However, this thesis claims an 
unconunitted use of the street-level perspective. To support this claim, I 
will outline the origin and development of my interest in Lipsky's 
perspective. 
Encountering Lipsky 
My first encounter with Lipsky's work was in the early 19gos, as a graduate 
trainee social worker. Before commencing social work training I worked in 
policy implementation, and Lipsky's account of street-level bureaucracy 
seemed to me a convincing account of the ability of professionals to 
influence, the nature of the policy implemented at street level. In the 
context of the Griffiths reforms in health (National Health Service 
Management Inquiry 1983) and then in social care (Griffiths 1988), it also 
seemed to me to pose interesting questions about the claims 
being made 
for the effectiveness of management techniques in controlling and 
directing services. 
My interest in the critical examination of Lipsky's work developed 
through my experience as a qualified social worker in the period 
following 
the implementation of the NHS and Community Care Act (iggo). 
I 
qualified in 1993 and started work in a mental health team soon after the 
introduction of the new community care framework. According to 
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Lipsky s argument, street-level workers such as social workers retain 
discretion despite their managers; however, I also felt that I was given a 
wide degree of freedom in my practice by managers-social work 
professionals who had moved into management roles. In part this may 
have been due to my lack of previous experience as a social worker; 
certainly some practitioners in the team regarded the new community care 
framework as limiting their professional freedom. However, other 
practitioners believed that recent reforms had helped remove some of the 
interference that they had experienced before the reforms. 
I moved to another social work team, where my experience was of 
continuing professional freedom. At the same time I encountered a 
situation described by Lipsky: that is, an organisation seeking to use 
resources and procedures (such as eligibility criteria) to control access to 
services; but creating uncertainty and confusion, which both generated 
discretion and required its use to make systems work. At this point, while 
working in a community mental health team, I decided to undertake 
research to investigate these issues more closely. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THESIS 
As mentioned above, the literature on Social Services points to a 
significant change in their organisation over the past two decades, in the 
form of the growing influence of managerialism (see Chapter 111). In the 
development of the thesis I returned to Lipsky's original work and found 
its contemporary relevance reinforced. While Lipsky writes about 
American public services in the 1970s, his account of these organisations 
and how they were managed reflects contemporary accounts of 
managerialised Social Services, ---far instance, in terms of the ethos of 
management control and the language of eligibility, performance measures 
and outputs etc. (Harris igg8a). Accordingly, his work offers an interesting 
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starting point from which to explore arguments about the unpact of 
managerialism on Social Services, because it challenges key claims of 
managerial capacity and effectiveness. However, the perspective's limited 
analysis of the nature of management and of the influence of professional 
status on discretion points to areas for finther investigation. 
Managerialism's emphasis on formal systems of management and the 
effectiveness of managers in controffing staff relates to the view within 
much of the literature identifying and analysing the impact of 
managerialism on Social Services that workers no longer have discretion. 
Commentators looking at the impact of managerialism on professional 
discretion often share this view. However, on closer examination the 
literature examining the impact of managerialism on social work staff 
suggests two different analyses with differing implications for 
understanding discretion. 
Lipsky's work can be seen as a challenge to accounts-here called 
'domination managerialism--of the success and power of managers in 
running organisations and curtailing practitioner discretion. His account 
of discretion is in terms of the day-to-day ability of street-level 
practitioners to influence and change policy, which is often more extensive 
than formal (organisationally acknowledged) discretion. While Lipsky and 
domination managerialism disagree on the effectiveness of management 
control, they do agree that managers are committed to the organisation 
and to ensuring that recalcitrant workers comply with policy instructions. 
However, their analyses play down the potential influence of another, 
professional, idea of discretion, its influence on what is understood as the 
basis and extent of (professional) discretion, and the possible influence of 
shared professional backgrounds on the relationship between practitioners 
and their managers. I argue that these factors are recognised 
by another 
perspective on discretion in contemporary managerialised Social 
Services, 
here called 'discursive managerialism'. This approach to discretion offers a 
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complex analysis which, while recognising the growing influence of 
managers and management ideas within Social Services, also points to the 
continuing influence of a professional culture which interacts with the new 
management culture in various ways in various settings, creating different 
discretionary settlements in each settmig. 
The focus of this thesis is on the extent of discretion experienced by 
professional social workers in adult Social Services, and the basis of this 
freedom. In using Lipsky's work to explore this area, I have concentrated 
on particular aspects of the street-level bureaucracy perspective. Lipsky's 
account both examines discretion's continuation in a managerialised 
organisation and seeks to evaluate and describe the ways in which street- 
level bureaucrats use their discretion. However, to engage in a study of 
both the extent of discretion and the way in which it is used would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis restricts its focus to the extent 
and basis of discretion, for the following reasons: any study of the use of 
discretion assumes its existence, but the existence of discretion must first 
be addressed; and the main academic debate-as outlined above-focuses 
on the existence of discretion. However, in conclusion this thesis identifies 
the uses of discretion as an area for further exploration. 
In summary, this thesis is a critical examination of the extent and nature 
of professional discretion in the context of Social Services, employing 
Lipsky's theory as a vehicle and exploring key issues through a study of 
professional social work discretion in a Social Services Department. 
Discretion and different accounts of discretion are examined in two adult 
social work teams: a mental health team and an older persons team, and 
through these sites and the examination of discretion, the impact and 
interaction of managerialism and professionalism are explored. Policy is 
examined in relation to the light it sheds on the nature and operation of 
discretion in these settings, focusing on the impact of the community care 
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reforms and aspects of the modernisation agenda of the New Labour 
government. However, the thesis does not aim to offer a detailed analysis 
of these two policy areas and considers them only in relation to their 
contribution to understanding the context of discretion in Social Services. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In this chapter I have outlined social work discretion as a topic for 
investigation and identified Lipsky's work on street-level bureaucracy as a 
useffil starting point in e professional discretion in an increasingly 
managerialised context. Chapter II outlines Lipsky's analysis of discretion 
in street-level bureaucracy and argues that his account of the conditions of 
work which give rise to discretion, while acknowledging professionalism, 
fails to explore its implications for the extent of discretion in street-level 
bureaucracies and (related to this) the relationship between managers and 
street-level bureaucrats. These issues emerge in the critical response to 
Lipsky's work; the thesis outlines the shift in empirical research from 
demonstrating the validity of Lipsky's picture of extensive street-level 
discretion in public organisations, to increasing consideration of the role 
of professional status in constructing different regimes of discretion, and 
of the role of managers as discretionary agents themselves. 
Chapter III provides a critical analysis of the application of the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective to British Social Services. This chapter considers 
the significant body of literature arguing that discretion within Social 
Services has been severely curtailed in the wake of the impact of 
managerialism, as well as studies seeking to demonstrate continuation of 
discretion, and argues that Lipsky's work is directly relevant to 
contemporary Social Services, contrary to the view of his critics. Lipsky's 
account of discretion accepts the idea of increasing regulation of practice, 
but calls into question the effectiveness of many management strategies of 
io 
control. In this consideration of the contemporary relevance of Lipsky's 
work, two other strands of analysis of discretion are identified in the 
literature. The 'domination managerialist' perspective emphasises 
managerial control of discretion as top-down domination, and is the 
primary location of critics of Lipsky's analysis. A second strand is 
identified-'discursive managerialismý--which suggests a different 
critique of the street-level bureaucracy perspective, pointing to the 
potential influence of professionalism on discretion and the role of 
managers as discretionary agents. 
Chapter IV outlines the approach taken to the empirical research in 
exploring these issues and the operation of discretion within a Social 
Services Department. It describes the two Social Services teams, within 
the same authority, chosen as a case study to explore different impacts of 
managerialism and professionalism. 
Chapters V and VI present the context of and findings from the case 
study. Chapter V outlines the case study and presents 'thick descriptions' 
of the two sites, identifying them as sites of street-level bureaucracy within 
which managerialism, particularly through the development of community 
care, has had a differing impact on the pre-existing bureau-professional 
culture of Social Services. Chapter VI presents the case study 
findings in 
relation to key areas, identified in Chapters II and III, as requiring closer 
investigation, namely: the nature of management within Social Services; 
the effectiveness of management techniques in controlling practitioners; 
and the relationship between practitioners and their 
local managers. 
Chapter VII reviews and discusses these findings in relation to the 
literature examined in Chapters 11 and 111. In Chapter VIII the thesis 
concludes by identifying the contribution made to the understanding of 
social work discretion, and considers the implications 
for further research. 
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CHAPTERII 
THE STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY PERSPECTIVE AND 
DISCRETION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine Lipsky's account of the nature of discretion in 
street-levcl bureaucracies and his description of the relationship of 
managers and street-level bureaucrats. It will then consider the subsequent 
development of a street-level bureaucracy literature. Lipsky's analysis was 
well, but not uncritically, received when it was published. The 
contemporary reactions to Street-level Bureaucracy win be outlined, as well 
as the literature that has sought to demonstrate and develop the street- 
level bureaucracy perspective through empirical research. These studies 
initially focused on demonstrating the validity of Lipsky's account of 
discretion. However, recently a more critical strand has developed in this 
literature, which has started to raise questions about aspects of Lipsky's 
analysis. The discussion will identify the claims of proponents of the street- 
level bureaucracy perspective that it is sufficient for the understanding of 
the motivation and behaviour of street-level bureaucrats (and their 
managers). It will then point to the need to consider wider issues, 
particularly the influence of professionalism-and related ideas of 
discretion and supervision-which raise questions about how strect-level 
bureaucracies operate. In an examination of Lipsky's theory, key areas for 
further investigation are: the way in which professional street-level 
bureaucrats and their managers operate; and how this conforms to and 
differs from the picture Lipsky presents. 
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LIPSKY'S ANALYSIS OF DISCRETION 
Discretion-the freedom to carry out work-is a central concern for 
Lipksy in Street-level Bureaucracy. In the complex and chaotic world of 
public service, he argues, discretion is necessary to make policy work, but 
the need for discretion can give rise to street-level practices that 
undermine effective policy implementation and the organisational 
accountability of street-level workers. Central to his examination of 
discretion is the tension he identifies in the relationship between street- 
level workers and organisationat managers. 
Lipsky's analysis of discretion in Street-level Bureaucracy focuses on the 
nature and conditions of street-level bureaucrats' work and hierarchical 
control over their work. His account of discretion is closely tied to his 
analysis of work undertaken by front-line staff delivering services to 
individuals and communities from large public organisations, and the. 
particular characteristics of these types of organisation. Lipsky's analysis 
developed in the context of the study of American urban politics in the 
ig6os and 1970S (Lipsky, 197"1 '1976, -ig8o). In the 25 years following the 
Second World War there was a significant expansion of public services at 
federal and local level, particularly in the late ig6os, with the expansion of 
social programmes associated with the war on poverty (Eisinger 1998*- 395)- 
In this context, Lipsky observes that: 
The public sector has absorbed responsibilities previously 
discharged by private or ganisations in such diverse and critical areas 
as policing, education and health. Moreover, in all these fields 
government not only has supplanted private organisations but also 
has expanded the scope of responsibility of public ones (Lipsky -ig8o- 
6). 
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Within the expanded public sector professionals in health, welfare and 
education had become powerfizI groups able to achieve significant 
discretion in their work (Lipsky ig8o: 7). However, in the mid '70s state 
and city public services were facing substantial cuts in their budgets (Diner 
. 1998: 726). The context of constrained public services, an environment of 
pressing demand, concern about funding levels and programme efficiency, 
and political conflict (Hawley and Lipsky 1976, Kaufman 1998: 123) gave 
rise to Lipsky's understanding of street-level bureaucrats and street-level 
bureaucracies. 
Lipsky's aim is to move away from traditional approaches to the study of 
public administration, which emphasised formal structures, and to 
examine the dayý-to-day conditions of policy implementation (Bream and 
Gates iggg: io). His work builds on a strand in post-war analysis of public 
bureaucracies that examined the balance of control and discretion in 
public service work and suggested that the balance was tilted towards 
discretion. Prottas, a research assistant of Lipsky's in his work on street- 
level bureaucracy, summarises the impact of this literature on the 
formulation of Lipsky's key problem: 'Street-level bureaucrats make public 
policy as it emerges on the street level, and ... they 
do so despite the 
massive mechanisms designed to control and direct their behaviour' 
(Prottas 1978: 288). 
Lipsky's explanation for this apparent paradox focuses on a picture of 
complex and confusing policies which, at street level, have to be 
interpreted, prioritised and made to work. In this context, he argues that 
the issue of discretion is central in policy analysis because: ".. the routines 
they [street-level bureaucratsl establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become 
this emphasis) 
the public policies they carry out' (ibid xiii). In effect, he says, they 
become 
significant policy; --making actors-the '... street ministers of education, 
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dispute settlement, and health services' (Lipsýy ig8o: 12). 
The nature of the organisations within which street-level bureaucrats work 
is central to our understanding of their discretion. Lipsky characterises 
bureaucracies as public rather than business organisations (ibid 48) and 
defines street-level bureaucracies as public bodies whose services are 
predominantly provided or allocated by street-level bureaucrats (ibid. 3). 
Street-level bureaucrats are not all public service employees, but those: 
... who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and 
who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work ... 
typical street-level bureaucrats are teachers, police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, social workers, judges, public 
lawyers and other court officials, and many other public officials who 
grant access to government programs and provide services within 
them (ibid. 3)- 
Furthermore, Lipsky presents street-level bureaucracies as difficult 
organisations within which to work, characterised by the challenging 
working conditions they create for workers---conditions of resource 
shortages and policy confusion (Lipsky1991: 215). This environment of 
uncertainty and scarcity is placed at the centre of Lipsky's understanding 
of the dilemmas and tensions that impact on street-level bureaucrats'work 
and extend their discretion. According to his account, policy objectives 
tend to be ambitious, ambiguous, vague or conflicting, and have to be 
matched to resources. Working in the context of policy complexity and 
resource paucity that characterise street-level bureaucracies, street-level 
bureaucrats have to make sense of what their work involves and survive by 
prioritising policies, choosing between incompatible policies and ignoring 
impractical policies (Lipsky 1980: 32). For Lipsky these conditions are not 
incidental but are fundamental to understanding street-level bureaucracy: 
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'The analysis presented here depends upon the presence of the 
aforementioned working conditions. If for some reason these 
characteristics are not present, the analysis is less likely to be 
appropriate... ' (ibid. 28). 
According to Lipsky street-level bureaucrats, unlike similar workers in 
other bureaucracies, '... have considerable, discretion in determining the 
nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their 
agencies' (ibid. 13) - Street-level bureaucrats are involved in dynamic work 
situations, where there is a need to respond to the human dimension of 
service. It is work made up ofi '... complex tasks for which elaboration of 
rules, guidelines, or instructions cannot circumscribe the alternative' (ibid 
15). They need discretion to respond to the, unexpected and to ensure that 
services are responsive to individual need. LiPksy does not claim this to be 
the case for every piece of work carried out, but argues that, within their 
role, there, is a recognition that situations can arise that will call for them 
to think on their feet and produce appropriate responses. Howeven'... 
possible responses are often circumscribed, for example, by the prevailing 
statutory provisions of the law or the categories of services to which 
recipients can be assigned' (ibid. 161). The tension between the 
requirement to follow organisational guidelines and responsiveness to 
individual requirements is at the heart of Lipsky's analysis of discretion. 
For him, the organisational characteristics that delineate formal discretion 
paradoxically create both pressures and opportunities to act beyond the 
street-level worker's formal role. 
In summary, Lipsky characterises street-level bureaucrats' conditions of 
work as 'the corrupted world of service' (ibid. xiii). He talks ofi 'The 
ambi ity and unclarity of goals and the unavailability of appropriate 19u, 
performance measures in street-level bureaucracies' (ibid 40)- Street-level 
bureaucrats have to work with ill-4efined. organisational goals and 
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unrealistically high public expectations of the agency and its staff. Policy 
objectives tend to be overblown, ambiguous, vague or conflicting. The 
problem of policy imprecision is compounded by insufficient resources for 
the job. They have fragmented contact with their clients, work with people 
from diverse backgrounds and need to make rapid decisions, typically 
under conditions of limited time and information. Simultaneously, the 
services that street-level bureaucracies provide are under-resourced to 
meet demand. In this context street-level bureaucrats have to exercise 
discretion; they have choices to make about services and how they are 
delivered. They have to decide how to make policy work through 
exercising discretion about whom to help, which needs to meet and which 
policies to follow. 
For Lipsky this level of discretion is a problem because it threatens policy 
implementation. Managers find it difficult to control and direct discretion 
in line with organisational. goals. He emphasises the problems that 
managers have in controlling street-level bureaucrats, whose goals are, he 
argues, fundamentally different from theirs and the organisation's (ibid 
13-25). Lipsky's analysis of this problem of control is not just in terms of 
managers' ability to monitor and apply solutions but also in terms of the 
micro politics--the conflict and dependency that exist between street-level 
workers and their managers. 
Street-level Bureaucrats and their Managers 
For Lipsky, street-level bureaucrats and their managers operate in 
significantly different ways. They have different job priorities and 
commitments and different values, and they use different strategies. 
Street-level bureaucrats want at least to make the conditions of their work 
as bearable- as possible and, where they can, to take control of the 
direction 
of their work (ibid 18). In contrast, managers are concerned with 
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implementing the policy that they are directed to put into effect, and with 
doing this as effectively as possible Oid i[S). Street-level bureaucrats are 
guided by their own preferences, including a desire to maintain as much 
discretion as possible, and tend only to follow those agency objectives to 
which sanctions are attached (ibid 18). Managers, however, have a clear 
commitment to carrying out policy (ibid i8-ig). While managers are 
committed to equal treatment (ibid22), workers'commitment to 
procedural fairness is more ambivalent: they want to treat people on an 
equal basis, but they also want to adapt the rules and they bring their own 
concerns into play (ibid. 23). Street-level bureaucrats and managers in 
Lipsky's account are, then, in separate, antagonistic camps: 
... it is a relationship best conceived in large part as intrinsically 
conflictual. The role of the street-level bureaucrat is associated with 
chent-processing goals and orientations directed toward 
maximizing goals. Managers' roles in this context are associated 
with worker-management goals directed toward aggregate 
achievement of the work unit and orientations directed toward 
minimizing autonomy' (ibid. 25)- 
Lipsky also argues that, while they may well have different interests, street- 
level bureaucrats and managers rely on one another, and often have to 
compromise to achieve their different goals as best they can. Managers 
have power, but it is limited in a number of ways. Surveillance and 
sanctions cost in terms of time and disruption. Regulation of the 
workforce through the manipulation of benefits and sanctions to induce 
performance tends to be limited by employment rights. Managers can also 
make- work more or less interesting for individuals; but these opportunities 
tend to be on the margins (ibidIg-24). Managers, then, in Lipsky's view, 
are: '... ultimately constrained by law, labor agreements, political opposition 
and worker solidarity from dictating decisions or otherwise compromising 
18 
the role of street-level workers in determinations about individual clients' 
(Lipsky 1991: 216-217). Significantly, managers also need workers to 
perform. If the job is not done, it reflects not only on workers but also on 
managers themselves. Their status as managers relies on being seen to get 
the job done, which in turn is largely in the gift of the workers: 'Workers 
can punish supervisors who do not behave properly toward them, either by 
refusing to perform work of certain kinds, by doing only minimal work, or 
by doing work rigidly so as to discredit supervisors' (Lipsky1980: 25). 
Similarly, workers can bend and break rules, but they are also aware that 
managers wield power and that non-compliance, if pushed too far, could 
give rise to sanction: 'Formal sanctions, although costly for managers to 
invoke, are also costly to workers, who thus try to avoid receiving them' 
(ibid. 24). 
The relationship between street-level bureaucrats and their managers is 
one of: 
... mutual 
dependency. Thus managers typically attempt to honor 
workers' preferences if they are rewarded by reciprocity in job 
performance. To a degree reciprocity will characterize all working 
relations; in street-level bureaucracies, however, the resources of 
lower-level workers are greater than those often possessed by 
subordinates in other work contexts. Hence, the potential for 
reciprocity is greater (ibid. 25). 
Management control and street-level discretion are, in part, an armistice 
between managers and workers. However, managers also have to accept 
their own limited ability to control and direct street-level bureaucrats 
(ibid. 164). The 'corrupted world of service' described above affects 
managers as well as street-level workers: street-level bureaucracies are 
difficult organisations to run. Management strategies of control, such as 
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performance measures, are difficult to put into effect in the conditions of 
street-level bureaucracies. It is problematic, for instance, to define what a 
'good' service is; and there is the constant risk that imposing crude 
performance measures could distort service delivery: 'There is often a fine 
line between inducing workers to better conform to agency policies and 
inducing workers to be open to fewer options and opportunities for 
clients' (ibid 164). Furthermore: '... street-level bureaucrats, in recognition 
of the importance performance measures have to limiting their autonomy, 
actively resist their development and application' (ibid. 53)- 
Another aspect of the tension in the relationship between managers and 
street-level bureaucrats is reciprocity in the operation of discretion: 
managers allow the letter of policy to slip, provided street-level bureaucrats 
respect its spirit. But for Lipsky this is a 'cold war' reciprocity, based on a 
recognition of limited power and distrust. This becomes evident in his 
detailed analysis of the nature of discretion in street-level bureaucracies. 
Professionals and Street-level Bureaucracy 
The everyday world of public service involves conflicting priorities, cost 
concerns and inadequate resources and street-level bureaucrats frequently 
find themselves having to make sense of rules and procedures that collapse 
complex goals with many, often conflicting or outright contradictory 
aspects, paradoxically creating further confusion. Human services can also 
throw up situations for which policy has not yet been developed, and 
street-level bureaucrats are left to decide policy for themselves. Within 
this broad framework of policies, discretion involves being practical and 
pragmatic; not letting the detail get in the way of the service; abiding by 
the spirit, if not the letter of policy-. 
It is desirable to clarify objectives if they are needlessly and 
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irrelevantly fuzzy or contradictory. However, while agency goals may 
be unclear or contradictory for reasons of neglect and historical 
inertia, they may also be unclear or contradictory because they 
reflect the contradictory impulses of the society the agency serves. 
The dilemma for accountability is to know when goal clarification is 
desirable, because continued ambivalence and contradiction are 
unproductive, and when it will result in a reduction in the scope and 
mission of public services (ibid. 165). 
Lipsky argues that in response to this inevitable policy tension and 
confusion street-level bureaucrats either leave, buckle under the strain or 
stay, adapt and survive. The adaptations identified by Lipksy involve either 
a narrow idea of discretion or one that is very wide-ranging (ibid. 149-15')- 
Some street-level bureaucrats, Lipsky argues, adopt a bureaucratic stance, 
following rules and using only a very limited idea of discretion in the sense 
of retaining a basic flexibility to respond to different human needs as 
fimdamental to the provision of human services. He also identifies an 
extreme version of this approach, which involves workers hiding behind 
rules and regulations, as a defence against discretion; denying their 
freedom to make policy work and operating strictly according to rules and 
regulations: 
Workers seek to deny that they have influence, are free to make 
decisions, or offer service alternatives. Strict adherence to rules, and 
refusals to make exceptions when exceptions might be made ... 'it's 
the law', and similar rationalisations not only protect workers from 
client pressures, but also protect them from confronting their own 
shortcomings Obid- 149)- 
An opposite response is also identified by Lipsky. Because of the extent 
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and need for discretion at street level, street-level bureaucrats can turn 
discretion against policy: They may assert discretionary dimensions of 
their job to a greater degree than called for in theory... ' (ibid i5o). They 
have leeway not only to work in accordance with organisational goals, but 
also to operate in ways which contravene or subvert those goals, making it 
relatively easy for workers to tailor their behaviour to avoid accountability 
(ibid. 163): 'Street-level bureaucrats resist organizational pressures with 
their own resources. Some of these resources are common to public service 
workers generally and some are inherent in their position as policy 
deliverers with broad discretion' (ibid. 25). The key tactics which street- 
level bureaucrats can use to circumvent interference from supervisors are: 
control of information upwards; playing on the essentially private nature of 
their work; and exploitation of management's reliance on their good will 
and initiative, on which continuing service provision depends (ibid23-25). 
Lipsky is critical of what he sees as this tendency of street-level 
bureaucrats to either minimise or maximise their discretion. He sees them 
as distorting public policy in ways which undermine managers' emphasis 
on using discretion pragmatically to best achieve policy-makers' 
intentions. Street-level bureaucrats become the key policy makers, 
resulting in a democratic and accountability deficit: The political 
significance of routines is highlighted by the fact that the policies that 
result from routine treatment are often biased in ways unintended by 
agencies whose policies are being implemented or are antithetical to some 
of their objectives' (ibid. 84). 
However, Lipsky does not give sufficient attention to the possibility that 
some street-level bureaucracts-such as professional workers--may 
be 
required to exercise extensive discretion by the organisation 
because of 
their particular attributes. He also equates policy distortion with the 
freedom that street-level bureaucrats exercise and fails to acknowledge 
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that policy outcomes are the aggregate of activity within the organisation, 
and may be the result of management discretion, as much as that of front- 
fine workers. 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIPSKYS ANALYSIS 
Street-level Bureaucrats and'Professionals' 
Lipsky's account emphasises the generic characteristics of street-level 
bureaucracies, the nature of their discretion, its control and its use. 
However, I would argue that there is some confusion about the way street- 
level bureaucrats are conceptualised. This touches on how discretion 
might be approached by street-level bureaucrats and how the relationship 
with managers is negotiated. Professionalism, for instance, can influence 
the nature of discretion and the nature of the relationship between 
practitioners and managers (Freidson . 1994:. io2). Lipsky's theozy is so 
intent on emphasising similarities that it fails to take sufficient account of 
differences in occupational status and their potential impact on the 
elaboration of his perspective. 
A central issue here is Lipsky's treatment of professional street-level 
bureaucrats (and bureaucracies). In his account of street-level 
bureaucracies Lipsky often talks of street-level bureaucrats as 
'professionals' (Magnusson 1981: 213). As noted above he also characterises 
street-level bureaucrats as possessing substantial discretion in the exercise 
of their work (Lipsky ig8o: 13). The use of the term 'professional' can range 
from being synonymous with white-collar staff to a more restricted 
meaning of an occupational group that has certain attributes, status and 
power ijohnson 1972: 21). However, while there is a wide range of skilled 
workers, professionals are generally thought of as different 
because of their 
particular skills, values and status, which afford them some 
degree of 
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control and regulation over their work (Freidson 1994: 128). Lipsky uses 
4 professional'in both ways. He tends to use it in the first sense throughout 
Street-level Bureaucracy: '... the word "Professional" is used quite loosely, and 
can encompass people without very much training'. But he also talks about 
observing '. _professionalism in the ethos of SLBs [sicl', alluding to the 
narrower idea of professionals (personal communication20o4). Here he 
seems to be eliding'street-level bureaucrat'with the more restricted term 
of 'professional'. He includes in his defuiftion of street-level bureaucrats a 
number of occupations-lawyers, doctors, teachers, and social workers 
(Lipsky 1980: 3)-that would be considered professional in the technical, 
restricted sense. The significance of whether street-level bureaucrats are 
conceived of as white-collar employees or more narrowly as professional 
staff is threefold. 
First, it influences the coverage of the perspective. The narrow sense of 
'professional'would restrict its application to a limited range of public 
welfare bureaucracies which predominantly employ professionals at street 
level, whereas the first sense is more inclusive. In relation to the coverage 
of the theory, Lipsky clearly sees it as wide-ranging and inclusive: 'In 
developing the street-level framework, I identify the common elements of 
occupations as apparently disparate as, say, police officer and social 
worker' Ubid xvi). 
Secondly, the idea of a core of necessary discretion to do the job (see 
above) would involve very different claims depending on how street-level 
bureaucrats' professionalism is understood. The nature and extent of 
discretion is likely to be both more robust and more extensive if street- 
level bureaucrats are understood to be professionals in the narrow sense, 
rather than if they are understood as all white-collar staff. When Lipsky 
alludes to the street-level bureaucrat's attributes, he seems to 
be using this 
narrower sense of 'professionalism': 
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To the extent that street-level bureaucrats are professionals, the 
assertion that they exercise considerable discretion is fairly obvious. 
Professionals are expected to exercise discretionary judgement in 
their field. They are regularly deferred to in their specialized areas of 
work and are relatively free from supervision by superiors (ibid -4)- 
This fluid use of the notion of 'professional' is problematic in that it fails 
to distinguish the level of discretion available to all street-level bureaucrats 
from that additionally available to street-level bureaucrats who are 
professionals in a narrow sense. 
Finally, where street-level bureaucrats are seen as professionals in the 
narrow sense, it points to another perspective on their organisation and its 
managers' expectations of their use of discretion. This is the idea that 
professionals have a role not only in implementing policy but also in 
developing it. This notion is central, for instance, in understanding the role 
of professionals in the post-war British welfare state in translating general 
welfare rights into particular provision (Marshall. and Rees 1985: 255-257) 
and has also been noted in American public administration (Kadish and 
Kadish 1973). The emphasis here is on regarding obligations not in an 
unquestioning way but responsibly and thoughtfiffly. Discretion is 
necessary not only because of possible conflicts between means and ends, 
as Lipsky suggests, but also because policy is necessarily sketchy, requiring 
professional staff to create and develop a workable policy in practice. 
For the most part, Lipsky is concerned with the common experience of 
street-level bureaucrats and their general responses as workers. While he 
acknowledge s-almost as an afterthought-that there may be differences 
between workers, his emphasis is on their commonalities (Lipksy ig8o: 
xvi). He is focused on his goal of developing a universal approach to street- 
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level bureaucracy. Lipsky tends to emphasise the 'central tendencies' Ubid 
xvi) in diverse public services-the (lowest) common denominators of 
discretion, difficult work conditions, challenges to central control and a 
discretionary response to these conditions that emphasises pragmatism 
over idealism (ibid. xv-xvi). 
Managers and Street-level Bureaucracy 
A similar comment could be made about Lipsky's account of managers in 
street-level bureaucracies. He presents managers in stark, undifferentiated 
terms as obedient organisational agents. The basis for this is unclear in the 
body of his argument. He has subsequently clarified the basis of his view: J 
know very little systematically about the origins of managers... ' (personal 
communication20o4). Furthermore, while in Street-level Bureaucracy he 
recognises that: 'The focus on the divergence of objectives between the 
organization and lowest-level workers could with some modifications be 
applied to the relation between lowest-level supervisor and the roles to 
which this position is subordinate' (Lipsky ig8o: 216), he does not develop 
this point; in fact he leaves it out of the main body of his argument, 
locating it in a footnote at the end of the book. This is surprising, because 
the implications of this observation for his argument are significant for 
understanding the role of managers and the relationships between layers of 
management within the organisation. The implication is that policy, the 
standard that Lipsky assumes can be used to assess the use of discretion, is 
not simply transmitted through layers of management in the organisation 
unaltered, but that, in the same way that street-level bureaucrats adapt the 
objectives of their managers, so their supervisors adapt the objectives they 
have been given by their supervisors, and so on. Managers, as well as street- 
level bureaucrats, exercise discretion. 
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Actors and Motives 
This discussion relates back to the micro-politics of the relationship 
between street-level bureaucrats and their managers. Lipsky characterises 
managers and street-level bureaucrats as having fundamentally different 
orientations. Managers, according to Lipsky, are the creatures of the 
organisation; workers seek to resist it. However, in line with the earlier 
argument, where street-level bureaucrats are professionals, the nature of 
their relationship with management may be very different from this: 
professionals working in organisations tend to be managed, at least at the 
level of their immediate supervision, by fellow professionals (Freidson 
1994). Here Gouldner's distinction between cosmopolitans and locals is 
instructive. Looking at the orientation of workers within organisations, he 
distinguishes locals, who identify with and are loyal to the organisation, 
from cosmopolitans, who identify more with their peers, who have 
specialist skills and professional commitments (Gouldner 1957)- 
Accordingly the concerns, priorities and commitments of the professional 
group may cut across the antagonism and conflict which Lipsky sees as 
inevitable in the relationship of street-level bureaucrats and their 
managers, and it may be the basis for shared commitments that are 
strikingly different from official policy. This suggests the need to analyse 
the practices of street-level bureaucrats and their managers in a way which 
can recognise additional professional responsibilities, commitments, and 
so on, that professional street-level bureaucrats and managers may 
have--and how these impact on their working relationship-as well as 
those they share with other street-level bureaucrats and other managers 
respectively. 
Lipsky's perspective is seen as applicable to all street-level workers, 
including professional staff, through the adoption of a level of 
generalisation that denudes organisations and organisational actors of 
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important characteristics. (This may be due, in part, to his belief that, to a 
large extent, these workers have been de-professionalised: '... in the 
American case at least, eligibility determination has been 
deprofessionalized over the last 20-years or so' (personal communication 
2oo4). However, this is an empirical question that requires empirical 
investigation and cannot simply be asserted. ) 
My argument here is that, in developing the street-level bureaucracy 
perspective, Lipsky has too often emphasised central tendencies and, in 
the process of doing this, has ignored diversity and relegated differences to 
footnotes and passing comments. However, the observations above suggest 
that the street-level perspective is best approached as a tentative 
framework rather than as a fully developed model of how all street-level 
bureaucracies work. Street-level Bureaucracy is a starting point for 
analysis-a picture of factors which help us to understand these complex 
public organisations but which also requires critical adaptation and 
augmentation to take account of specific differences in particular settings. 
Lipsky, I would argue, recognises this when he points out that: 
just as one of the most important contributions of the concept of 
'professionalism' is to facilitate understanding of the difference 
between, say, doctors and nurses, in the same way the concept of 
street-level bureaucracy should encourage exploration of important 
differences in public service as well as contribute to an 
understanding of central tendencies that they share ... it is to 
be 
expected that an elaboration of central tendencies such as the 
description of street-level bureaucracy cannot apply evenly to all the 
cases from which the generalizations are drawn (Lipsky iig8o: xvi). 
However) Lipsky fails to foreground this tentative dimension of his 
analysis in the analytical framework. 
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ME i "I"ACTION TO STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 
The general reaction to Street-kvdBureaucracy when it was published was 
positi-ve (Anon. -198-1, Hasenfeld 1-981., Joffe ig8i, Magnusson iggi, Perlman 
ig8i, Goldner 1982, Hill 1982, Yates 1982, Stone 1983). Goldner, for 
instance, described it as a rich compilation and surnmary of 'what we know 
about worker discrefioný (Goldner 1982-. 153), while Yates saw it as an 
important and original contribution to public administration scholarship 
(Yates 1982: 145)- Stone welcomed the work as a timely contribution to 
understanding a key problem in public policy around the gap between high 
expectations for services and problematic delivery (Stone 1983). However, 
within this generally positive picture reviewers were not uncritical, and it 
is possible to identify two key critical themes in their comments on Street- 
level Bureaucracy which relate to discretion. 
ry-%l 
I he first set of criticisms relates to the sweeping nature of Lipsky's 
account of street-level bureaucracy. Commentators point out the need to 
recognise that street-level bureaucrats and street-level bureaucracies, while 
they have some similar characteristics, may also be significantly different. 
An anonymous reviewer in the Michigan Iaw Review (Anon 1.981) is critical 
of the absence of a nuanced account, pointing out that: 
[Lipskysl analysis suffers from the inevitable difficulty of fitting 
into one mold such diverse services as police patrols, elementary 
school classes, and legal services interviews ... Lipsky's method 
emphasizes selected similarities but does not highlight differences 
that might have provided additional insight (ibid. &3-81.4). 
Hasenfeld argues that Lipsky fails to take sufficient account of the impact 
of different political and economic contexts of practice. While he accepts 
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that street-level bureaucracies are generally under-re sourced, he points out 
that the level of under-resourcing and the nature of the policy context of 
practice can vary and that these variations can, in turn, affect the 
opportunities that street-level bureaucrats have to respond positively or 
negatively in the situations they encounter (Hasenfeld igS-T: 156). 
The second theme concerns the implementation gap in policy, discretion 
and the role of managers. These critics suggest that the unanticipated 
policy outcomes from street-level bureaucracies that Lipsky ascribes to 
street-level bureaucrats are more likely to be the result of a complex, multi- 
layered and multi-actor process than the result of the actions of one group 
of workers. Several commentators are critical of Lipsky's focus solely on 
street-level bureaucrats as policy-makers. While they agree that street-level 
bureaucrats play a role in changing and implementing policy, they point 
out that the response of street-level bureaucrats to their situation-such 
as rationing contact time-may be a management strategy, as opposed to a 
worker response (Anon iq8i: 8-13) Hasenfeld states that: 'There simply is no 
evidence to support his argument that the service practice in the welfare 
departments or the school system are more a function of the discretion of 
lower-level workers than the deliberate policies of the organisational 
elites... ', and goes on to say that this is not to deny the importance of 
discretion, 'but to suggest that its impact is far more limited than the 
author implies' (Hasenfeldiq&r: 156). 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the role of street-level bureaucrats to 
explain policy distortions does not acknowledge the part of managers and 
policyý-makers throughout the organisational hierarchy, who themselves 
play a role in developing and changing policy, and who often use 'technical 
experts'to provide them with cover when problems arise in the 
implementation of their own, impractical strategic policies (Stone 1983)- 
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STREET-LEVEL THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The critical points identified in the reviews are not explicitly picked up in 
the empirical material. However, as research has developed, similar issues 
to those identified by the reviewers have emerged. Initially, the empirical 
research focused on demonstrating the basic claims of street-level 
bureaucracy-. that street-level bureaucrats exercised significant discretion 
in terms of their ability to select and adapt policy through implementation 
and practice. However, particularly in the past decade, a more critical 
literature has also developed which has questioned assumptions of the 
street-level bureaucracy approach. 
Street-level Bureaucrats: Enýployees or Professionals 
A central theme in the research, especially in the initial stage, involves the 
validity of the street-level bureaucracy perspective, particularly through 
demonstrating the extent of discretion exercised by street-level 
bureaucrats. Lovrich et al. (1986) present the findings of a survey of the 
employees of Washington State, which, they argue, provide empirical 
validation of Lipsky's theory (Lovrich et aL 1986: 14). The survey, which 
involves 781 state employees (75010 of the work force responded), looks at 
workers' perception of their work and the organisational context. 
Respondents are categorised as street-level bureaucrats and non-street- 
level bureaucrats (ibid. 20). The researchers find that street-level 
bureaucrats are demonstrably more active than non-street-level 
bureaucrats in seeking opportunities to develop and use their 
discretionary power, and that there is a general perception amongst the 
interviewees that fellow street-level bureaucrats do not stick to the letter 
of agency rules UW25). 
Another study looks at how patrol officers define their jobs in different 
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ways from their supervisors (Gianakis 1994). Gianakis' survey of police 
patrol officers in a city in Florida (2o60Ut Of 294 officers) is supplemented 
by interviews with a small number of officers and supervisors. He finds 
that, while there is a broad surface agreement about what the job 
involves-which could be specified in job appraisals etc. -this still leaves 
considerable room for operational individualism and job-customising by 
each officer. In Gianakis'view, this confirms Lipsky's claim that public 
servants fimction as defacto policy-makers in that they decide how to 
define and operate their particular role and so directly determine the 
quality and nature of the service they provide (ibid. 299). 
Brodkin (1997) and Meyers, Glaser and MacDonald 0998) look at the 
implementation of 'welfare to worV programmes in two US states (Illinois 
and California). Brodkin looks at the job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
(JOBS) programme in Chicago and does supplementary research on Work 
Pays programmes in California. Meyers, Glaser and MacDonald look at 
the Work Pays programme in California. While these are separate studies, 
the authors of both acknowledge the other and make links between them, 
drawing similar conclusions (Brodkin 19971- 29 and Meyers et at. 1998-. 2-1). 
In both the JOBS and Work Pays programmes, Brodkin and Meyers et al. 
are interested in the way workers respond to both a new policy and a new 
role-no longer just determining eligibility for benefits, but now required 
to encourage welfare beneficiaries to consider work as an alternative to 
benefits and provide advice and guidance on services to enable people to 
reintegrate, in the work world where appropriate. Brodkin finds that street- 
level bureaucrats used their discretion to resist the new policy: '... case 
workers routinely failed to elicit this information [about special 
circumstancesj or respond when clients indicated problems' (Brodkin 1997*- 
22). Meyers et al. also identify problems with programme implementation. 
They find that both workers and their office superiors explicitly disavow 
responsibility or even authority to discuss entry into work with clients 
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(Meyers et al. 1998: 12). Furthermore, workers frustrate the programme by 
failing to exercise positive discretion (that is, actively promote the Work 
Pays message) and relying heavily on routinised and scripted interviews 
(ibid. 12). 
Winter (2oo2) and May and Wood(2003) have also looked at discretion in 
relation to street-level bureaucrats who perform regulatory roles. These 
researchers tend to talk about discretion in terms of different regulatory 
styles, pointing out that while some street-level bureaucrats choose to 
adopt a literalist approach to the regulations they enforce, others operate 
within a more flexible understanding of the regulations, seeking to educate 
and persuade those they regulate into complying with regulations, and only 
enforcing them in extreme circumstances. 
A common theme in these studies is the way in which they approach 
street-level bureaucrats as an homogenous group; employees, as workers 
employed to implement policy, taking this as the basis upon which any 
exercise of discretion by them should be understood. In part, this view 
may reflect the fact that many of the empirical studies have focused on 
non-professional street-level bureaucrats: police patrol officers, welfare 
clerks etc. (Brodkin 1997, Gianakis 1994, Lovrich et al. 1986, Meyers et al. 
. 1998). However, it also seems to reflect a conscious 
decision to see street- 
level bureaucrats as non-professionals. In one study, for instance, 
professional staff are excluded from the street-level bureaucrat category: 
'professional/technical job classifications were assigned to the 
management/specialist group' (Lovrich et al. 1986: 21); and the implication 
of adopting a street-level bureaucrat as employee perspective is 
exemplified by Brodkin (ir997) and Meyers et al (1998), as seen above. 
Meyers et al. and Brodkin are critical of the workers for not being 
responsive to their employers' changing requirements in implementing 
policies, and for not adapting and changing their practices to achieve this; 
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they fail to consider the possibility that workers are not skilled in terms of 
the new role, or that they may see it as inappropriate to jettison their 
established role and take on a new role. 
While the conceptualisation of the street-level bureaucrat as including 
professionals is not a prevalent reading, it is the focus of one empirical 
study. Kelly (1994) distinguishes between professional and non-professional 
street bureaucrats in order to explore their approach to discretion. She 
looks at street-level bureaucrats, their work context and their ability to 
exercise discretion. Her research involves open-ended interviews with28 
professionally qualified school teachers and iS unqualified welfare workers, 
and she analyses their stories of justice and injustice. She finds that 
different groups of workers report significantly different organisational 
cultures, allowing them greater or lesser freedom to put their beliefs into 
effect in their work. The teachers she interviews are encouraged to be 
innovative and have significant freedom to achieve what they see as fair 
outcomes---e. g. in grades (Kelly 1994: 122-130; while, in contrast, the 
welfare workers constantly reiterate their lack of freedom and the rule- 
centred nature of their work. 
Kelly's findings are also interesting because, in contrast to the major strand 
of empirical research, they suggest that there is a difference in the degrees 
of discretion available to different groups of street-level bureaucrats, such 
as professional workers, who, because of the contexts within which they 
work and different evaluations of their discretion, have different levels of 
discretion. 
Managers and Discretion 
As mentioned above, Lipsky's account of the role of managers is both 
ambivalent and emphatic. While he acknowledges, enpassant, that 
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managers may themselves adapt and change policy in the process of 
implementation, as well as acting as straightforward policy implementers, 
he emphasises their role as obedient and committed implementers of 
policy. 
An assumption of the street-level bureaucracy perspective that is directly 
questioned in the empirical research is that managers act only to put 
policy into practice, even if it sometimes involves recognising the 
limitations of their ability to direct street-level workers and make strategic 
compromises with street-level practices. The perspective accepts that 
managers tweak policies, or compromise with strect-level discretion, but 
asserts that they do this only: '... to increase the probability that outcomes 
on the whole will be more favourable to the preferred policy direction' 
(Lipsky199I: 216). However, research looking at the influence on policy 
implementation of senior officers in the local variations found in highly 
centralised systems of welfare provision suggests that these managers are 
themselves significant policy actors. 
Keiser (iggg) looks at the variations in the level of disability benefit 
payments between American states. (The disability benefits programme at 
the time of the study was funded by the federal government but 
administered by states. ) Keiser considers local economic and political 
factors to identify influences on variations in fimding (ibid. 98). He looks at 
policy outcomes-the defacto policy of the bureaucracy-which, in terms 
of the logic of the street-level bureaucracy perspective, are the products of 
street-level bureaucrat behaviour. However, he points out that a factor in 
the variation between states is the influence of senior state officials in the 
policy implementation process (ibid ioo). 
An earlier study, by Weissert 0994), also points to the role of senior 
officials using their discretion to influence and change poky. 
Weissert 
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looks at variations in spending between local welfare offices on Medicaid 
within Michigan, a state renowned for its highly centralised and 
proceduralised system. Despite strict policies of eligibility and monitoring 
of caseworkers, he finds that there is still a good deal of room for local 
discretion (ibid. 230-23.0- Weissert contrasts generous offices, 
characterised by a 'culture of service giving', with non-generous offices, 
characterised by a 'culture of poverty' (ibid. 229). Seeking to account for 
this difference, he finds that: '... while supply, demand and political factors 
are important in predicting intrastate Medicaid spending patterns in 
Michigan, recipient behaviour-shaped in large part by the behaviour of 
the social service office leadership and the environment of the 
county-matters as weff'(ibid. 225). The style of local directors differs in 
terms of the importance of following rules and guidelines (ibid242), and 
reflects different managerial goals and work styles Oid250): 6... the office 
manager's discretion, attitude, and activism in the community differed 
substantially... equated with the generosity of the office in Medicaid 
spending and participation' Ubid25.0- In contrast to the influence of local 
managers, Weissert does not identify caseworkers as playing a significant 
role in local policy variations. However, he points out that this may be a 
result of his method of data collection--caseworkers were surveyed using 
close-ended questions UW245)--and that: '... Professionalism and 
discretion of caseworkers and political party association were difficult to 
assess even in the more detailed analyses of six counties, and they need 
further attention as well as future studies'UW250- 
Furthermore, at the level of line management, Meyers et al., in their study 
of the Work Pays Programme (mentioned above), also fmd that managers 
play as significant a policy-making role as the street-level bureaucrats they 
manage. Contrary to the picture of the obedient manager and recalcitrant 
street-level bureaucrat, they identify first-tier managers as actively 
resisting poficyq pointing out that managers as well as workers block policy 
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implementation and seek to disavow responsibility for reorientating the 
service that they manage (Meyers et al. 1998: 12). 
CONCLUSION 
Lipsky presents street-level bureaucracy not simply as bureaucratic public 
administration but as a context within which managers seek to control, as 
well as coordinate and administer. However, he argues, the nature of the 
organisation-particularly its wide-ranging and imprecise goals and the 
mismatch between resources and policy-and the limited ability of 
managers to control street-level staff give rise to extensive street-level 
discretion. Discretion is a result of street-level staff s ability to circumvent 
control and managers'need to collude with them in order to get the job 
done. This is a picture supported by the empirical research. Nevertheless, a 
close reading of Lipsky's analysis raises questions about the nature of 
discretion that is available to different street-level bureaucrats and points 
to professional status as a significant factor in enhanced levels of 
discretion. While most of the research within a street-level bureaucracy 
perspective has not explored this question, one study by Kelly points to 
important differences in discretion between a professional and non- 
professional staff group. This is an area of the theory that requires further 
investigation. In addition, Lipsky's account of the role of managers and the 
empirical research raises questions about his portrayal of managers as 
passive policy implementers. This area has not been extensively researched, 
and again highlights the need for furtherexploration. The relationship 
between managers and street-level bureaucrats is rather crudely drawn, in 
terms of opposed interests and concerns. When professionalism is 
introduced into understanding the organisation of street-level 
bureaucracies, it emphasises the need to consider the role of managers and 
their relationship with the professional street-level bureaucrats whom they 
manage. Shared professional concerns may well break down the barrier 
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which, Lipsky suggests, divides managers and street-level bureaucrats. 
Where managers and street-level bureaucrats share professional concerns, 
this may lead to cooperation and collusion-not necessarily, as Lipsky 
suggests, on the basis of purely pragmatic concerns, but perhaps also in the 
pursuit of shared professional commitments. 
These issues will be now be explored through the examination of social 
work discretion within British Social Services, as an example of street-level 
bureaucrats and their operation in street-level bureaucracies. 
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CHAPTERIII 
STR. EET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY IN THE SOCIAL 
SERVICES CONTEXT: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 
ONDISCRETION 
INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter looked at Lipsky's examination of discretion and 
management control in street-level bureaucracies and considered the 
research literature that developed in response to this work. The issues 
arising from the examination of the perspective in relation to the 
operation of discretion focus on its characterisation of management 
within street-level bureaucracies; the impact of professional claims and 
status on the extent of discretion exercised by street-level workers; and, 
related to this, their impact on the nature of the relationship between 
managers and the street-level workers they manage. In this chapter these 
issues will be explored through the examination of the management and 
practice of social work discretion within British Social Services. 
Before considering these issues in depth, this chapter will first consider a 
view within the British literature that the street-level bureaucracy 
perspective is no longer useful in the analysis of modem Social Services, 
where practitioner discretion is said to have been effectively eliminated. 
The argument will be put that, contrary to this view, Lipsky's perspective 
does directly address itself to managed public service organisations; but 
that, rather than asking whether street-level bureaucracy is relevant, a 
more fruitful question involves exploring its analyses of discretion with 
that adopted by different critics and their assessments of the ability of 
managers to control and direct street-level practice. The impact of 
managerialism on Social Services and its significance for the application of 
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the street-level bureaucracy perspective will then be considered, and the 
argument made that it is possible to distinguish two broad views of the 
impact of managerialism: domination managerialism, which sees 
managerialism replacing the previous organising principle of Social 
Services, which emphasised professionalism; and discursive manageriafismý 
which sees it as another influence alongside professionalism in the 
organisation of Social Services. 
Following on from this analysis, the role of managers in controlling (and 
supporting) street-level discretion will be considered. A distinction will be 
drawn between senior, strategic managers and local managers within the 
teams. Senior managers largely rely on remote control strategies-control 
of resources and procedures- to direct practice. The, effectiveness of 
these strategies, and local management and practitioner resistance to 
them, will be examined. Finally, the relationship between local managers 
and street-level practitioners will be considered, to identify how this 
relationship influences street-level discretion. 
In summary, this chapter will argue that Lipsky's work was developed in 
the context of nascent managerialism. and that it is a prescient challenge to 
ideas of managerial omnipotence. However, it will also be argued that the 
street-level bureaucracy perspective can be criticised for not giving 
sufficient attention to the impact of professionalism on manager-worker 
relations and on the practices of discretion within some street-level 
bureaucracies. 
ARE SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENTS STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRACIES? 
When Street-level Bureaucracy was first published in Britain it was greeted 
as a cogent and credible account of the extensive discretionary practices of 
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employees of public bodies such as Social Services: '... too much rings true 
... for it to be dismissed as a recital of American problems... ' (Hill. 1982: 
78-8o)- In the decade following the publication of Street-levelBureaucracy, in 
Britain, Hudson has observed that it was a valuable but little-used research 
perspective in the study of public services (Hudson 11993)- However, in the 
past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in Lipsky's work in 
Britain, where it has been applied to the analysis of Social Services 
(Baldwin 1998,2ooo, 2004 and Ellis etal 1999), the administration of 
housing benefit (Blackmore20oi), GP services (Checkland20o4) and 
discharge from hospital care (Allen et al. 2004). 
In the period following the publication of Street-levelBureaucracy, 
managerialism-the idea that managers should be in control of public 
organisations and that they should run these organisations in line with 
business principles and concerns-has been identified as an increasingly 
significant influence, on public service orgardsations such as Social 
Services, particularly in the United States and Britain (Pollitt 1993, 
McDonald et al. 20 03)- In the wake of this development some 
commentators have criticised the street-level bureaucracy perspective as 
no longer relevant (Howe iggia, Cheetham 1993). Howe, the main 
proponent of this view, argues that managerialism in Social Services has 
made the street-level bureaucracy perspective redundant. 
Howe's argument is interesting not only for its direct attention to social 
work discretion in Social Services, but also because of the challenge it 
makes to a core proposition of the street-level bureaucracy perspective: 
that is, the extensive nature of discretion at street level within street-level 
bureaucracies. He fiindamentally disagrees with this view in relation to 
social work and Social Services: 'Most of the writing by social workers 
about social work is stiff discussed by its practitioners as if they are a group 
capable, of determining all that they do' (Howe iggi a-. 2o3). He 
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characterises Lipsky's argument as an 'interesting and clever boost for the 
advocates of professional discretion, through its emphasis on the active 
role of street-level bureaucrats, including social workers, in the 
implementation and interpretation of public policy' (ibid. 203-204)- 
However, he is sceptical about the applicability of Lipsky's framework in 
the changed context of state social work, which has resulted in a decisive 
shift in power away from practitioner discretion and towards practice 
defined and driven by managers (Howe 1986, iqqza,. iqqib,. rqq6). 
Howe's argument draws on a study he undertook in the early ig8os 
examining the role of social workers within Social Services (Howe. 1986). 
He concluded from this study that managers have now displaced 
professionals as the key players in Social Services departments, and now 
control practice: '. -- the basic design of services, including the routes to 
them and the gateways met on the way, is constructed by managers 
interpreting legislation' (ibid. 130)- Within the organisation managers, he 
argues, are now the only people with discretion, and they use this to create 
procedures and routines to control practice: 'Managers extract whatever 
uncertainty there is in the process so that their "act" of devising the 
system of practice, surveillance and resource allocation which determines 
the work of subordinates remains the major free act in the whole business' 
(ibid. 150. Howe's contention is that Lipsky's analysis is no longer relevant: 
practitioners no longer have discretion (Howe 19gia: 2o4) because 
managers have created a coherent system of management that is able to 
control practice through the mechanisms of procedures, budgets and 
surveillance (Howe 1986, Howe iggra). 
Baldwin takes the opposite view of Lipsky's work to Howe. He sees it as a 
perspective that continues to have contemporary relevance in the 
understanding of street-level practitioners' discretion (Baldwin2000, 
2oo4). In his study of the implementation of the community care reforms 
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in two local authorities in the 19gos, he examines the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective to'... see to what extent ... fitJ helps explain the findings from the research interviews' (Baldwin20 0 0: 79). Baldwin 
recognises that there have been significant changes in the British context 
of Social Services since the publication of Street-level Bureaucracy, 
particularly in terms of an increasingly managerial environment and 
increasingly inadequate resources. However, unlike. Howe, he argues that 
the essential characteristics of street-level bureaucracy persist in Social 
Services in Britain: 'The context of practice that Lipsky 
describes-resource shortfall, indeterminate objectives and a dearth in 
controls on the use of discretion--describes an organisational 
environment that has changed little since his book was published in ig8o, 
apart from a worsening of the resource position because of demographic 
changes and political decisions'(ibid 83)- 
Baldwin, like Howe, is interested in examining the influences on 
professional practice, but contrary to the picture of management control 
of practice through procedures presented by Howe, he concludes that: '... 
it was apparent that of the many influences on practice in assessment, not 
all related either specifically or even incidentally to policy guidelines. There 
was evidence of [practitioners'l unconsidered reliance on intuitive 
approaches to practice-[quoting one of his intervieweesl "a lot of gut 
feeling, a lot of intuition, you've just jolly well got the vibes... Oid 4 0) - 
While he finds some commitment to procedures amongst a small number 
of care managers (practitioners-not necessarily qualified social 
workers-who assess and develop packages of care), his general finding is 
that most care managers are suspicious of influences such as bureaucracy, 
resource control and the techniques of managerialism (ibid 43-44). In fact, 
Baldwin finds not only resentment of managerial requirements but also 
many examples of resistance to control; for instance: 'There was one 
example of workers in a team running two systems side by side-the old 
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and the new-because they found the new system inimical to their 
preferred method of practice ... 'Ubid- 44). Baldwin considers his research 
as providing support for Lipsky's view that street-level bureaucrats such as 
social workers are able to exercise wide discretion and resist management 
control (ibid 94). He concludes that his research casts'... a useful light upon 
the extent to which intentions [of poficy-makersl are undermined through 
the unreflective use of discretion by implementers such as care managers 
in the way that Lipsky describes' (ibid M3). 
These two different evaluations of the continuing relevance of Lipsky's 
work are instructive because of their similarity as well as their difference. 
The similarity relates to their shared recognition of the increasing 
attempts by managers to control and direct street-level practice. However, 
while Howe sees this as undermining Lipsky's relevance, this is not the 
case for Baldwin. I would argue that this difference arises, in part, from a 
misreading by Howe of Lipsky's argument and that Lipsky's street-level 
bureaucracies are, in fact, the sort of organisation in which managers play a 
significant role. 
It is important-particularly for British readers-to draw out implicit 
elements of Lipsky's analysis in Street-levelBureaucracy, which the title of 
the book itself might obscure. Welfare bureaucracy is often contrasted 
with more managerial and business-focused organisations in the social 
policy literature in Britain (Butcher 1995). However, Lipsky's street-level 
bureaucracies are quite unlike this British notion of public administration 
bureaucracies. These are organisations with managers, not administrators, 
where there is concern for what is produced, not the process. His account 
of these organisations is permeated with the language of management. 
They employ performance indicators to measure outputs and use 
eligibility criteria to ration access (Lipksy x98o: 6o). Workers are resource 
units to be applied to achieve the organisation's goals 
(ibid 30- Managers 
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are concerned with achieving agency objectives and are distrustful of the 
motives of the workers they supervise (ibid M-iq). Furthermore, 
6managers' are not limited to the higher echelons of the organisations: they 
make up the hierarchy of supervision, including '... someone in an 
immediate supervisory position vis-a-vis street-level bureaucrats' Ubid 
216). In a comment on the objectives managers seek to implement through 
supervision of subordinates, Lipsky notes that: "'Objectives" refers to the 
goals that the supervisor is charged with realizing. It is necessary to put it 
this way because the role of supervisor is itself subordinate to other roles 
in a complex bureaucracy' (ibid. Z16). 
Lipsky's characterisation. of street-level bureaucracies is, then, more in 
tune with the contemporary Social Services that Howe acknowledges, in 
the sense that they are characterised by the presence of a significant 
management dimension within the organisation. The interesting issue, 
however, is the different ways in which Howe and the street-level 
perspective approach the analysis of discretion. 
The Basis of Discretion: De. 7ure and De Facto 
Discretion is freedom within the work role: 'A public officer has discretion 
whenever the effective limits on his [sid power leave him free to make a 
choice among possible courses of action or inaction' (Davis 1971: 4)- 
Within the idea of discretion as freedom to act (see Chapter 0, it is 
important to ask how this freedom to act is acquired. A common 
distinction is often made between freedom that arises in the circumstance 
and freedom that is formally given by an authorised body such as a 
hierarchical superior within a bureaucracy. These two different bases of 
discretion are usually referred to as defacto discretion-having the power 
to act, though not necessarily officially recognised; and 
dejure 
discretion-having the power to decide as an officially recognised 
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entitlement. The first, defacto, sense of discretion can be associated with a 
capacity to act because of the absence of control. In the second sense it is 
about the authority to act, the official recognition of a right or entitlement 
to decide, such as professional discretion. 
When we recognise these different dimensions of discretion we can see 
that Howe and Baldwin are at cros&-purposes in their argument about 
discretion in Social Services. Howe tends to focus on formal systems of 
control and responsibility and points to the increasing reduction in the 
formal discretion of professional workers (the curtailment of their de jure 
discretion). He is concerned with what practitioners are allowed to do and 
the growing level of formal controls managers exercise over them-the: 
'"documents, devices and drilled people Ithat] allow those at the centre to 
control those at the boundaries of an organisation's activities"' (Law 
quoted in Howe iggia: 218). Baldwin, on the other hand, acknowledges that 
managerial strategies seek to control social workers, but points out that, 
despite the increasing level of formal management controls, practitioners 
still have the capacity to exercise significant defacto discretion in their 
work-freedom, beyond that which is officially recognised. He is less 
concerned with formal discretion than with the ways in which 
practitioners can undermine and circumvent structures and processes to 
retain a significant degree of freedom to act, confirmingt'... Lipsky's 
contention that coercive forms of management will result in covert... 
forms of discretion which are likely to be destructive of policy intentions' 
(Baldwin20oo -. 86). The nature of the organisational context of social work 
discretion rasied by Howe and Baldwin can be explored by examining the 
policy context of Social Services; and the nature and effectiveness of 
managerial control. 
Howe's position is that: 'SSD [Social Services Departmentl managers 
interpret welfare legislation, determine the resources to meet legal needs, 
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design the systems which allow statutory matters to be handled' (Howe 
z986: r61r), and he points to the growth of check lists and procedures 
governing practice and their impact on day-to-day practice in support of 
his view (Howe 11996: gi-92). Howe is not alone in his view that managers 
are in control, implementing the clear direction and policy given to them 
from the centre. His observation about increasing management control of 
practice and the concomitant decline of discretion (Howe 1986, iggia, b 
and. 1996) resonates with the views of other social work commentators. 
(This perspective will be finther discussed below: see page 55-) The idea 
that managers can organise conflicting policies and better match resources 
to policies is also expressed by Macdonald, who argues that managers 
should use their power in Social Services the better to clarify and delineate 
social workers' roles (Macdonald 1990: 542)- Cheetham, considering the 
impact of the implementation of the new community care legislation, 
argues that the picture presented by Howe, in contrast to Lipsky's 
portrayal of extensive discretion, offers'... a much more sober account and 
one which is probably nearer the day to day experience of contemporary 
local authority workers, particularly as they deal with the progress charts, 
tick lists and performance indicators which are now so central to 
managerial practice' (Cheetham 1993: 17-0- 
Howe and Cheetham are making two points here: first, that the dejure 
discretion social workers have taken for granted has been superseded by 
management control; and second, that management control is so effective 
that it has effectively limited the ability to excercise choice in day-to-day 
practice. The latter point-the effective limitation on defacto discretion in 
social work practice-will be considered first. 
There are good reasons and a growing body of evidence to call into 
question an unqualified picture of managers' ability to implement a policy 
as a blueprint, and closely control and direct the work of their subordinates 
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in line with this goal. The evidence challenges this top-down idea that the 
centre can direct and implement predetermined policy through its formal 
control of the hierarchy of the organisation (Hogwood and Gunn 1984)- It 
offers support for the more qualified view of the street-level bureaucracy 
perspective that, while managers may seek to control the freedom of 
street-level bureaucrats such as social workers, they are more limited in 
their ability to do this than may at first appear to be the case. 
Lewis and Glennerster, reviewing the literature on public policy 
implementation, observe that this view assumest'... that, if not the local 
detail, then at least the broad intellectual rationale for the policy is tightly 
conceived by the centre' (Lewis and Glennerster 1[996: 20). However, they 
point outt 'This is frequently not the case or is at least questionable' (ibid. 
20). Rather, policyL-making and policy implementation can be a messy 
business. More often than not policyý-making is a process of compromise, 
imprecision and managing tensions Wein -1993). Evidence from the 
implementation of the community care reforms suggests that policy is a 
complex of goals, different priorities, and public and private agendas 
(L&wis and Glennerster 1996-. 1-9-21). For the Conservative governments of 
the late ig8os/early 19gos, for instance, the development of community 
care policy involved concerns about controlling spending; fraught 
relationships with local government; a belief in market models of 
provision, and public rhetoric of choice and consumer responsiveness 
(Alaszewski and Manthorpe i[99o). While there was a clear concern with 
managing the Social Security budget, they had to do this in a politically 
acceptable way (Lewis and Glennerster 1996: 8). 
Recent research examining the application of changing guidelines for 
community care services illustrates the impact of policy tensions on street- 
level practice. Bradley identifies '... insufficient clarity or openness in local 
procedures ... coupled with 
local political and economic expediency ... as 
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significant factors in creating extensive discretion in application of charges 
for services amongst practitioners and managers' (Bradley 2003: 653). 
Another problem with the top-down approach is that it assumes that the 
authors of a policy can determine the way their statements are interpreted. 
However, policy, like any text, is not fiffly under the control of its authors. 
The intended content of any document (what the authors mean) is not 
necessarily the same as its received content (what the document's readers 
understand) (Scott 1990: 34). The author takes for granted a certain 
context of interpretation that the audience(s) does not necessarily share. 
Implementation studies often note local confusion and 
misunderstanding---ýpuzzlementý-about what the centre is asking them 
to do (Harrison et al. 1992: 3-4)- In relation to the implementation of the 
community care reforms, researchers have noted that local authorities 
sought to make sense of the policy, giving rise to a range of interpretations 
which often tended to fit their existing commitments-for instance, in 
terms of responsiveness to users or willingness to use market mechanisms 
(Lewis and Glennerster 1996: 197). The role of local interpretation was also 
made more complex by the way in which politically sensitive policies, such 
as reducing expenditure, had to be 'sugar-coated', as noted above. 
Preston-Shoot and Wigley (2ow), who look at the implementation of 
government guidance on vulnerable adults, also point to local puzzlement 
about and misunderstanding of policy: in implementing policy, managers 
and practitioners have to make sense of the guidance, but it is unclear 
what is directive and what is permissive. Policy also has to be interpreted 
in order to apply it to concrete situations, a constant problem for 
managers and practitioners because the policy cannot really 
deal with'grey 
areas' (ibid- 33r7)- 
In addition to 'honest' misinterpretation of the centre's requirements, the 
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process of policy clarification by the centre can itself complicate and 
confuse more than it clarifies. As tensions and unexpected problems in 
policy emerge, the centre has to deal with these in addition to the 
implementation of the policy itself. For example, Gostick et al. (ig 97) find 
that the work of the Social Services Inspectorate, given the task of 
implementing community care, grew as it responded to an emergent 
combination of anxieties arising in central government and in feedback 
from reviews identifying particular problems. In emphasising certain areas 
of practice, guidance produced by the SSI focuses attention on some 
aspects of the policy agenda and shifted attention away from others. Lewis 
and Glennerster (11996), for instance, talk of 'clouds of guidance' being 
issued by the SSI, which tried to reconcile growing tension between 
financial restraint and increasing user choice (ibid. 13-15)- 
Researchers also point to the problem of policy and resource incongruity: 
the mismatch between rhetoric and resources. 1-twis and Glennerster find 
in their study that while, at first, funding was less of an issue than their 
research authorities anticipated, as the study progressed it became more 
significant. Towards the end of the research period some. of the research 
authorities were starting to feel severe financial pressure, a situation 
reflected in the experience of many authorities outside the study (ibid 42)- 
A Local Government Association (LGA) survey of Social Services budgets 
(LGA2002)finds local authorities spending over their predicted budgets 
in the financial year2001-2, despite the imposition of increasingly 
restrictive eligibility criteria on access to services. The authorities 
surveyed highlight as key problems unrealistic cost assumptions made 
by 
central government in setting grant levels and the underfunding of new 
responsibilities transferred to them 
by central government. The report 
concludes: 'The scale of budget pressures on 
Social Services, whether 
expressed in financial overspend or severe restrictions on services, are 
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manifest' (ibid. 6). The continuing problem of the mismatch of resources 
and policy rhetoric has recently been acknowledged by the Chief Executive 
of the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI), who has pointed to 
the need for additional fimding for Social Services to meet the demands 
being put on them by the government (Tbe Guardianl. 12.05). 
The impact of these tensions on practice is noted by Postle(2002). She 
looks at the experiences of care managers implementing community care, 
and finds them caught between'the idea and the reafityof community 
care policy, in the sense of trying to match the generous rhetoric of 
community care with increasingly restricted resources; seeking to achieve 
needs-led assessments, in the knowledge that resources are insufficient to 
meet the needs they identify (Postle2002: 346). 
This problem is not confined to the implementation of community care. A 
study of the, implementation of management reforms in children's 
residential services in the late 19gos (Kirkpatrick20oz) echoes Lewis and 
Glennester's description of policy implementation. Kirkpatrick also finds 
policy confusion and contradiction in terms of competing goals that 
emerge from core legislation (the Children Act 11989) and wider policy 
requirements in Social Services to contract out services (Kirkpatrick 
2002* ws from his study is thatt 34). One of the main conclusions he dra 
... it is 
far from clear that demands for management reform 
necessarily represented clear and internaUy consistent archetypes or 
templates for how to organise ... local organisations were presented 
with a multiplicity of competing goals and policy expectations all of 
which had potential implications for how they should re-structure, 
services. In this case and perhaps more generally it seems 
inappropriate to conceive of management restructuring initiatives 
in terms of a clear, well: -designed project for change. Rather ... these 
5' 
initiatives often have more in common with a loosely formulated 
'bright idea' than a clearly defined 'blue print' (Kirkpatrick 2o o 2: 
43)- 
The evidence suggests, then, that Social Services continue to share the 
basic characteristics of street-level bureaucracy central to the persistence 
of street level discretion identified by Lipsky: that is, the conditions of 
policy uncertainty and inadequate resources that create conditions within 
which actors have to make choices and exercise discretion, even when this 
discretion is not officially acknowledged or sanctioned. Baldwin agrees 
with Howe that managers are playing an increasingly significant role 
within Social Services; but disagrees with Howe's view that they have 
clarified policy and resolved problems of policy resource mismatch to the 
point where there is no longer any significant defacto street-level 
discretion. 
These different conclusions about the continuation of street-level 
discretion also reflect different readings of Lipsky's analysis-perhaps a 
result Of Lipsky's ambivalent treatment of professionalism and discretion 
within Street-kvel Bureaucracy. Howe's argument against Lipsky is that 
managers have now replaced professionals as key players in public service 
bureaucracies; and that managers run these organisations like well-oiled 
machines, where policies and resources are all marshalled effectively to 
achieve the desired objectives-a system of control that has effectively 
eliminated professional discretion. In contrast, Baldwin's reading of 
Lipsky is as an analysis of employee discretion: workers' ability to avoid 
control. He sees managerial attempts to proceduralise practice as limited 
by conflict, confusion and resource inadequacy. This is a setting in which 
practitioners retain discretion, but often informally, in their capacity to 
adapt and alter policy, which echoes Lipsky's account of street-level 
bureaucracies. 
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Howe criticises Lipsky as an advocate of professional discretion. In so 
doing he identifies an important line of argument about the analysis of 
discretion in organisations such as Social Services that requires further 
attention. He seems to share the street-level bureaucracy perspective's 
view that professionalism, as an organising principle in understanding 
discretion, is no longer significant. In the next section the question of the 
nature of the impact of managerialism and the continuing influence of 
professionalism in understanding discretion will be considered. 
MANAGERIALISED SOCIAL SERVICES: THE END OF 
PROFESSIONALISM? 
Historically, Social Services Departments have been strongly influenced by 
the ethos of professional social work (Hadley and Clough 1996, Lewis and 
Glennerster 1996, Payne20o5), recruiting senior officers from the social 
work ranks and recognising the professional status and discretion of social 
work staff within the organisation (Brown 1975, Harris 1998a, b, Payne 
20o5). The continuing influence of professional social work in Social 
Services is particularly evident in field social work, where professionally 
qualified social workers continue to be the most significant occupational 
group, making up over 70 % of field work practitioners (Balloch et al. 1995). 
State social workers have always been subject to management control, in 
the sense of a mode of organisational coordination (Clarke1996: 48). 
Historically, in departments such as Social Services in British local 
government, management was professional-led, rather than drawn from 
separate management cadres, as in the NHS (Brown1975, Laffin and 
Young 19go, Harris 19g8a and b). In this context managers were seen as 
committed to the idea of professional social work and advancement in the 
organisation was based as much on professional standing as on managerial 
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authority (Harris 1998a). However, in the past 20years managers are 
widely seen as having become increasingly powerful vl*s-a-vis the 
practitioners they manage, and increasingly distanced from professional 
commitments and concerns. Managers in Social Services, as in other parts 
of the Public sector, have had to shift from the role of adequate 
administrator to one of the proactive, effective manager (Hugman iggi: 61, 
POllitt 1993, Flynn 1999: 3). The increasing focus on management as 
control, rather than coordination, in Social Services has, it has been 
argued, led to a significant weakening of the professional links between 
managers and professional street-level staff, to the point where they are 
now distinct, antagonistic groups with very different concerns (Howe. 1986, 
iggiia, b, 1996, Hadley and Clough 1996, jones1999,2001). 
This argument draws on a larger literature, which points to the growing 
power of manageriýlism in the public sector: that is, the introduction from 
the commercial, private sector of business approaches to the management 
and organisation of services. Managerialism is associated with the focus on 
output, control of costs (often summarised as efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy), responsiveness to the business environment (especially 
consumers) and innovation and risk-taking. These attributes are seen to be 
central to the idea of a manager who is free to make the decisions 
necessary to get the job done (POllitt 1993, James 1994, Clarke and 
Newman 1997). Managerialism took on its current significance in Brit 
following the election of the Conservative government in . 1979, which 
promoted it as a 'natural solution' to the iffs of the welfare bureaucracy-. 
... 'better management' sounds sober, neutral, as unopposable as 
virtue itself Given the recent history of public-service expansion 
the productivity logic has a power of its own which stands 
independently of the political programme of the new right. Yet 
simultaneously, for new right believers, better management provides 
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a label under which private-sector disciplines can be introduced into 
the public sector, political control strengthened, budgets trimmed, 
professional autonomy reduced, public sector unions weakened and 
a quasi-competitive framework erected to flush out the 'natural' 
inefficiencies of bureaucracy (Pollitt . 1993: 49)- 
Two Views ofManagerialism 
While the phenomenon of managerialism is widely recognised, it is 
possible to identify two strands of analysis within the literature examnung 
the impact of managerialism. on public services such as Social Services. The 
'domination' analysis focuses on the increased power of managers within 
Social Services, and characterises managers as committed to the 
organisation for which they work (rather than to the profession from 
which they come) and as motivated by a concern to implement and enforce 
hierarchicafly directed policy. In contrast, the 'discursive' strand of 
analysis suggests the potential continuation, alongside an increasingly 
powerful managerialist discourse, of professional concerns and 
practices, -a bureau-professional discourse-in which, for instance, 
management may be consultative and concerned with support and 
accountability, as opposed to just punitive. The 'domination' perspective 
of managerialism presents managers and professionals as distinct 
occupational groups: practitioners as workers doing the bidding of 
managers, managers as creatures of the organisation, with corporate 
authority and identity. 
These two approaches to understanding the impact of managerialism on 
public services are underpinned by two different conceptualisations of 
power. From the domination perspective, managers now have power, and 
practitioners do not; managers are in control and can command and direct 
powerless practitioners, who are bound to comply because of their 
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powerlessness. This is power as something that is exercised over others: it 
is domination, radically asymmetrical and irrevocable. Authors adopting 
this position draw on a range of analytic frameworks. Howe (iggia: 218), 
for instance, drawing on Law (1986), adopts a Foucauldian analysis, in 
which managers discipline workers as drilled and reliable automata Oid 
256), while Jones's position emphasises a Marxist analysis that 
characterises managers operating power as the clients of the New Right 
(jones. iggg). The result for both, however, is the same: practitioners are 
controlled by managers through surveillance and threat (Howe 1986, iggia, 
Jones 1999) and by procedures: 'Rules, resources, and routines can define 
what a social worker might do in a situation without a manager looking 
over her shoulder'(Howe iggia: 218). 
The discursive managerialist approach to power is significantly different, 
emphasising power's fragmentary and dispersed nature and seeing it 
everywhere and at all levels in the organisation. This analysis of power and 
discursive subjection is critical of approaches which 'treat such strategies 
[of controll as though they worked rather than as attempts to achieve their 
desired results' (Clarke and Newman 1997: Y). Leonard, for instance, 
criticises the idea of power in bureaucratic organisations as an 'iron-cage' 
of constraint. This notion of power characterises the organisation quite 
differently: a set of ideas, practices and relations which are supported by 
particular interests but which are also subject to challenge and subversion 
(Leonard 
-7997: 90-92)- 
Discursive managerialism, like Howe's version of domination 
managerialism, has been influenced by Foucault's analysis of power, but it 
draws more on Foucault's later analysis of power than on his earlier works 
(Clarke and Newman 1997: 3o-3i). Foucault's earlier work approaches 
power as a 'juridico-, discursive' force that can be seen as external, top- 
down, law-like domination (Foucault ig8i: 82). However, in his later work 
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Foucault comes to accept the criticism that this approach is problematic, 
particularly in that his analysis is based on the contradiction of dismissing 
the idea of freedom and agency while at the same time relying on the idea 
of freedom for the critical force of his position (Foucault ig8i: 81-86, 
McNay 1994: 127)- In his History of Sexuality, Foucault explicitly 
reformulates the notion of power in line with this self-critical analysis of 
his work, and puts forward a view of power that, he argues, better fits his 
analytic method. This account of power contrasts the earlier, top-down 
view of power with the reformulated view of power as bubbling up from 
street-level: 
By power, I do not mean 'Power' as a group of institutions and 
mechanisms that insure the subservience of the citizens of a given 
state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, 
in contrast to violence, has the form of rule. Finally, I do not have in 
mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over 
another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, 
pervade the entire social body ... It seems to me that power must 
be 
understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organisation; as a process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens and reverses 
them; as the support which these forces find in one another, thus 
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and 
contradictions which isolate them from one another; and 
lastly, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied 
in 
the state apparatus, in the formulation of law, in the various social 
hegemonies (Foucault ig8i: 92-93). 
In this later account, power and freedom are intertwined: power relations 
are understood as contingent, fluid and reversible 
(McNay 1994: 128). 
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In contrast to the first (domination) strand of managerial analysis, this 
discursive approach identifies tensions around the aim of managers to 
control practitioners, while also seeking to engage professional expertise 
and commitment (Newman and Clarke 1994: 29, HarriS2003: 64-65). 
These tensions create ground for: 
... struggle between regimes. They produce new focal points of 
resistance, compromise and accommodation ... managerialism has 
shifted the terms of reference on which confficts and tensions 
around social welfare are fought out both within and beyond 
organisations. If managerialism is not yet'hegemonic'in the sense 
of having established itself as the uncontested regime of social 
welfare, it is nevertheless the dominant force in the field (Clarke and 
Newman 
. 1997: 76-77)- 
From the domination perspective, Jones and Howe identify the 
establishment of the new Social Services departments in the 1970s as the 
key point in the rise of management and its separation from professional 
concerns. Professionals and managers were no longer employed in small 
departments where they shared similar concerns and outlooks, as they 
were in the pre-Seebohm mental welfare, children's and welfare 
departments. Instead managers became part of large bureaucracies, where 
they focused on developing the skills to run these organisations. Howe, for 
instance, talks about managers becoming more businesslike, going on high- 
powered training courses and becoming saturated with business wisdom 
(Howe iggia: . 158)- 
Jones points to the presence of an increasingly careerist 
management cadre in Social Services and this group's growing concern 
with personal advancement and embrace of the New Right agenda, in 
terms of accepting the reduced role of the local state, moving away from 
direct provision and supporting the imposition of market principles in 
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Social Services (Jones 1999: 48). 
By contrast, the 'discursive' perspective locates managers at the 
intersection of discourses of power which define their role and their 
relationships with the street-level staff they supervise in very different 
ways: managers may or may not subscribe to managerialism; they are likely 
to be struggling with and operating within discourses of professionalism as 
well as managerialism (Clarke and Newman 1997: 77)- 
These two accounts of managerialism and its relations with 
professionalism bring out different issues in terms of understanding the 
application of street-level bureaucracy to the analysis of discretion. 
Paradoxically, in the light of Howe's critique, the domination perspective 
bears strong similarities to the way in which Lipsky characterises the 
nature and role of management in street-level bureaucracies-although it 
fails to recognise, as Lipsky does, the essential limitations of management 
power. The second (discursive) perspective, however, presents more of a 
challenge, calling for a more nuanced analysis of the role that managers 
play, their motivation and the nature of the relationships that they develop 
with staff in their teams. This account, while seeing an increasing focus on 
management concerns, locates it within a context of a weakened but 
continuing culture of professionalism in Social Services and points to the 
tension and contradictions that this creates for understanding the 
operation of discretion. 
The Nature(s) of Management: Reviewing the Evidence 
F-r'%I 
I he foregoing discussion emphasises the need to analyse the nature of 
management in order to understand practitioner discretion. Discretion is 
located within the relationship between managers and practitioners, rather 
than being an attribute of one or the other. Management within Social 
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Services is a relatively under-re searched area. Many of the empirical 
studies that do consider managers presume a unity of management. The 
National Institute of Social Work (NISW) study of Social Services work 
undertaken in the mid-iggos, for instance, distmiguishes between different 
areas of work within Social Services-fieldwork, residential care and 
domiciliary-but treats management within these different areas as a 
distinct and unified category (Balloch et al. iqqqb: 7). However, other 
studies of Social Services suggest that it is, in fact, a segmented category. A 
consistent distinction emerging from research studies is that between local 
operational management and central strategic management (Parsloe and 
Stevenson 
-1978, 
Satyamurti19Si, PithouseiggS, Harris irgg8a, b, 2003)- 
This distinction is useful in examining the evidence, as it will allow us to 
identify any differences between the two levels of management and also 
assess how well this distinction still holds in the context of contemporary 
Social Services. 
The domination perspective account of managers focuses on senior 
managers as the powerful organisational actors, and tends to equate 
'manager'with free and powerful senior Social Services managers (Howe 
1986: 130) 1511 19gib: 159, Nixon 1993: 207-208). There is a paucity of 
research into senior management in Social Services, but in the broader 
body of empirical evidence on policy implementation and Social Services 
organisation, there is some support for the view which domination 
managerialism (and Lipsky) puts forward: that senior managers'primary 
identification is with the organisation rather than with social work as a 
profession. A persistent theme in the research literature is that, 
historically, there is a gWf between local teams-field-level workers and 
their managers (Satyamurti ig8i, Parsloe and Stevenson 1978, Pithouse 
1998, Harris igg8a, b)-and senior managers, certainly from the point of 
view of the local teams, with senior managers often viewed as alien: 'Social 
workers did not view the organization outside the area teams as an object 
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of loyalty or identification. They viewed it as a source of frustration or, at 
best, as devoid of meaning' (Satyamurti 19811: 35). However, according to 
research into the views of senior managers in local government, including 
Social Services directors, they may also see themselves as professional 
advocates for their department within the organisation (Laffm and Young 
1990: 110-113). 
Kirkpatrick, who looks at management reforms in Social Services in the 
late z9gos (Kirkpatrick2002), finds that, in all seven of the authorities 
examined, managers often have to struggle with ambiguous and conflicting 
policy demands (ibid, 34), and that they respond to these in different ways 
for different reasons. While he finds some examples of senior managers 
taking a clear managerial stance-calling for 'corporacy' and '... one view, 
one aim, one statement... ' (an assistant director quoted in ibid, 35)-he also 
finds numerous examples of managers responsive to professional concerns 
about how to provide the best service (ibid- A 39)- 
In another major implementation study, Lewis and Glennerster question 
the suggestion (made by Nixon -1993) that'... managers who 
have wanted to 
shed their professional association with social work have had reason to 
welcome the changes'. Their findings suggest a range of attitudes to the 
professional culture of social work within Social Service. Some managers 
express impatience with this professional culture, while others-including 
some who were not themselves social workers-remain committed to it 
(Lewis and Glennerster. T996: 2o5). Furthermore, while many managers see 
managerial approaches as a way of realising the goals of community care, 
standardisation of organisational procedures are used as much to promote 
good professional practice as to constrain it (Lewis and Glennester1996: 
205). This view, that procedures and policies propagated by managers 
reflect shared professional concerns, is also identified by Robinson(2003). 
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Kirkpatrick and Lewis and Glennerster's studies also call into question the 
view that senior managers approach their instructions from policy-makers 
with an unproblematic, literal reading and seek to implement them within 
their commitment to a management approach. Kirkpatrick, for instance, 
points out that they have to negotiate conflicting demands and local 
political, organisational and professional structures in formulating policy 
(Kirkpatrick2002: 41-43). 
The admittedly fragmentary picture that emerges of senior managers from 
these studies calls into question the image presented by Lipsky and 
domination managerialism of autonomous management cadres within 
Social Services, acting as loyal implementers of a clear policy direction, 
distanced from professional concerns. Some managers may see themselves 
and seek to act in the way suggested by the domination perspective, but 
the evidence suggests that this stance is neither so extensive nor so 
consistent as to justify the street-level bureaucracy perspective and the 
domination managerialism portrayal of (senior) managers without any 
commitment to professional ideals. 
The presentation of managers as a distinct group -managers, not 
professionals-does not reflect the more complex picture of the nature of 
senior management in Social Services suggested in the research evidence. 
Another problematic aspect of this binary approach is the picture of 
(senior) managers and practitioners with middle managers and supervisors 
as ciphers between fieldworkers and the 'strong but remote managers' 
(Howe 1986: 162). This fAs to recognise: that management in Social 
Services departments is multi-layered and that within Social Services 
'management' there are not only senior managers but also middle managers 
and supervisors, who are significant actors; that conflict can exist between 
management layers, and that there may also be alliances between managers 
and street-level practitioners (Harris igg8a, b). Hugman, for instance, 
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notes that within the complex environment of professional concerns and 
organisational priorities: '... the team leaders are regarded by more senior 
managers as well as by practitioners as occupying the borders between the 
two worlds, a position imbued with ambiguities' (Hugman 1991: 77). The 
significance of this is that the focus on managers at senior level ignores 
what is, for most practitioners, their main experience of 
management--day-to-day supervision at team level (Seden and Reynolds 
2003)-and does not engage with the possibility that these subordinate 
managerial actors may not just carry out the work of surveillance and 
policy policing in compliance with the goals of 'the managers', but are 
themselves 'active shapers of the way initiatives develop', making sense of 
policies and procedures in terms of their own understanding of the 
organisation (Balogun and Johnson2005: 1596). 
Freidson points out that, at first and second management level, 
professionalism has a strong influence in organisations that employ 
professionals (Freidson 1994: 138). Unlike the health service, where 
management is a distinct organisational group, in Social Services 
Departments social workers have tended to be managed by fellow 
professionals (Pahl iE994). While official statistics do not give information 
on the professional background of front-line managers, reviews of job 
advertisements in the press suggest that this continues to be the case. A 
recent study examines 40 job descriptions and personal specifications for 
front-line managers in Social Services, and finds that employers mostly 
seek professional qualifications and that: 'There was little evidence of 
employers prioritising management expertise rather than professionally 
defined skiffs, abilities and experience' (Henderson and Seden 2003: 87)- 
The line between managers and workers is more, blurred than the 
domination and street-level bureaucracy perspectives suggest and many 
front-line managers occupy hybrid roles that cross the 
manager/professional divide (Causer and Exworthy iggg: 84-85). Part of 
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the domination managerialism argument, however, is that, on becoming 
managers, qualified professionals jettison their backgrounds, suggesting 
that we need to look beyond those backgrounds in order to gain a sense of 
their commitments (Howe 1986, iggia, Nixon 1993). 
Many local social work managers are professionals and this raises 
interesting questions about the way they see themselves as managers and 
how they view practitioner discretion. In a recent text book for front-line 
managers, they are characterised as being guided by'... the values and 
ethics of social care, while at the same time meeting the requirements of 
government, employers and policy makers' (Seden and ReynoldS2003: xiv)- 
Reynolds also emphasises the need to recognise the professional dimension 
of managerneritt'... there are links between practising and managing, and ... 
new managers should not only be able to build on some of their practice 
skills but also have responsibility to maintain a commitment to practice in 
managing other people's practice' (Reynolds 20133- 32)- 
Evidence from a number of studies suggests that local managers conform 
to the, domination view of managers as a separate cadre. hostile to 
professional discretion. Since the mid-ig8os, and with increasing 
emphasis, researchers have identified significant changes in the behaviour 
and orientation of local managers, reflected in a tendency for managers to 
exercise increasing control of Professional practice and to focus on the 
enforcement of corporate concerns, usually rationing resources (Howe 
1.986, Nixon '1993, Pahl 1994). Within Social Services the community care 
reforms in the early 19gos, which now form the basis of state social care for 
adults, were widely seen as a sea change in the role of Social Serivces 
managers: 
As well as a more prescribed and rigid role for front-line workers, a 
more prominent part was expected of their superiors. It has 
been 
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recognised that front line managers offered an opportunity to 
complete such roles as regulating the duties of subordinates, survey 
the stricter eligibility (for services) criteria applied to clients during 
assessment, and also guard finite resources against claims for 
assistance from outside (Carey 20()3:. 122)- 
In a study of care management in the mid-iggos, Harris observes that 
operational managers have developed a 'business orientation'with close 
scrutiny of practice, particularly focusing the use of resources and worker 
productivity, using procedures and information technology. He also points 
to the changing basis of recruitment of practitioners into management, 
having changed from professional qualities as a practitioner (Harris 1998a: 
849) to an ability to manage budgets and information systems (ibid 856). 
Pithouse, in the mid-iggos, finds a changing focus to work and its 
supervision: 'care' and 'relationship'work within the team is now largely 
the responsibility of unqualified staff For qualified staff and managers the 
priority is child protection work-legal, technical and focused on 
risk-and this is the focus of supervisory oversight (Pithouse 1998: 116). 
Hadley and Clough also report an increasingly tense relationship between 
practitioners and managers. They find that managers and professional 
workers seem to inhabit different worlds-the former a world of efficiency, 
value for money, objectives achieved; the latter a world of crises in services, 
impossible pressures and inability to deliver (Hadley and Clough,. r996: 
195). 'The result is that the majority of the workers in our sample find the 
behaviour of their organisations increasingly confusing and difficult to 
understand or predict, and become suspicious and cynical about the 
motives, pronouncements and actions of managers' (Fladley and Clough, 
1996: 187). 
Carey also finds that managers are generally unpopular with the 
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practitioners who have day-to-day contact with them, who describe them 
as strict or incompetent (Carey 2003: 127-1128), and Pahl observes that 
there is now a chasm between social workers and their managers (Pahl 
1994). While social workers tend to gain most satisfaction from their 
direct work with clients, the managers tend to gain satisfaction from 
organising well (Balloch et al. 1995: 95). 
However, alongside evidence of conflict between local managers and local 
practitioners studies also suggest, in line with the discursive perspective, 
that local managers can also be critical and question the priorities of the 
organisation for which they work, and retain a professional commitment. 
Carey, for instance, finds that managers express frustration with the 
policies of their organisation. and sympathy for the difficulties staff 
experience in a context of resource constraint (Carey 2003: 128-129). 
Pithouse also finds that team leaders are sensitive to the pressure on their 
staff and seek to lessen the impact of supervison on staff, protecting their 
supervisees from 'the intrusive gaze' of senior managers (Pithouse 1998: 
-113)- 
A striking finding of the NISW study of the social care workforce (Balloch 
et al. r995, r999a) is the ambivalence amongst many managers about the 
organisation for which they work. Managers feel as disempowered as social 
workers in their work-with only about a third of each group feeling 
satisfied with the amount of influence they have in the organisation 
(Balloch et al. 1999c: i8q), and with two-thirds of both groups equally 
frustrated by a failure to meet the service users'needs (McLean iggg: 68). 
Over a third of managers feel that their values are different from those of 
the organisation--only a slightly lower percentage than for field social 
workers (Balloch et aL 1995: 87)- 
The NISW study also calls into question the idea of the transformation of 
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practitioners when they become managers. It finds that preparation for 
the management role and commitment to the organisation's values is 
patchy amongst managers, who feel insufficiently trained and ill-prepared 
for their role (Balloch et al. 1995: iv). Fewer than 50 % of the managers 
interviewed say they received any support from experienced managers 
when they first started in their role, and only a third have received any 
initial training (ibid. 53); only a quarter of the managers interviewed have or 
are studying for a management qualification (Balloch 1999: r52)- 
Another source of evidence for the domination point of view seems to be 
the increasing proceduralisation of practice. However, if management 
continues to have a significant professional element within it, then 
increasing numbers of procedures may include a strong professional 
element. Procedures and guidance, viewed from this perspective, are not 
necessarily alien to professional social work practice, but can, in fact, 
support it, while stiff exerting a form of control. Procedures can be 
professional tools, ensuring good practice, and supporting expertise 
(Baldwin200o, Kirkpatrick2002, Robinson2003)-I The empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. Management concerns have become increasingly 
prevalent within Social Services, but there is also conflict between local 
managers and local practitioners. However, the idea of managers shedding 
their professional concerns and becoming exclusively organisational 
creatures is called into question. Treating management as an homogenous 
category fails to recognise the different experiences and perspectives of 
different levels of management (Harris 1998a, b); dilutes issues associated 
with the management of particular work groups such as professionals; 
and-related to this point-obscures the different quality and nature of 
relationship between management and workers in different settings. 
i This brings out anotheFZ. mension in the analysis of discretion. Here, 
procedures can be seen as n ht professional practice, identified by a 
I; 
r1f 
rofessional oup collective i as the appropriate way to act-self-reoation; but For 
individulp(ractitioners, t 
Key 
can be constraints on discretion, where practice 
is contrary to good professional practice. 
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The discussion up to this point has considered the broad issues of the 
nature of Social Services as an organisation, specifically the impact of 
managerialism. and the continuing influence of professionalism in the 
structuring of discretion and the relationship between street4evel workers 
and managers. The literature points to managerialism having had a 
significant impact on Social Services as an organisation. However, this has 
not invalidated the relevance of Lipsky's analysis, because Lipsky's view of 
street-level bureaucracies entails seeing bureaucracy as a managerial 
organisation (see page 44). A debate exists, nevertheless, about the nature 
of managerialism, which raises questions about the application of the 
street-level bureaucracy perspective to Social Services, but in quite a 
different way from the criticism of Howe and domination 
managerialism-namely, citing the continuing influence of 
professionalism, and challenging the idea of management as a separate 
occupational cadre. This argument, put forward by proponents of the 
discursive perspective, highlights the continuing potential of 
professionalism to influence discretion and management Oversight. 
PROFESSIONALISM INMANAGERIALISED SOCIAL 
SERVICES: STILL GOING OR GONE? 
The preceding analysis points to different regimes of discretion within 
Social Services; that is, different systems of relationships and power 
between managers and practitioners which influence the level of 
practitioner freedom. Alongside the street-level bureaucracy perspective 
outlined in the preceding chapter, two other analyses have emerged: 
domination managerialism and discursive managerialism. The distinction 
between the two arises from the way in which the encroachment of 
managerialism is understood against the backdrop of the idea of bureau- 
professionalism. Bureau-professionalism refers to the combination of 
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organising principles of bureaucracy and professionalism in Social Services 
during the first decades following their establishment in the wake of the 
Seebohm report. Social Services, while located within the bureaucratic 
structure of local authorities, were strongly influenced by professional 
principles of organisation, emphasising professional supervisors as 
supportive colleagues rather than directive managers, and professional staff 
operating with a significant degree of discretion, trusted by fellow 
professionals who occupied the significant hierarchical posts within Social 
Services as an organisation (Stevenson 1978, Parry and Parry 1979, Clarke 
1996, Harris igg8a, b, Payne20o5). The difference between the 
domination and discursive approaches to managerialism focuses on 
whether or not they see it as a clear break with this mode of organisation 
within Social Services. 
The domination approach characterises managerialism as a conclusion 
(Howe 1986, iggia, b, 1996, Pahl -1994, 
jonesr999 and2001). Managers are 
the winners in a zero-sum game: 
Except in matters of style, all the substantive elements of their 
[social workersl work are determined by others, either directly in 
the form of managerial command or indirectly through the 
distribution of resources, departmental policies and procedures, and 
ultimately the framework of statutes and legislation that create both 
welfare clients and welfare agencies (Howe i[ggia: 204). 
Managers are now the key actors in Social Services, interpreting laws and 
policies and controlling workers-both by means of a 
hierarchy of control 
and through an hegemonic control of the social work world view 
(although 
ideological hegemony, Howe argues, is more prevalent in older persons' 
services, while overt management control is more evident 
in child care 
settings where: 'Behaviours are judged, 
laws invoked and procedures 
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applied'(Howe 1986: 131). 
In contrast to this point of view, the discursive perspective casts 
managerialism as a continuing process, within which there is resistance 
and challenge. This more tentative analysis characterises managerialism as 
an 4 ... emergent culture of control which involves a shift from a professional 
to a fmancial/business orientation amongst managers, a focus on the 
management of scarce resources and the intensive surveillance of social 
work practice through the use of procedures both paper and computerised 
and intrusive supervision -- -', while also recognismig that: '... the impact of 
these developments is likely to be uneven and, at least in some cases, may 
be open to negotiation... ' (Harris, igg8a, 856-858)- Managerialism is seen as 
changing, overlaying and altering existing professionalised structures, 
rather than replacing them. Leonard (1[997), for instance, identifies the 
practice of discipline as a central method of managerialist control. Control 
of discourse is used to reshape discretion rather than to get rid of it. What 
may feel like discretion is, in fact, restricted within the ideas of what is 
acceptable, through assumptions that are imposed and enforced. However, 
actors are not seen as simply passive; they are also able to resist and 
challenge and subvert managerialism (Leonard 1997: 92)- 
In short, for the domination perspective, professionalism is no longer a 
significant factor in Social Services; managerialism. has caused a seismic 
shift across Social Services, resulting in managers attaining control. In 
contrast, the discursive perspective presents a more complex and varied 
picture of change in which professionals retain some control, to a lesser or 
greater extent, alongside managers; and in which managers may be 
influenced by professional as well as managerial concerns. These, then, are 
the broad approaches of domination and discursive managerialism 
analysts. Their application to the specific areas of social work discretion 
within Social Services will now be examined in more detail. 
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A significant difference for the analysis of discretion that emerges from 
these different strands in the literature on managerialism in Social Services 
is an analysis of the extent to which discretion has been removed from 
professionals. One strand of this literature argues that social work is no 
longer a profession because it is not autonomous, due to both the extent 
and effectiveness of external controls and the way in which managerial 
ideas are now embedded and taken for granted (domination). Here, 
professionalism is presented in 'either/or' terms: either social work is 
autonomous-a profession-or it has no real freedom of decision-making 
and is not a professional occupation. The other 
strand---discursive-adopts a more nuanced view and recognises that, 
while practitioners may be subject to increasing controls--external and 
ideological-this does not exclude the possibility of professional discretion 
in their work, or of subverting the control of managers, albeit to a lesser 
degree than in the past. 
Key authors in the domination literature, such as Howe and Jones, focus 
on the growing strategies and techniques of managers to control 
practitioners and the profession (such as procedures, guidance and tick 
charts) as real limitations on social workers' traditional discretion. Jones 
points to evidence of increasing regulation of practice by central 
government and local managers, and emphasises the feeling amongst 
practitioners that their work is now governed by paperwork and 
procedures, and a frustration arising from the sense that they are no longer 
respected and trusted within the organisation IjonesI999,2001). 
This perspective characterises managerialism as managers in control: the 
victors in a conflict between managers and social work professionals over 
power within Social Services-which the professionals have lost (Howe, 
1986, iggia, 1996, Pahl, 1994 andjones1999,2001). Managers have power 
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and have used it to disempower and control professional staff-, power is 
understood as domination and control. Managers, sponsored by the New 
Right Gones 1999), have played and won the occupational power game: 
'The recent spate of legislation related to Social Services has created heavy 
work loads for managers, but it has also given them power in a way which 
many have found quite exhilarating' (Pahl 1994: 2o6). In contrast, social 
workers as an occupational group have now failed in their professional 
project (Lymbery -1998a). Social workers have failed to gain status and 
discretion, and are now subject to management control, to the point of 
being no more than drones (Howe 1986: 157). 'Less and less', in Howe's 
view, '... is the social worker expected, or indeed allowed, to make an 
independent, on the spot judgement or diagnosis of what is the matter. 
Less and less is the social worker likely to respond with a tailor-made, 
professional intervention based on his or her own knowledge and skills. 
There is a move from reason to rote'(Howe 1996: 93-94)- 
Discourse managerialism does not equate managerialism with managers in 
the same way. Rather than managerialism being the conclusion of a 
strategy of domination that has wiped away professional discretion, the 
discourse perspective sees managerialism as a dynamic process affecting all 
occupational groups within Social Services-managers as much as social 
workers-and identifies professionalism as a site of resistance to and 
possible adaptation of managerialism (Clarke et al. 2ooo: 8-9). It is 
another stratum in the geology of the organisation, which, rather than 
replacing what has gone before, is laid upon it, with the two 
interpenetrating each other to different degrees, in different ways, and in 
different settings (Clarke and Newman -1997: 76-77). 
There is a range of 
management styles, from the neo-Taylorist control and the crude market 
approaches of Thatcherism to an emphasis on processes and relationships 
through empowering partnership models (POlfitt -1993). 
But behind these 
differences in style is a shared discourse: the commitment to the goal of 
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the intensification of labour, seeing work identified and measured in terms 
of commitment to organisational performance, which'... foregrounds the 
calculus of "efficiency" and "performance" as the frame of reference for 
organisational action' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 64). However, these 
managerial ideas are not hegemonic- , sweeping all other perspectives aside 
(ibid- 73) 77). Rather, managerialism is seen as seeking to reconstruct state 
social work in various ways Ubid 76), through processes that are not 
uniform but are dynamic, interactive and shifting according to specific 
conditions (ibid 75). Managerialism. has not swept away professional 
power, but is seeking to contain and channel the discretion that has been 
an historic feature of field social work in Social Services (Harris -T998a). 
These two approaches to the analysis of managerialism share a sense of an 
historical shift. However, they differ in terins of how they characterise the 
nature of this shift and its impact on professionalism. They also differ in 
their characterisation of the idea of discretion. 
The Nature of Professional Freedom 
The idea of 'professional' is difficult to pin down but tends to involve an 
occupational group that has a degree of recognition and status-often 
based on its knowledge claims, organisation and norms of practice-giving 
it a greater ability than non-professional groups to guide and direct its own 
work (Freidson . 1994, 
Noon and BlytOn 2002: 210-2). Within this 
definition, analysts disagree on the level of control over 
work-discretion-that constitutes a defining characteristic of a 
profession (Noon and Blyton2002: 210-212). 
What is clear is that 
professionals are widely understood as workers who are authorised to act 
with a degree of freedom from external control in their work 
(EvettS 2002): 
-h- authors allude to Gramsci s vie-wr of hegemony as the temporary 2- Here te 
achievement of an equilibrium, which is, 
however, liable to disruption (Clarke 
and Newman 1997: 140-41). 
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In Anglo-American social systems, the occupational control of work 
has been a defining characteristic of that special category of 
occupations called professions. Professional workers have been 
characterized as having autonomy both in respect of their 
professional judgments and decision-making, and in respect of their 
immunity from regulation or evaluation by others (ibid. 341)- 
However, discretion and autonomy are very different ideas: autonomy 
suggests a complete freedom of action while discretion suggests a more 
restricted freedom to act within a framework (Dworkin 1978, EvettS 2002: 
345). Furthermore, as Dworkin points out, there are gradations of freedom 
within discretion; it is not an 'either or' notion (Dworkin 1978: 33). 
The domination managerialism perspective equates professionalism with 
autonomy and presents the shift in control to managers within Social 
Services as seismic, wiping away professionalism. Jones exemplifies this 
position and also illustrates its central problem: the idea of an historical 
golden age (Harris -T998b). 
He contrasts the current imposition of 
managerialism with the ig8os, when social workers had discretion to act, 
and management regulation was focused on the constraint of radical 
practice (Jones 2001: 555). However, in 1983 Jones was arguing that the 
organisation of Social Services undermined professional discretion as such 
(Jones 1983: 132) in contrast to earlier times, when managers were only 
concerned with restraining discretion where there was a risk that social 
workers would go 'native' [sicl (Jones 1983: 131)- 
In contrast, the discursive managerialism account focuses on 
professionalism as discretion, the continuation of a degree of freedom; it 
sees managerialism seeking to reshape the historical bureau-professional 
culture of Social Services (Harris, igg8a). This culture emphasises a 
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parochial professional loyalty at fieldwork team level, and the distrust of 
senior managers (Parsloe and Stevenson 1978, Satyamurti19Sr, Pithouse 
1998, Harris 1998a, b). Management control of staff is noticeably light, 
with a wide-ranging acceptance by managers of discretion and autonomy 
amongst professional staff (Hams -1998a: 849)- Managers in this context 
tend to characterise themselves in professional terms-for instance, in 
their approach to supervision, which is seen as a consultation between 
equals (Harris 1998a: 849). In a similar vein, Pithouse concludes that local 
managers see their role as nurturing and protecting practitioners and their 
service ideals against central interference, keeping a safe distance between 
the team and senior managers (Pithouse 1998: 97). This is not to say that 
practitioners are totally free to act as they choose. Newman and Clarke, 
for instance, identify three ways in which managerialism has reshaped 
the place and power of bureau-professionalism: displacement, 
subordination and co-option' (Clarke and Newman 1997: 76). 
Displacement-the total control of professionals (as suggested by the 
domination perspective)-is rare. More often, managerial influence can be 
seen in professional subordination: 'This takes the form of framing the 
exercise of professional judgement by the requirement that it takes 
account of the "realities and responsibilities" of budgetary 
management-need is now disciplined by managerial calculus' Ubid 76); or 
co-option: 'This refers to managerial attempts to colonise the terrain of 
professional discourse, constructing articulations between professional 
concerns and languages and those of management' Ubid- 76). 
Managerialism, then, in the discourse perspective, is seen as 
reconstructing professional discretion rather than abolishing it. While 
these processes are widespread, they do not operate in a uniform way 
(Clarke and Newman 1997: 75-76), but are varying in different situations, 
interacting with particular contexts and shifting according to specific 
conditions. The following section will consider the evidence from research 
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studies about the nature of social work discretion within Social Services. 
Social Work Discretion in Social Services: The Evidence 
Lipsky describes the common basis of street-level bureaucrats) discretion 
as their work in street-level bureaucracies, where freedom arises from 
policy confusion and resource inadequacy. Managers in this context are 
both limited in their ability to control this freedom and, to some extent, in 
collusion with it, in order to get work done (Lipskyiq8o). The two strands 
in managerialist analysis indicate two other different ways of 
understanding social work discretion within Social Services. The 
domination strand is less sceptical of managers'claims to control in the 
street-level bureacracy perspective. On the other hand, the discursive 
perspective alerts us to the continuing influence of professional social work 
discretion within Social Services, suggesting more caution in applying the 
street-level bureaucracy framework without some adaptation to local 
circumstances. 
Over the past decade a wide-ranging literature has developed which has 
detailed the increasingly significant role and power of managers in Social 
Services and its impact on professional social work. This literature, 
covering the curtailment of discretion, offers support for the domination 
view of the demise of professional discretion in social work (Pahl Ir994, 
Simic 1[995, Hadley and Clough 1996, Harris igg8a, b, La Valle and Lyons 
igg8a, igg8b, Lymbery igg8b, 2000, Irving and Gertig iggg, jones iggg, 
2001) POStlC 2001,2002, Carey 2003, HarziS, 2003)- Within this literature 
there is a growing body of empirical research which substantiates and 
illustrates the significant impact of managerial control of professional 
practice, particularly in terms of the curtailment of social workers' 
professional discretion (Hadley and Clough 1996, Harris igg8a, joneS2001, 
Carey 2003)- 
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Researchers have identified a significant shift in the role of social workers, 
who have become care managers, and this is seen as having undermined 
professional discretion. Jones (2001), for instance, who surveys 5o 
practitioners working in local authorities in the North of England, argues 
that the traditional role of social worker, focusing on the needs of clients, 
has been distorted by managers, who have sought to control practice and 
have transformed social work, imposing 'hard-nosed commercial logic' 
(ibid 56o), a process in which: 
... the contact [with service usersl is more fleeting, more regulated 
and governed by demands of the forms which shape much of their 
interaction ... I was told [by his intervieweesl that social workers 
were pressured to be speedy in their assessments, limit the contact 
with the potential client and get in and out quickly.. Oid 533). 
Hadley and Clough (1996), who, in a study of the implementation of the 
NHS and Community Care Act (r9go), interviewed community care 
practitioners in settings including social work, find that: 'In the Social 
Services, the split between purchasing and providing imposed an 
immediate reduction in both discretion and autonomy by splitting the role 
of the social worker' (ibid MO. 
A consistent theme arising from these studies is that professionals are now 
facing greater scrutiny and control of their activities by managers who 
emphasise social workers' accountability to the organisation: '... our 
interviewees are also aware of the influence of the development of a new 
form of scientific management that sees detailed information on workers' 
activities as an essential prerequisite for controlling the organisation' (ibid 
1186-187). This theme, that social workers are now being subject to close 
monitoring through information systems and close supervisory control to 
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ensure financial and productivity expectations, is also identified by Harris 
in a small-scale study of the impact of community care reforms on social 
workers (Harris igg8a: 856,858). 
Jones(20oi), encapsulating these themes, paints a picture of a work 
environment that is no longer professional-that is less trusting, more 
highly regulated and more mundane (ibid 552); one of his interviewees 
claims that: now everything is controlled and other people make the 
key decisions and feed it back to you to implement. It all seems to be 
about covering people's backs and saving money"' (ibid 555-556). 
Finally, Carey, in a recent study of care managers, also finds that routines 
and procedures have been imposed on practitioners which have 
bureaucratised their practice (Carey 2003: 125). Managerial routines, he 
finds, not only structure work and discretion but facilitate monitoring and 
surveillance of practitioners by managers. He points out that, within this 
developing system of control, practitioners have been encouraged to 
recognise their corporate responsibility to organisational goals of 
efficiency and economy, and that the world of the practice is increasingly 
dominated by budget restrictions Ubid 129). 
The picture painted by the research so far reviewed appears to confirm the 
domination perspective, in that managers are increasingly assertive in 
seeking to control practice and have succeeded in doing so. However, 
another body of literature presents a different picture of professional 
practice in Social Services, indicating some continuation of social work 
discretion within the context of managerial progress (Lewis and 
Glennerster 1996, Lapsley and Llewellyn 1998, Pithouse 1998, Ellis et al. 
. iggg, 
Kirkpatrick2002, Robinson2003, Bradley 2003). 
Ellis et at (iggg) present a complex picture of local responses to the 
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Community care reforms. Their study of two authorities, which includes 
observing practice, looks at the implementation of the NHS and 
Community Care Act (iggo) in a range of adult social work teams. While 
they find that the community care reforms have had an impact on social 
work practice, this is not consistent; and they point to continuing street- 
level discretion in significant areas of practice. A fiindamental issue they 
identify is that practitioners feel engaged in a struggle between 
maintaining their professionalism and conforming to managerial 
procedures. While in some teams practitioners talk of their continuing 
autonomy, the researchers also observe conformity and identification with 
managerial objectives (ibid. 273,277). Generally they find that operational 
guidance is inconsistently carried out: 'Contrary to the rationalizing thrust 
of both central and local authority guidance ... no common approach to the 
task of determining access to assessment existed amongst teams included 
in this study' (ibid. 277). In addition to continuing discretion in terms of 
interpretation and adaptation of guidance to local circumstances, they also 
find that some teams disregard procedures (ibid274). Teams also vary in 
terms of the level of their resources and the impact this has on their level 
of discretion. Specialist teams, in particular, tend to have more time and 
greater access to resources (including non-Social Services funding), which 
give team members greater professional freedom in terms of their 
approach to practice and the range and level of services they can provide 
Oid- 275)- Paradoxically, though, within these teams better resources also 
enable them to conform to procedures on recording unmet need, which 
the generic and hospital teams fail to do. 
While identifying the continuing extent of social work discretion, Ellis et 
at. are also critical of its use by some practitioners, contrasting those using 
discretion to advance professional norms with others who use it to'... 
reinforce rather than challenge dominant rationing imperatives' (ibid. 277). 
What is interesting here is that Ellis et at. identify continuing professional 
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(dejure), as well as defacto discretion. In another study, conducted by 
Lapsley and Llewellyn (z998), the researchers examine professional 
commitment in discretionary practice and are interested in the extent to 
which the new community care and its ethos of managerial concerns about 
resources influence professional practice. They find that social workers, on 
the whole, continue to demonstrate a commitment to professionalism in 
their use of discretion, while noting that there is some concern for the 
more economic values of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Lewis and Glennerster's (1996) study of the implementation of the 
community care reforms involves a mixture of observational, documentary 
and interview-based research in four local authorities in the south of 
England. While they focus on the strategic process of local 
implementation, they also look at the experience of practitioners of the 
new system and conclude that, while: 'Managerialism has had an effect on 
the exercise of professional discretion' (ibid. 205), this should not be 
exaggerated. Despite practitioners' fears that their work would become 
routine and mechanistic, 'On the whole these extreme fears have not been 
realised. But the transparency of the new transactions, for example the 
visibility of assessment and the resulting service decisions, and the need to 
achieve consistency, for example in respect of eligibility criteria and 
response times, have inevitably required more standardisation of 
professional practice' (ibid205). 
In another major study of community care reforms (Blaud et al. 20 o o) a 
similar picture of increased but limited managerial intrusion into practice 
is presented. An area examined by the research is the autonomy of care 
managers. The researchers find that the least qualified staff tend to have 
the least constraints on their practice-because they tend to work in the 
most routine, low-spending areas of care management (ibid. 129). Qualified 
staff, predominantly social workers, tend to work with complex and 
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resource-intensive cases, and are more subject to management surveillance 
and budgetary controls (ibid 1130)- Using the experience of amendment to 
assessment or care plans as an indicator of autonomy (non-amendment 
equalling greater freedom), they find that, while io% of all care managers 
have had work amended, this risestO 20%for those working with complex 
case s-predominantly social work staff (ibid. 129). They see this as a 
reflection of managers' concerns with control of expenditure. However, 
this still means that 8o% of workers in these complex, resource-intensive 
areas of work have not been subject to the curtailment of discretion 
suggested by the domination perspective. The general picture of discretion 
as it emerges in the study is of a patchwork, both in the nature of 
discretion and in its extent, but with most staff in all areas identifying 
continuing significant freedom in their work (ibid. 128-132)- 
Guidance, as mentioned above, is frequently portrayed in the literature as 
a sign of increasing managerial control and reduced professional discretion. 
Robinson(2003) challenges this view, however. She looks at the impact of 
a structured assessment instrument in a probation setting. Reaction to the 
instrument is mixed-it is seen by some as possibly limiting 
professionalism, but by others as enhancing their professional practice and 
status, promoting quality and backing up their judgement. Rather than 
replacing discretion, Robinson argues, the assessment toot provides a way 
of reinvigorating it; it'... should not be regarded as inherently "anti- 
professional"; advancing technicality, in some circumstances, may lead to 
positive professional outcomes' (ibid. 6o6), supporting a space for clinical 
judgement and discretion. 
The evidence reviewed here points to a complex topography of freedom 
and controL offering support for aspects of arguments suggesting the 
curtailment and the continuation of discretion. As well as evidence of 
continuing defacto discretion, there is also recognition of dejure 
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professional discretion: freedom to act within the organisation based on 
the acceptance of professional claims to expertise. This complex picture is 
encapsulated by Pithouse (1998). He returns after io years to the site of his 
ethnographic study of childcare field social work teams. The original ig8os 
study found that professional discretion was taken for granted in the team. 
While practitioners had little control over services or resources, they 
expected to have a considerable degree of self-regulation of their practice. 
The relationship between professional discretion and management control 
was characterised by loyalty to the team, trust and a commitment to care. 
When Pithouse returns he finds changes but also continuities. The 
relationship between supervisors and practitioners seems more strained. 
Team leaders, while trying to ameliorate the pressures of increased 
departmental supervision of casework (ibid 1113), also have to monitor the 
management of cases more closely Ubid iu6); at the same time team leaders 
feel over-stretched in coping with the demands on them to supervise 
practitioners (ibid. ii8-iiq). Practitioners seek to tread'... a careful line 
between seeking advice from a manager and retaining some autonomy 
around a preferred plan of action, while at the same time not exposing 
herself to risks that might accrue by withholding some aspect or other 
about a case' (ibid r211). 
Pithouse finds that, while for some practitioners, the increased 
involvement of managers in day-to-day issues is difficult, others see their 
involvement as helpful, an acceptable process of scrutiny in which they can 
share responsibility for difficult decisions and complex work (ibid 34)- 
Related to these developments in practice is the changing focus of work. 
'Care' and 'relationship'work within the team is now largely the 
responsibility of unqualified staff For qualified staff and managers the 
priority is child protection work-legal, technical and focused on 
risk-and this is the focus of supervisory oversight (ibidl23)- 
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Interpreting the Evidence 
The argument about the curtailment of discretion is not only concerned 
with the, existence of freedom to make decisions. It also entails an 
evaluation of the nature of this freedom. This is particularly the case in the 
debate between domination and discursive managerialism analyses of 
discretion. 
Domination managerialism's argument about the curtailment of 
discretion weaves together claims that practitioners are not professionals 
because they are not autonomous with the view that practitioners are 
effectively and closely controlled by managers. Jones puts forward a picture 
of the occupational dominance of managers in a context in which: '... what 
is required is a managed workforce with no illusions about professional 
autonomy ... focused on ensuring the "right" conduct on the job' Gones 
1999: 47). However, if we understand professional discretion in terms of 
the more limited idea of freedom within limits, as opposed to autonomy, a 
very different picture emerges, even when we consider the evidence and 
arguments employed by domination authors. 
A key element of Howe's argument involves locating social work within 
one of the three categories of 'professional' in Johnson's analysis of the 
nature of professional power Ijohnson 1972, Howe 1986). Howe places state 
social work in a category that he calls 'third party contror-where a third 
party defines both the nature of needs and the manner in which they are to 
be met (Howe 1986: ii8)-in contrast to Johnson's other two categories of 
6colleague or collegiate' (closely associated with the ideal type of 
professionals as autonomous) and 'client-controlled' profession. 
This characterisation ofjohnson's schema is Problematic. It rePlaces 
Johnson's original title of 'mediated'with the label of 'control' and this 
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account of the category does not acknowledge the capacity for professional 
freedom as well as the bureaucratic control Johnson sees experienced by 
'mediated' professional groups. 
For Johnson this 'mediated' category is where a third party (usually the 
state) intervenes in the relationship between client and professional: 
'Mediation arises where the state attempts to remove from the producer 
or the consumer the authority to determine the content and subjects of 
practice' (Johnson . 1972: 77)- Here professionals have increasingly been 
incorporated into the framework of the state, with a professional hierarchy 
reflecting the organisation's bureaucratic structure (ibid 79). But, Johnson 
points out, differences in organisational structure and location can 
influence the occupation's own self-identification and influence their 
commitment to their bureaucratic role and ability to operate in their 
professional role (ibid. 8z). Johnson identifies social work in local 
authorities as a prime example of a mediated profession (ibid. 77-8o). 
In approaching the evidence of growing management power, the 
domination managerialist analysis sets up an unrealistic standard of 
professional discretion in terms of autonomy and creates a dramatic, but 
false, choice between free-autonomous-professional and unfree-controffed- 
bureaucrat. However, there is good reason for seeing the idea of a 
profession as an occupational group able to control its own work as a 
myth: '... no occupations manifest professional autonomy of this ideal 
typical type. It is also questionable whether historically any ever did, 
although autonomy is retained and persists as a "golden age" image of what 
professional work might entail' (EvettS 2002: 341-342)- 
Setting up the choice between either autonomy or control is too crude. It 
ignores the experience of the vast majority of professionals who are now 
employed by organisations (Freidson 1994: 130)- While professionals are 
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incorporated into the bureaucracy of the organisation, they continue to 
operate with some freedom, even though they are controlled in some 
aspects of their work, in settings where they are often 'loosely coupled' to 
the organisation (ibid 138). Like other street-level bureaucrats, social 
workers are able to practice defacto discretion in their work-as Lipsky 
argues. However, as professionals they are also different from other street- 
level bureaucrats in the degree of freedom that they are able to exercise 
and the extent to which it is formally recognised (ibid -138-. 139)- 
Howe concedes that practitioners retain some freedom in their work, but 
in areas that, in his view, are not significant. First, there are areas of work 
not open to standardisation that call for 'in situ judgement', such as 
counselling, where the practitioner is the only resource available to meet 
the need. Secondly, in areas of work that are not a managerial or political 
priority, the style and manner of work is left to the worker until service 
users begin to exhibit behaviours that are of direct relevance to 
organisational operation-for example, involving resource costs, anti- 
social conduct or threats to physical or developmental well-being (Howe 
iggia: 219). However, Howe argues, the freedom that workers have is not 
significant because it does not relate to the use of resources and key 
practice areas such as the definition of need (ibid2lq). 
Here Howe seems to be saying that social workers do have some freedom, 
but that, because this freedom is not important, they are not autonomous 
and cannot really be seen as having professional discretion. However, the 
areas of freedom he identifies in his own account are significant when we 
look at evidence about areas of recognised and officially sanctioned 
discretion, and are significant in organisational terms. Resources, 
procedures and need are central to community care, and from the 
beginning practitioners are given a significant discretionary role in the 
implementation of the policy and translating it into practice. Professional 
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judgement fleshes out community care policy. According to the 
Department of Health's guidance for practitioners on the implementation 
of community care, for instance: '... having weighed the views of all parties, 
including his/her own observation, the assessing practitioner is responsible 
for defining the user's need' (Department of Health 1991: 3-35). The 
guidance goes beyond seeing this as just interpreting rules: the assessment 
of need requires expert knowledge, which the professional brings to the 
assessment, fi1ling an intended gap in the procedures: 'The same apparent 
need may have many different causes ... The proper identification of the 
cause is the basis for selecting the appropriate service response' (ibid 3.32). 
While Howe says that until the central interests of the organisation are at 
stake, the style and manner of work is left to the worker, he does not 
acknowledge the signifficance of this concession. Who, for instance, 
decides when the point has been reached at which the circumstances 
require a shift from the practitioner's discretionary judgement to 
procedures? This is in large part a question of how the practitioner 
understands and interprets the facts of the situation and whether the 
practitioner is recognised by the supervisor as the decision-maker. Rule- 
saturated practice does not entail rule-bound practice (Maynard-Moody 
and Mushen02OO3: i[o). Policy implementation is not simply applying 
rules; it is also about deciding whether the rule applies in the given 
situation. (ibid. io) Policyý-makers and managers often assume that 
procedures will not be followed to the letter but that practitioners will use 
their judgement to make, them work. This is clearly the message from the 
Chief Social Services Inspector in her exhortation to practitioners to use 
their discretion to implement the present government's modernisation 
agenda-. 'The changes require ... A culture of care that engages with the 
hearts and minds, as well as the budgets, of all those involved. A culture of 
care, which knows that consistency is important but it has to be 
implemented with intelligence and enterprise, not dogma; a culture of care, 
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which puts an end to checklists that replace thinking and judgment' (Social 
Services Inspectorate 2001: 8). 
A possible reason for not recognising social workers' professional 
discretionary role is the emphasis in domination managerialism on the 
proliferation of rules and procedures and the equation of this with control 
and deprofessionalisation (Howe 1986, iggia, Jones 1999,200I). Jones 
offers an historical explanation, portraying the entry of social work into 
Social Services Departments as the beginning of the end of 'vocationalism' 
(Jones 1999: 45), with social workers becoming workers, drawn into local 
state bureaucracy and required to follow instructions, procedures and 
directions (Jones 1999: 47). Howe makes a similar point, drawing on the 
work ofJamous and Peloille to support this view (Howe iggia). jamous 
and Peloille (197o) argue that the achievement of professional freedom 
relates to the relationship of the level of indeterminacy (work 
characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability of outcome) and the 
amount of technicality (capacity to formulate and proceduralise responses) 
in work content (the I/T ratio). The greater the indeterminacy, the greater 
the chance of achieving professional status. Groups claiming professional 
status are caught on the horns of a dilemma. Their claim to discretion 
relates to their ability to deliver the goods in areas of work that have the 
uncertainty and unpredictability (indeterminacy) necessitating their 
intervention. However, in order to intervene effectively, they need a body 
of knowledge that explains and makes predictable the problems with which 
they are dealing. Insofar as this body of knowledge is formulated, it has the 
potential to be codified and proceduralised and hence to undermine their 
claims to special qualities and skiffs. The higher the level of indeterminacy, 
the more potential there is for the operation of discretion. Howe uses this 
argument to challenge the idea that there is discretion in social work: '... to 
the extent that the occupation can systematically formulate its knowledge, 
practice, and outcomes, the work is prey to routinisation, de-skilling, and 
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Organisational regulation, and these are the strategies of managers' (Howe 
iggiia: 21r6). 
There are three difficulties with this argument: one empirical, the others 
theoretical. 
First, Robinson(2003) is critical of the assumption that increased 
technicality in work-that is, prescribed practices expressed in 
procedures-should be uncritically read as undermining professional 
claims. Her study of the implementation of a risk assessment instrument 
in a probation service (ibid. 596) finds that, despite trepidation about its 
introduction in terms of undermining professional discretion, the 
instrument is welcomed by many practitioners and managers as a useful 
tool in helping them to assess and manage complex situations and a spur to 
greater consistency, transparency and equity in assessment practice. The 
impact of procedures on professionalism cannot be prejudged; it needs to 
be evaluated in each setting. 
Secondly, there is also a problem in the assumption that the presence of 
rules equates with determinacy. The idea of 'essentially contested 
concepts' (Gallie 1955, Weitz 1977, Freeden 1996) provides a useful set of 
ideas to help understand why the presence of a body of rules may give rise 
to indeterminacy. Different but equally valid interpretations of procedures 
could be made by drawing on elements in the same body of rules, with 
these elements being outlined, emphasised or downplayed in different ways 
by different interpreters. The idea of evaluative and internally complex 
knowledge characterises much, if not all, policy and procedure that 
pertains to social work practice, allowing procedure to be prioritised and 
described in significantly different ways by different actors. Paradoxically, 
more rules may create more discretion; the complex nature of rules and 
their interaction and the problems of applying rules to concrete situations 
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is, after all, the basis of the legal professions' IN ratio claim to discretion 
(Evans and HarriS2004a). 
Thirdly, the idea that rules and protocols developed to guide professional 
practice are necessarily instruments of management control is 
problematic. It is not just that rules themselves can build up into a 
complex, interrelated body of knowledge; it is also that rules of practice 
may often entail a certain context of interpretation and background 
knowledge. Tick charts, by themselves, are meaningless: they require 
expert knowledge to make them usable (Munro 1998: ioi-io2). For 
managers to control practitioners through the proceduralisation. of their 
professional practice, management itself has to change. It has to adopt 
that professional knowledge and, in doing so, change its identity. This 
argument is suggested by the continuing reliance, at least in relation to 
first-level management, on professionals being managed by fellow 
professionals (Freidson 1994), and is also suggested by the observation of 
managerialism's attempts to colonise professional supervision (Clarke and 
Newman 1997: 77)--which shows both the power and the weakness of 
managers and managerialism. 
These arguments emphasise the value of assessing professional social 
worVs status against the standard of discretion, rather than 
autonomy"-freedom, which is not absolute but set about with limits 
(EvettS20o?. ). By this measure, social workers within Social Services 
continue to be a professional group. 
A possible argument against this view is that it ignores the role of 
sponsorship and support for professional status gamous and Peloille, 97 
17o)-something which many social work commentators identify as 
having 
been lacking for social work over the past two decades (Hopkins 1996, 
Bradley 2oo5, Payne zoo5). However, while there is reason to believe that 
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support for social work as a professional group has been reduced, it has not 
disappeared. Professional discretion continues to have its supporters and 
its uses in a managerialised service. Harrison, for instance, points out that 
professionalism in the welfare state is still supported by consumers, who 
often value an independent professional rather than a state bureaucrat 
being involved in their care (Harrison 1999). 
However, there are other reasons, too, why powerful actors may continue 
to see a role for social work discretion. While discretion may give freedom, 
it also ascribes responsibility. As Ellis et al. observe: 'Front-line staff had 
ultimate responsibility for managing inflated and conflicting policy 
objectives with inadequate levels of resources relative to demand, yet were 
subject to low managerial scrutiny' (Ellis et al. 1999: 276)- There is an 
assumption in much of the discussion about managers that they are happy 
to take both responsibility and control in their organisation. However, 
responsibility is a risky business. Modem society is widely characterised as 
concerned about the management of risk (Malin et. al. 2002: 1[8). Beck, for 
instance, has pointed to the impact of science in demystifying nature and 
giving the impression that risk can now be calculated and is susceptible to 
technical interventions (Beck][992, Lupton 1999: io8). Government has 
been seen as taking on a protective responsibility to control and reduce the 
risks to which its citizens are exposed (Hood etal. 2001). In this context, 
Hood et al. argue that organisations not only manage risks but also manage 
the organisation's exposure to blame when things go wrong: risk regimes. 
They identify a number of elements in risk regimes, including the 
management of information release, but also identify more fundamental 
changes to the basic structure of the organisation. Here they identify two 
key strategies. One is proceduralisation, which involves the increasingly 
detailed specification of procedures and guidelines, setting out the right 
way to do things, so that when something goes wrong the organisation can 
point to the procedures as a defence against criticism Ubid2001: 166). 
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Another strategy is 'service abandonment'. The risk, for the organisation, 
of proceduralisation is that it implies an acceptance of responsibility. In 
many situations this is unavoidable, but in others the organisation can 
reduce its exposure to blame by clouding its responsibility for a service 
area. At its most extreme service abandonment involves withdrawing from 
providing a service, but more often it can involve stopping '... issuing advice 
or information for fear of blame, legal liability or other adverse risks' (ibid. 
2ooii: r66). An example of this process can be seen in the use of retaining 
some idea of professional discretion and decision-making within social 
care organiations to distance managers and the organisation from 
responsibility for problems. Wells (T997), for instance, argues that 
managers are as much involved in a strategy of shifting responsibility as 
they are in seeking control, and that continuing professional discretion can 
be seen as an element in this process. He identifies a chain of blame- 
shifting in mental health policy from the top down, and points out that 
while government policy calls for the targeting of specialist mental health 
services on people with a 'severe and enduring mental illness', it has failed 
to provide a clear definition of the term. The definition provided by the 
government is a framework within which precise definitions are to be 
agreed locally: 'The government requires managers to strike a balance 
between demands, needs and resources but it avoids direct responsibility 
for what can and cannot be met' (ibid. 336). In turn, professionals are put in 
the position of managing individual demands for resources from service 
users, thus 'distancing management and policy makers from the reality of 
the "felt" experience of policy, which is ultimately left to practitioners to 
interpret' (ibid- 340). Marchant (1993) and Bradley (2003) Point to a similar 
process in Social Services Departments generally, where practitioners are 
faced with vague and imprecise criteria and regulations, which distance 
senior officers and politicians from difficult rationing decisions. 
The continuation of a professional element in the organisation of social 
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work within Social Services Departments can, therefore, be seen, in part, 
as a managerial strategy to redistribute blame. (The significance of this 
practice is suggested by Laming's criticisms in the Climble report Urd 
Laming 2003), which highlights the way in which senior managers 
distanced themselves from professional decision-making. ) However, there 
may also be more positive reasons within the culture of Social Services for 
the continuation of an element of professional discretion associated with 
the continuing culture of bureau-professionalism, not only amongst 
practitioners but also amongst their managers. 
CONCLUSION 
Lipsky's analysis of discretion in street-level bureaucracies has been 
considered in relation to contemporary debates about the impact of 
managerialism within Social Services and particularly on the nature of 
management and the extent of professional influence on discretion. 
Lipsky's work has been identified as directly relevant to the analysis of 
practitioner discretion within social work by authors such as Baldwin and 
Ellis et al. However, other commentators such as Howe and Cheetham. 
argue that Lipsky's work no longer provides a convincing analysis because 
of the increasing influence of managerialism. 
The argument in this chapter develops from the recognition that, contrary 
to this criticism, Lipsky's street-level bureaucracies are organisations in 
which managers and management concerns and techniques play a 
significant role. In contrasting these two analyses of discretion, Howe's 
argument is related to a broader literature on managerialism, which 
presents managers as dominant forces in organisations. Contrary to the 
perspective suggested by Howe, it has been mooted that street-level 
bureaucracy theory and domination managerialism are similar in their 
characterisation of the orientation of managers, as being committed to 
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organisational goals and their portrayal of workers as deprofessionalised 
employees. They also share the view that there is a fundamental conflict 
between management and these workers, although within this conflict the 
street-level bureaucracy perspective portrays managers engaging in 
pragmatic compromises with workers. This relates to the significant 
difference between these points of view. Domination managerialism's 
account of discretion emphasises the effectiveness of management control 
and the minimal nature of street-level practitioners' resources for 
resistance to this control. The street-level perspective, in contrast, sees 
managerialist techniques as flawed, in a context of necessarily vague policy 
and uncertain resources, giving rise to extensive means at street level to 
resist management control. The result is that, while domination 
managerialism underlines the minimal and residual nature of discretion, 
the street-level bureaucracy perspective points to extensive, day--to-day and 
practical discretion, exercised by street-level bureaucrats. Alongside the 
domination managerial perspective, I have argued that it is possible to 
identify another strand of managerial analysis, here called discursive 
managerialism, differing from the street-level perspective in questioning 
the assumption that managers' orientation is necessarily and exclusively 
organisational, and that their relationship with practitioners is necessarily 
conflictual. While it recognises that practitioners are part of an 
organisation and are, as such, employees, this perspective also points to the 
continuing influence of professionalism as a factor in managers' 
understanding of their role and as a resource used by practitioners to claim 
discretion in their work. It shares with street-level bureaucracy a 
recognition of the limited effectiveness of managerial techniques of 
control, but also highlights the influence of professional discourse as an 
additional resource for resistance to managerial control. The picture of 
discretion put forward by this position is variegated, focusing on local 
constructions of discretion that draw in various ways on defacto conditions 
and professional claims. 
93 
These interrelated but different analyses of discretion are surnmarised in 
the table below. The key areas they identify for further exploration about 
discretion and the value and limitations of Lipsky's theory focus on: the 
organisational context of discretion; the orientation and concerns of 
management; the nature and effectiveness of management control of 
practice; and the nature of the relationship between street-level 
practitioners and their managers. 
REGIMES OF DISCRETION WITHIN 
MANAGERIALISED SOCIAL SERVICES 
DOMINATION STREET-LEVEL DISCURSIVE 
MANAGERIALISM BUREAUCRACY MANAGERIALISM 
ORIENTATION Organisational Organisational Organisational and OF MANAGERS Professional 
interpenetrate 
ORGANISATION- Employeel Employeel Employeel AL HIERARCHY 
C14ARACTERISA- worker worker Professional 
TION OF 
PRACTITIONERS 
CHARACTERISA- Conflict. Conflict. Conflict and TION OF 
RELATIONSHIP 
Managers Management principled collusion 
BETWTEN dominating power limited. 
MANAGERS AND Needfor 
PRACTITIONERS pragmatic 
compromises 
STRATEGIES OF Effective Problematic Problematic 
MANAGEMENT 
CONTROL 
RESOURCES FOR Minimal Extensive 'Widespread and 
PRACTITIONER dejacto resources variedpotential- de RESISTANCE facto and dejure 
resources 
Residual Extensive - Widespread CHARACTERISA- defacto potential, locally 
TION OF constructed DI ETION I I 
94 
This range of analysis suggests different ways of understanding social work 
discretion within Social Services Departments. Lipsky's perspective is, 
contrary to the arguments of some critics, directly relevant to British 
Social Services Departments and underlines the need to consider the 
effectiveness of management control. This organisational context of Social 
Services also points to the need to critically examine the street-level 
bureaucracy analysis of discretion in the light of the influence of 
managerialism and professionalism on social work practice. The 
interaction of these factors will be considered through the examination of 
discretion in relation to a particular organisational context by asking the 
question: is this setting characterised by the conditions of street- 
level bureaucracy? 
Furthermore, as will be seen in Chapter IV, the fact that a site shares the 
basic conditions of a street-level bureaucracy should not exclude the 
possibility that other factors may also have a significant impact on street- 
level discretion within the organisation. Accordingly, it is also necessary to 
consider: what additional contextual factors contribute to the 
extent and nature of discretion within a particubw site? 
Managers have been identified as playing an increasingly significant role 
within Social Services organisations. This development, I have argued, 
rather than making the street-level bureaucracy perspective less relevant, 
in fact increases its relevance. However, the idea of management, which is 
central to Lipsky's analysis of street-level discretion-he characterises 
management as an homogenous entity which is committed to 
organisational values and restricts the freedom of street-level 
practitioners-is called into question by the literature which points to 
management as internally stratified and motivated by a range of concerns, 
not just organisational commitment. This analysis suggests the need to 
investigate the nature of nmnagement within Social Services as a 
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street-level bureaucracy, particularly at the interface between 
street-level and front-line ana ment, and between front-line 
managers and senior managers in terms of its structure and range 
of motivations of nunagers. 
Lipsky's analysis of discretion at street-level emphasises a dual process of 
control and resistance - managers striving to control, and street-level 
practitioners seeking to resist. He also points out that, within this context 
of conflict, managers and street-level bureaucrats collude in accepting 
limited discretionary behaviour in order to get the job done (managers) 
and to ensure that the job continues to be there (street-level practitioners). 
The literature which has been considered above is inconclusive about the 
capacity of management to control and the ability of stree-t-level to resist, 
thus creating discretionary space. The literature also questions Lipsky's 
basic assumption that managers and street-level bureaucrats are motivated 
by different concerns, --and particularly in the context of an historically 
professionalised bureaucracy such as Social Services. The issue that arises 
is that what Lipsky identifies as a collusion to keep things ticking over 
between managers and street-level practitioners may be motivated not 
only by pragmatic concerns but also by shared professional commitments. 
In light of the suggestion in the literature that there is a fundamental 
distinction to be drawn between senior strategic- managers and local 
managers, I propose to explore two finther issues about the relationship 
between managers and the control of professional street-level bureaucrats. 
Senior managers rely largely on 'remote control' strategies, such as control 
of resources and procedures to direct street-level practice. Is control 
through resources and procedures exercised uniforndy across all 
areas of social work or only in certain areas? How effectively do 
these strategies control local discretion? To what extent can 
street-level practitioners resist? What role do local nuinagers 
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play in enforcing resource and procedural controls? The 
relationship between local managers and street-level practitioners appears 
to be central in understanding management control of discretion, both in 
terms of the enforcement of procedures and in terms of the possible 
recognition of professional commitments. In terms of understanding 
street-level discretion, the nature of the relations between local managers 
and street-level practitioners requires closer examination: what is the 
nature of relations between local rs and street-level 
practitioners? To what extent is it structured by the idea of 
conflicting interests of managers and street-level bureaucrats? 
To what extent is it influenced by shared commitments and 
concerns, particularly around professionalisn-L; ' 
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CHAPTERIV 
METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of Lipsky's analysis of discretion in Street-level Bureaucracy 
and the consideration of its subsequent development and application to 
the examination of professional discretion in Social Services have raised a 
number of questions. Critics have argued that the conditions of British 
Social Services Departments are quite unlike Lipsky's characterisation of 
street-level bureaucracy, and that the theory does not apply in the 
contemporary British context. I have argued that the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective is, in fact, directly relevant to the more 
managerialised nature of contemporary social work and raises important 
questions about the effectiveness and nature of management control 
portrayed by domination managerialist analysts. However, some 
proponents of the street-level bureaucracy perspective present it as a 
sufficient account of discretion. This is a disputable claim. Discursive 
managerialist analysts point to the way in which professionalism continues 
to influence the nature of discretion, both through the impact it might 
have on assumptions within the organisation about discretion, and 
through the relationship between managers and practitioners (and 
between managers at various levels in the organisation). While Lipsky 
provides a perspective on discretion within large, public organisations, its 
insights appear to be limited where professionalism is a significant factor 
in the structure of Social Services Departments. 
This chapter will set out the process bywhich the research questions 
identified at the end of the preceding chapter have been investigated 
through the empirical study of a local authority Social Services 
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Department, as an example of a street-level bureaucracy. 
The investigation of Lipsky's analysis of discretion in the context of Social 
Services identified three related but different views of discretion: the 
street-level perspective, which emphasises extensive defacto discretion; the 
domination managerialist view of minimal residual discretion; and the 
discursive managerialist characterisation of discretion as locally 
constituted at the intersection of professional and managerial discourses, 
and varying between contexts. This thesis will examine the 
conceptualisation of social work discretion in the organisational context of 
a Social Services Department, through the following research questions: 
Is the department characterised by the conditions of street-level 
bureaucracy? NVMch additional contextual factors contribute to 
the extent and nature of discretion within the department? 
What is the nature of nutnagement within Social Services, 
particularly at the interface between street level and front-line 
management, and between front-line managers and senior 
managers in terms of its structure and range of motivations of 
rs? 
00 How do managers exercise control over practitioners, 
particularly in terms of control of resources and use of 
procedures? 
VVhat is the nature of relations between local managers and 
street-level practitioners? To what extent are they influenced by 
conflicting interests? To what extent are they influenced by 
shared conw[iitments and concerns, particularly around 
professionalism" 
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There are two dimensions to the discussion of the research methodology. 
The first concerns the design of the study, and the second the rationale for 
the process of data collection and analysis. I will now look at each of these 
issues in turn. 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDYAPPROACH 
In developing the empirical study I found helpful Edwards and Talbot's 
suggestion that a research design needs to be identified. They point out 
that the design's framework holds together the methods of data collection 
and analysis in a way that best answers the research questions and helps to 
clarify the nature of the, claims that can be made for any findings (Edwards 
and Talbot 1999: 32-34)- 
Case studies are particularly useful in examining people's experience and 
relating them to their context, and for developing theoretical analysis that 
engages with'... the realities which conflict with [the researcher's] 
expectations' (Hartley 2004: 325). The complex and interrelated nature of 
the research questions reflects recognition of the actors' interaction and 
their context in public organisations and points to the appropriateness of 
adopting a case study approach. Case study research is suited to these 
interrelated questions because it involves examining the experience of 
actors in a specific context and seeking to understand the complexity and 
interconnectedness of their practices and the situation (Yin2003: 13, 
Hartley210041- 323)- It also captures complexities of social life in a situation 
that enables us to develop a more nuanced and'... fine tuned exploration of 
complex sets of interrelationships'(Edwards and Talbot 1999: 50)- 
Additionally, the case study approach combines the opportunity not only 
to explore these questions in a particular setting but also to use the lessons 
from this setting to elucidate and develop the theory finther (Hartley 
Ioo 
2004: 330- 
There is an argument that case studies focus on the unique and the unusual 
and are not appropriate to making generalisations in developing theories 
(Stake 1998). In this respect case studies are often contrasted with survey 
research, which is designed to make general observations (Blaxter2001: 71, 
77)- Surveys have been presented as a means to generalise findings through 
sampling: a survey interrogates a sample of a population and, on the basis 
that this sub-group is a fair representation of the wider population, makes 
claims about the way in which its findings reflect the characterstics and 
experiences of that population (Hartley 2004: 331)- Stake ([998) argues that 
case studies should focus on uniqueness. The primary purpose of the case 
study is to recognise the difference and particularity of each case and learn 
from it. Generalisations, he argues, create disembodied abstractions that 
reduce the impact of the case and detract from its power-not least, its 
ability to demonstrate the limitations of general theory (ibid 94) -104)- 
In line with this view Stake distinguishes between instrumental and 
intrinsic case studies (ibid. 88). The instrumental approach views the case 
study as a bundle of data which can be used to test or develop theory. In 
contrast, the intrinsic approach recognises the particularity of the 
case-the way in which it is unlike anything else. This distinction alerted 
me to another approach to conceptualising case study research, which is 
outlined below. 
Stake's argument for an intrinsic approach paradoxically relies on an 
instrumental argument: that the case study is different from the way things 
generally are. That which makes a case different or unique (ibid 87-88) is a 
pre-existing idea of the ordinary; rather than being chosen for its own sake, 
a case is chosen because it does not conform to an idea of what is common 
(Gomm etal. 2000: 102). 
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Generalising from Case Studies: the Theoretical Case 
Walton proposes an instrumental approach to case studies, emphasising 
the importance of theory in identifying cases. He rejects an intrinsic 
conception of cases-the idea that the case is a natural entity, 'out there' 
and predefined-and instead argues that the properties of events, actions, 
institutions etc. are constructed as a case in a relationship with theory 
(Walton1992: 121). Theoretical concerns define the case and identify 
significant dimensions and where its boundaries are. The same range of 
circumstances might be constructed as different cases from different 
theoretical perspectives (ibid 134)-for instance, the same hospital could 
be a case of street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky ig8o) and of negotiated order 
(Strauss et A -1963), depending on the concerns of the researcher. However, 
his claim is not simply that theory can be imposed on any situation. For 
Walton, there is a process of matching and adapting between theory and 
circumstances (Walton'1992'. 126-134). The case study is in a dynamic 
relationship with theory-, theory clarifies the focus of the case study, while 
the concrete circumstance of the case study is used to develop, adapt and 
challenge theory. 
Walton sees this process operating in two ways (ibid. 125). Theory is 
developed through analogy: it works in one case; another is seen as 
analogous, and the case study tests this analogy and demonstrates it (or 
not). Alternatively, cases are studied which, while similar, are also 
different: they are problematic, and require the theory to be adapted or 
changed to take account of the circumstances. A similar emphasis on the 
role of theory in case study work is made by Burawoy (iggi), who argues 
that case studies provide the opportunity to look at theories of general 
structures and examine how these structures operate and interact in 
particular, often anomalous, cases (ibid. 28o). 
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A possible criticism of this emphasis on theory is that the facts are forced 
to fit the theory. Theory acts like a Khunian paradigrn in normal science, 
where the goal is to confirm and elaborate the exemplar case (May 1997: 
33). The challenge is how to maintain a balance between extending theory 
from one situation to another, and still challenge and adapt that 
theory-and here, as mentioned above, the case study approach provides a 
powerful approach to unlocking assumptions and opening up thinking 
(Hartley 2004: 330- 
Walton's characterisation of theory as hypothesis, held tentatively and 
continually open to change, development and adaptation, is an important 
notion in protecting against imposing theory on reality. Ragin (1987) also 
provides some pointers to how this can be achieved in practice. His view is 
that inductive theoryý-generation brings up points for consideration. These 
points are not hard and fast truths; they establish a dialogue between the 
investigator's ideas and the evidence, taking the initial hypothesis, 
developing and changing it, the better to explain complexity (ibid 44)- In 
the context of case studies, the value of this questioning approach is that it 
looks behind apparent similarities and differences and acknowledges the 
interaction of individual factors and the broader context: '... to determine 
how different combinations of conditions have the same causal 
significance and how similar causal factors can operate in different 
directions' (ibid. 49)- 
Identifying the Case 
The first step in case study research involves 'choosing the case study, by 
asking what sort of case study is needed to answer the questions being 
posed (Hartley 2004: 327). This raises the question: how does the 
researcher know when a case and a theory relate to one another? In answer 
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to this, Schofield points out that: 
A consensus appears to be emerging that for qualitative researchers 
generalizability is best thought of as a matter of 'fit' between the 
situation studied and others to which one might be interested in 
applying the concepts and conclusions of that study. This 
conceptualisation makes thick descriptions crucial, since without 
them one does not have the information necessary for informed 
judgement about the issue of fit (Schofield2000: 92-93)- 
'Thick descriptions' do not have to be voluminous accounts of 'the case'. 
What is important is that the description provides sufficient background 
information, the context, to allow a reader to understand the findings 
(Lincoln and Guba2000: 40). A thick description gives a sense of the 
circumstances from which the findings emerge and within which the 
theory belongs. Its purpose is to clarify the background assumptions that 
make sense of the theory and help identify similarities and differences in 
the context of the original study and the new situations in which the 
theory can then be applied and developed. 
The concern of this thesis is the critical examination of Lipsky's street- 
level bureaucracy perspective in relation to professional discretion in 
managerialised Social Services. The context of this perspective, without 
which'... the analysis is less likely to be appropriate... ' (Lipsky ig8o: 28), is 
the conditions of work which characterise these organisations. This is 
what constitutes the thick description and the basis of establishing fit 
between the theory and particular cases. Street-level bureaucracies are 
organisations characterised by problems of scarce resources that are 
compounded by ill-defined organisational goals and unrealistically high 
expectations of public agencies and their staff (ibid. 27-28). They are also 
organisations in which 'performance oriented toward goal achievement 
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tends to be difficult if not impossible to measure'(ibid. 28). They are 
difficult organisations to work in and to manage. Transferability, though, 
is not about establishing an identical match; it is often more like a family 
resemblance, and as well as recognising similarities is concerned with 
understanding possible differences (Guba and Lincoln irg8g: 24-0- In 
relation to the examination of issues raised in the preceding chapter, an 
important dimension of difference is the presence of professional staff at 
street level and in management roles. 
Yin identifies a range of approaches to case-study research, based on the 
number of sites within a study and whether the focus is on the whole 
setting or specific parts within it (Yin2003). This study is designed as a 
single case study of social work in adult services in a local authority Social 
Services Department, which focuses on two embedded units of analysis: an 
older persons social work team; and a mental health social work team (see 
pages 125-131). The rationale for adopting this design is that a single case 
study provides the opportunity to undertake the critical examination of 
theory--street-level bureaucracy (ibid 4o)-and, within this, the use of 
two units of analysis to compare and contrast the influence of 
professionalism and managerialism on discretion and the relationship 
between practitioners and managers within this street-level bureaucracy 
setting (ibid 42-45). To this end I have compared social workers in an 
older persons team and in a mental health team. Social workers are a 
minority of Social Services employees (Department of Health20o5), but 
are closely associated with the ethos and management of Social Services 
(Hill 2003: 197--T99)- Social work within the new Social Services 
Departments was primarily seen as a generic role, but subsequent 
developments gave rise to the increasing specialisation of social work along 
client group lines (Hill 2ooob). The Mental Health Act 1983 and its 
establishment of the role of Approved Social Worker (ASW) reinforced 
the historical separateness of psychiatric social work and enhanced the 
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training and professional status of mental health social work (Shaw 2000, 
Payne2005). The community care reforms of the early irggos, which are 
closely associated with the insinuation of managerialism within Social 
Services, were primarily concerned with the control of expenditure on 
older persons services (Chalfis and Hugman 1993: 320, Lewis and 
Glennerster 1996). In e the impact of care management on older 
persons and mental health services, a distinction has been made between 
'brokerage care management', which is largely administrative and concerns 
coordinating services, and 'clinical care management', which emphasises 
the central role of care managers as professional providers of services 
(Huxley 1993, Burnsr997). Using this distinction, Huxley has argued that 
the brokerage approach is more relevant in understanding adult 
community care, while in mental health the clinical approach is more 
appropriate (Huxley 1993: 376-377). Burns also points out that in mental 
health, clinical care management has been more influential in the 
operation of the Care Programme Approach-the mental health version of 
care management (Bums 1997: 394). The contrasting nature of these two 
different services points to their value as sites for examining the influence 
of professionalism and managerialism on discretion. 
Accessing the Field Sites 
The first step in putting into effect the development of the field study 
involved gaining access to a research site (Hartley 2004: 327). 
One approach to accessing a research site would be to use 
local contacts on 
the ground and work up from street level (Berg 2004: 15.1). 
However, as I 
had recently moved over a hundred miles to take up a new post, 
it would 
not have been practical to seek access via my previous employment 
contacts and I had not yet established 
local links. Accordingly I wrote to 
local Social Services directors to request permission to carry out fieldwork 
iio6 
in their authorities. One of the directors responded, expressing interest. 
Fig. i summarises the process of gaining access, which is described below. 
Fig. i ACCE SS TO RE SEARCH SITE S 
Director of Community Care and Housing 
(Director of Social Services) 
Sent letter asking for access 
Passed on to Assistant Director 
Assistant Director (Community Care) 
t t 
Meeting to eylain research proposal 
Passed on to te two service managers 
II 
Manager: Older Persons & Physically Manager: Mental Health 
Disabled Services Set up joint meeting 
Request passed on to with CMHT managers 
team manager 
Manager: Older Persons Team (OPT) Newunit CMHT 
Meeting with team manager manager and assistant managers 
Set up meeting with social workers Told to contact consultant psychiatrist 
Set up meeting with social workers 
Social workers 
OPT 
Meeting with team 
who agreed access 
Consultant psychiatrist 
Correspondence 
Social workers 
CMHT 
Meeting with team 
who agreed access 
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I met the assistant director for adult services, who agreed to my research 
going forward and contacted the director of the local mental health trust, 
which jointly manages the community mental health team (CMHT), to 
obtain its agreement. She also passed on an information sheet about the 
study (see Appendixr) to the older persons services manager, who agreed 
to put me in touch with an older persons team (OPT) manager who had 
expressed interest in the research. 
I met the older persons manager to discuss the research. She was 
interested in and positive about my proposed research. Her primary 
concern was ensuring the confidentiality of the interviewees. I referred her 
back to the confidentiality undertaking on the information sheet. She also 
seemed to be curious about the motivation of senior managers in allowing 
the research to progress: in a contemporary note of the meeting I noted 
that: IThe team managerl asked me about what [the assistant directorl 
wanted out of the research. I said I don't know but that I had made the 
point [to the assistant director] about anonymity etc. Felt awkward-was 
I being tested out? ' and I made a note to myself to'... think about 
confidentiality of the thesis' (Field note: OPT, comment by team manager, 
October2Ooi). The team manager agreed to invite me to a team meeting 
and to circulate a written outline of the research proposal amongst team 
members. 
My meeting with the mental health service manager was less 
straightforward. First, the service manager had invited three local assistant 
mental health managers (one of whom managed social workers in the team) 
to the meeting. Secondly, the tone of the meeting was more challenging. 
One manager, for instance, was concerned that my focus on social workers 
would exacerbate professional fissures in the team. Throughout the 
meeting I felt it necessary to handle the situation carefully and to avoid 
overstepping an invisible but clearly present line. At the end of this 
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meeting the service manager agreed to invite me to a team meeting. 
In my research information sheet I had mentioned consulting social work 
files to examine the influence of procedures on the progress of a case. The 
service manager told me that this would require permission from the 
team's psychiatrist. I contacted the psychiatrist, offering to meet her to 
discuss the research. She wrote back that any involvement of health staff in 
the research would first require the approval of the Health Ethics 
Committee and that Social Services files, which I believe you wish to see, 
contain letters from myself as a third party, which Social Services are not 
entitled to disclose without permission' (personal correspondence 
22. io. oi). I read this letter in the context of my sense of resistance in the 
meeting with the managers. In this situation I felt that discretion was the 
better part of valour and decided not to seek access to files. 
I he process of negotiating access alerted me to the pertmence of Burgess's 
observation that-. '... gaining access to a research site is not a one--(: )ff event; 
it is instead a social process that ... influences not only the physical 
accessibility but also the development of the design, collection, analysis, 
and dissemination phases of the investigationý (Burgess 1.99"*- 52-)- 
As noted above, one aspect of the research design that changed as a result 
of the process of gaining access to sites was the idea of reviewing a sample 
of case files in each team. Originally I had intended to look at one or two 
files and follow through the process of decision-making in order to 
establish how procedures and rules were used or not used and how they 
were interpreted. Having decided against this in the CMHT I then 
decided not to pursue this course in the OPT. While I could make an 
argument for looking at the files in terms of usefiA data, I realised that I 
had not fiffly appreciated the possible impact on service users of having 
their case files examined in this way. (The damaging impact on service 
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users of confidential information disclosed beyond its original purpose was 
emerging as a key issue in another piece of research I was conducting at 
the time [EvanS2002, Evans and HarriS2004bl). On balance I did not feel 
I could justify seeking access to case files for a useful but subsidiary aspect 
of the research. 
My sense that there was resistance to the research in the CMHT was 
subsequently reinforced during the observation period, when an assistant 
manager, who was at the meeting held to negotiate access, told me that ' 
[The service manager and team manager) hadn't wanted me to come to the 
team because of the current disruptions (not specified) but that [the 
assistant directorl had told them that they had to give me access'(Field 
note: CMHT, comment by assistant manager, December2001). Whatever 
the veracity of this information or the motivation of the person in telling 
me, it raised questions for me of the ethics of access. I felt that'imposed' 
access would have been a problem had I been talking to people in their 
personal capacity. However, as I was interviewing managers and staff in 
their capacity as public officials/professionals, and as the imposition was 
on the team to provide access rather than on individuals, I felt it 
acceptable to continue on the basis that the practitioners and managers 
had a choice whether or not to participate. 
The same manager also told me that social workers in the mental health 
team were also uneasy about the research: 'The problem has been that 
there have been recent audits of files and the CPA [care programme 
approachl, and people feel they are being checked up on again... I've 
circulated the stuff you gave me but it just doesn't seem to sink in'(Field 
note: CMHT, comment by assistant manager, December20oi). This was 
an issue which needed addressing in both teams: a manager in the OPT 
had asked about confidentiality, and the team had also been subject to 
inspections. Before each interview I reiterated the written information I 
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had given interviewees and underlined the confidentiality statement and 
their right not to participate. 
As a result of my meetings with managers I was invited to team meetings, 
and the team members agreed to my being given access to the team. I had 
provided the teams with an information sheet outlining the nature and 
purpose of the interviews, and these meetings involved going through the 
sheet and dealing with questions, which tended to be practical-such as 
how long I would be present in the team, how long interviews would take 
etc. Following these meetings, the team managers contacted me to let me 
know that the teams had agreed to give me access. 
F-"I 
I he remainder of this chapter will outline the methods of data collection 
and the approach taken to the analysis of data. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Case study research usually involves a range of data collection methods 
(Hartley 2004.328). In this study observational and documentary research 
support the interviews, which are the main focus of the study. This 
combination of methods allows me to explore the influence and 
interaction of managerialism. and professionalism in the relationship of 
practitioners and their managers and to build a picture of official and 
unofficial discretion in each team. I will outline the role of each of these 
techniques in turn. 
Observation 
The role of observation in my research is to support my interviews, and to 
provide an overview of the structure and function of the teams and local 
issues (ibid- 328). The main element of observation was at the start of the 
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fieldwork, when I spent a week with each team as an observer in 
November and early December20oi. After the teams had agreed to my 
research, I asked for an induction into each team. These were organised by 
the manager of the OPT and the assistant manager of the CMHT. These 
'induction'days involved being shown around the offices, being shown 
paperwork and procedures by practitioners, shadowing practitioners and 
talking to them informally. The purpose was twofold. First, I wanted to 
'appreciate the situation' (Berg 20 04: 1155): to get a sense of the 
organisational environment inhabited by the team and how they 
characterised it. I made field notes on these visit days (writing them up in 
the evening) and collected copies of the policy and procedure documents 
mentioned in the course of the day. This gave access to informal aspects of 
the teams that would not have been gained by commencing the interviews 
immediately. For instance, one person took me into the coffee area, where 
there was a copy of a recently published Social Services league table on the 
noticeboard. This gave rise to a conversation about the way the local 
authority was portrayed in the local press. 
Within the structured observational phase my role was largely passive, in 
recognition that I was not a participant in the team's work. This 
experience allowed me to recognise and make connections with my own 
previous experience as a social work practitioner. For example, in hearing 
accounts of obtaining ftm&mg for care packages, I was able to use my own 
experience to understand the process. However, my experience was 
different, having been at a time of more generous funding. While I needed 
to ensure that my experiences were not imposed on the situation, they 
allowed me to recognise the nature of the experiences and challenges faced 
by these professionals. 
Secondly, the induction observation gave the opportunity to meet and 
build relationships with prospective interviewees. Both teams had recent 
112 
experience of audits and inspection and I made a point of letting people 
know that my professional background was similar to their own in order to 
distinguish myself from these official actors. 
In addition to this formal observational period, my observation continued 
throughout the research period as'... ad hoc or opportunistic data 
collection' (Hartley 2004: 329). While the interviews were conducted in 
interview rooms in the reception areas, after the first couple of interviews 
in both teams I was invited to the office for a drink while I waited for 
practitioners to finish tasks. On one or two occasions these opportunities 
proved enlightening-for instance, allowing a conversation with one of the 
assistant managers about a meeting attended that morning in preparation 
for a forthcoming SSI inspection. 
Pole and Lampard(20o2) note that: 'The quality of the data gathered in 
observation can only be as good as the method(s) used to record what is 
seen and what is experienced' (ibid 8o). The observation was unstructured 
and did not permit the use of a predetermined schedule to record the data. 
Instead I made contemporaneous notes wherever possible and would write 
up a journal at the end of each observation day. The journal described 
incidents and captured comments, and I also noted the source of 
comments where possible (e. g. 'social worker' or 'manager). In the report 
of the study which follows, data from the journal are referred to as 'field 
note', followed by the team (OPT or CMHT), and, where the note is of a 
person's comment, whether that person is a social worker or a manager. 
Documents 
The second element of my data collection strategy was documentary 
research. This focused on the examination of the procedural and policy 
documents-many of which I had collected during my observational 
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period-and other documents, such as accounts of organisational 
structure, community care plans and audit and inspection reports, which 
provided both the framework within which street-level practitioners and 
managers operated and a picture of the outlying organisational context. I 
also used archival sources to access documents relating to the introduction 
of community care in the shire county and the process of handing over 
Social Services from the shire county to the new unitary authority in the 
late 19gos. 
In using these documents I was aware of the need not to take them as 
simple reflections of reality but to recognise that they were written for 
certain purposes, with particular audiences in mind and that they reflected 
a viewpoint (Denscombe 2003: 20- 1 tended to use the documents for two 
purposes. The first was to convey the official picture of the organisation: 
how its senior officers portrayed it to the outside world. This was to 
provide me with the official view. The documents gave a sense of the 
structure and the official account of the organisation within which 
practitioners operate and of the language and nature of policy and 
procedure in the authority. The second purpose was to use documents 
such as inspection reports and committee minutes as sources of financial 
and statistical information, giving a picture of the material context of 
practice: staffing levels, resource provision etc. 
The documents also gave important background information with which 
to prepare for the interviews-. '... fore knowledge of the situationý (Merton 
and Kendall 1946: 54). First, they gave a sense of the organisational 
language used by interviewees-for instance, 'matrix'was used to refer to 
'eligibility criteriaý-and an awareness of documents referred to by 
interviewees (such as 'the blue formý--ix. risk assessment). While, at 
times, I had to seek clarification of terms and assumed knowledge in 
interviews, it gave me sufficient background to allow the interviews to 
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flow. Secondly, being aware of the documents and policies enabled me to 
rehearse and prepare for issues that might arise in interviews and how I 
might explore and clarify them; for instance, using phrases from the matrix 
to explore the clarity and flexibility of eligibility criteria. 
The documents consulted are produced by or have as their subject 
'Oldshire' (the former county) and/or'Newunit' (the new unitary 
authority). Accordingly they are not included in the bibliography, as this 
would breach the research authority's anonymity. In the account of the 
case and the findings the general source of the document is indicated-e. g. 
'Community Care Plan', 'Inspection Report'. 
]Interviews 
The main focus for data collection was one-to-one interviews with 
practitioners and local managers in each team. 
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I he focus of the study undertaken involves unofficial day-to-day practices. 
A picture of formal structures, as mentioned above, can be obtained from 
documents such as procedures, policies and reports, and from the way the 
authority presents its work on its website. Some impression can also be 
gained from strategic players of their view of local managers and 
practitioners. However, within the constraints of my resources-the time 
available for the fieldwork-my priority was to gain perspectives from the 
street level of the organisation: practitioners and their first-line managers. 
Before undert king these interviews I contacted the practitioners and 
managers to ask whether they would be happy to be interviewed. All but 
one social worker in each team agreed to be interviewed and the team 
managers and assistant managers in both teams also agreed to be 
interviewed. 
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Prior to conducting each interview I went through the information sheet 
previously circulated in the team (Appendixi). Two issues tended to arise 
from this discussion: practitioners' interest in and motivation to 
participate in the interviews and their view of the research as directly 
relevant to them and concern about maintaining confidentiality, 
particularly ensuring that senior managers were not able to identify the 
comments of individual interviewees. As seen above, I addressed 
confidentiality proactively with interviewees. I will return to this issue in 
my discussion of the analysis and presentation of the data (see Chapter 
VII). 
FoRowing these discussions I asked participants once again whether they 
wanted to be interviewed. Aff agreed to be interviewed. I then asked them 
to sign an agreement form (see Appendix2). 
I also asked each participant to complete a profile pro forma at the start of 
the first interview, which gave me information on gender, ethnicity, period 
qualified, period working for authority and period working for the team 
(see Appendix 3). The sheet was given an anonymous code number. This 
information is provided in graphic form (Tables i and2in Appendix 4)- 
As will be seen from Table i, most of the managers and social workers 
interviewed were women. As a male interviewer I needed to be aware of 
how gender might influence the interview process. However, as the subject 
matter did not relate to 'personal issues', it is likely that gender would not 
be a significant barrier in terms of building a relationship and discussing 
roles in the organisation (Padfield and Proctor 11996)- 
Aff interviews were tape-recorded with the permission of the participants. 
The tapes were erased after transcription. The tape transcripts were given 
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the same anonymous code number as the respective interviewees' profile 
sheets. 
The interviews were conducted in both teams from late autUMn2001 to 
Spriý 2002. Practitioners and managers in the teams were interviewed 
using similar interview schedules (see Appendix 5 and 6), which focused on 
their understanding of the nature of the work context, the role of social 
work practitioners and how this was governed. These themes arose from 
the research questions identified in the literature review. A semi- 
standardised format allowed the interview to cover those themes, while 
giving participants the freedom to express their own perspective and 
subjective understandings (Flick 1998: 82-88). The research questions 
relate to conditions of work within the organisation, particularly clarity of 
policy and adequacy of resources; the nature of management and the 
control of practice; and the nature of the relationship between local 
managers and practitioners. In developing the interview themes I sought 
to translate these potentially abstract questions into more concrete terms 
by drawing on my own previous experience as a practitioner and my 
current involvement with practitioners and students on placements. For 
instance, to explore the relationship of local managers and practitioners, I 
decided to focus on supervision, which, in my experience, was a key site in 
this relationship (and which was also identified as such in the 
literature--e. g. Pithouse -1998). 
1 discussed the interview schedule with 
colleagues who were practitioners, and with my supervisor. The aim of 
these discussions was to ensure that I was linking the theoretical concerns 
of the research questions with day-to-day practice issues in a way that 
provided triggers for discussion. For instance, in developing questions 
about the context of work, I did not wish to impose my own 
understanding of friction within the managerial hierarchy, acquired 
through observation, and so posed the question in terms of the 
organisation, allowing interviewees to explain their view of the 
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organisation and any levels within it. 
This form of interview can be criticised for being superficial, allowing 
interviewees to present an account of their situation that does not reflect 
their dayý-to-day practice (Ellis et al. 1999). 1 originally intended to use a 
review of case files as a check on this possibility. However, as explained 
above (see page iog), I abandoned this idea for practical and ethical 
reasons. Instead, I incorporated a style of interviewing that would explore 
answers in an active way. For instance, as well as asking for information on 
levels of discretion, I asked interviewees to explain how they understood 
the term and evaluated the level of discretion. I also asked for examples 
from their practice of the situations discussed. In discussing procedural 
clarity, for instance, I asked interviewees to identify documents and 
statements to substantiate their view, and used two sources-managers 
and practitioners-to cross check against each other. 
Particular difficulties with this approach relate to the conduct of the 
interview and the nature of the data generated. A possible risk is that 
exploration might feel inquisitorial, making interviewees uncomfortable 
and defensive (Flick 1998: 85). 1 sought to avoid this by ensuring that my 
questioning was tentative. The comments I received from interviewees 
suggest that this worked: they described the interviews as interesting and 
said that they had made them think more carefiffly about their experience 
at work. 
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I he second potential difficulty was the danger of imposing my point of 
view on the interviewee by taking an active role in the interview. However, 
I would argue that my approach recognised the inevitability (and 
necessity) of bringing ideas and presumptions to the interview (Gadamer 
. r975)-for 
instance, in identifying the areas I wanted to cover. The 
advantage of this recognition is that it required me to encourage 
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interviewees to present their own viewpoint, as material to challenge and 
question my own presumptions (ibid. ). I sought to do this, as mentioned 
above, through the use of a semi-structured interview approach. 
In presenting the interview data, I have sought to use the interviewees' 
own words wherever possible. Often this has involved cutting verbatim 
quotations to enable me to meet the word limit. Cuts are indicated with 
ellipses and usually involve extraneous, illustrative material and phatic 
statements. Where proper names have been used I have changed them and 
put the pseudonym in square brackets. For instance, the following 
statement: 
But I will go out and do stuff I will go out and do some shopping 
and I'll ... last week I had ... doing some of the washing as well. 
Simply because noone else to do it, it needs doing, it maintains that 
person and it's easier to do it. Now I know that I shouldn't be doing 
those tasks, but I do it. I mean, when I'm running for the shopping 
for one of my old people because the carer has yet again failed to 
turn up and she had no food and I know she doesn't eat. I know she 
doesn't eat. And so I ... you know, you're running down town and 
thinking, 'this is mad'. I must be the most expensive shopper in 
[name of unitary authority) 
becomes: 
'But I will go out and do stuff I will go out and do some shopping 
and I'll ... Simply 
because noone else to do it, it needs doing, it 
maintains that person and it's easier to do it. Now I know that I 
shouldn't be doing those tasks, but I do it... you know, you're 
running down town and thinking, 'this is mad'. I must be the most 
expensive shopper in [Newunitj (MS4). 
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The source of the quotation is given in brackets at the end of each 
quotation. The first letter indicates the team. 0 for the older persons 
team, and M for the mental health team. The second letter denotes 
whether the interviewee was a manager (M) or a social work practitioner 
(S), and the number identifies different individuals and is based on the 
order in which they were interviewed. The above quotation is ascribed to 
MS4: that is, the fourth social worker interviewed in the mental health 
team. 
Analysis 
Yin identifies four principles for the analysis of case study data: exhaustive 
examination of the evidence; focus on research questions; consideration of 
a range of interpretations; and locating the interpretation within the body 
of existing knowledge (Yin2003: 137). The first step of analysis involved 
summarising interview transcriptions, observation notes and document 
notes, and then using these to build a picture of the case 
study-identifying basic patterns, in terms of my research concerns. 
In the marshalling of data, reading of transcripts and analysis of their 
contents, the street-level bureaucracy perspective and the domination and 
discursive managerialist accounts of discretion were foregrounded. I read 
each interview transcript, summarising the material according to the focus 
of my theoretical concerns. Following this, I collected the summaries to 
obtain a global sense of how the data related to these concerns. I then re- 
read each transcript against this global picture, examining the quality of its 
fit with the data in that particular interview. The aim was to provide a 
coherent narrative, but one which took account of the fiffl range of the 
empirical evidence. This was achieved by examining the data in three 
different but related ways. The, main focus of data collection was the 
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interviews, and the observational and documentary data provided 
important contextual material to support the interview process. Secondly, 
within the interviews the data from different groups provided different 
sources of information which identified shared perceptions but also 
different perspectives. Finally, the three sources of 
information--observation, documents and interviews--also provided 
different fragmentary elements of the case study, which I have sought to 
combine to provide a more rounded picture than any one source alone 
could draw. 
This was not a straightforward, linear process, but rather involved an 
iterative process of dialogue between my research concerns and the 
empirical data. My focus was on discretion and the interactions of street- 
level bureaucrats and their managers, but I also needed to be aware of 
research and theoretical arguments which called into question the 
continuation of discretion (rather than taking it for granted); in examining 
patterns identified in the data and comparing and contrasting the two 
teams, it was necessary to consider the alternative interpretations of rival 
positions. 
Additionally, the interpretations I developed needed grounding in the 
whole body of the empirical data. This required me to check my 
interpretations against confirmatory evidence, but also to identify any 
evidence left out which might be contradictory and feed this back into my 
interpretation. 
The whole process has been informed by the idea of an hermeneutic circle 
(Gadamer 1975), where a theoretical understanding is used to guide the 
initial reading but is then subject to critical analysis against the detailed 
findings, with the aim of amending or changing the theory to better 
account for the range of findings. 
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In order to anchor the analysis, given the primarily qualitative nature of 
the data employed, I have sought to use quotations from the original 
material as far as possible in the presentation of the findings. I have sought 
to represent the fiffl range of voices within identified categories, but there 
is extensive quotation in some situations of one or two individuals who are 
in a particularly strong position to provide an overview or who have 
particular insights-for example, the older persons team manager-Or who 
provide clear representative comments. 
The approach taken in the interviews enabled me to gather rich, detailed 
and sometimes unexpected data. However, the small number of people 
involved-iS in all (see below)--meant that, while it was possible to 
identify trends and categories, these were inevitably impressionistic and 
the general points drawn reflect the art rather than the science of analysis. 
The limited number of interviewees, in just two teams, also makes it 
difficult to protect their anonymity. Two strategies are adopted to achieve 
this. The first is to avoid analysis on the basis of ethnicity and gender. As 
only one interviewee is not British White, and all but three across the two 
teams are women, this would clearly identify some interviewees. While 
participants are sometimes referred to by gender, this is on a random 
basis-sometimes referring to a woman as a man and vice versa-as a 
means of further protecting confidentiality. While for practitioners this 
strategy would be sufficient, for the managers, where job titles are used, it 
would not. Accordingly, findings relating to managers will be restricted 
(University of Warwick2005: section 6.1). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the rationale for adopting a case study 
approach to investigating discretion. Having outlined the idea of a 
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theoretical case study it has identified a location for the research-two 
adult social work teams within the same authority-that allows the 
comparison of discretion and of the influence of professionalism and 
managerialism in two sites. The main methods of data collection are 
outlined, focusing on interviews as the primary source of data. Interviews 
involved all the team managers (five in total) and all but one of the qualified 
social workers in each team (five in each team). 
The findings of the case study are presented in the next two chapters. 
Chapter V presents a'thick descriptioný G. Incoln and Guba 2. ooo) of the 
research authority and of the two adult social work teams within the 
authority which form the research sites. It outlines the basic 
characteristics and background which provide the Context for 
understanding the findings and which identify the similarities and 
differences between Lipsky's characterisation of street-level bureaucracies 
and this particular research setting. Accordingly, the data presented in 
Chapter V are particularly relevant to the first research question: is the 
department characterised by the conditions of street-level 
bureaucracy? WIiich additional contextual factors contribute to 
the extent and nature of discretion within the department? 
Chapter VI presents the findings as they relate to the remaining research 
questions (see pages 95-97), concerning the nature of management, control 
of practice through resources and procedures and the nature of relations 
between local managers and street-level practitioners. 
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CHAPTERV 
CASE STUDY OUTLINE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV focused on an account of the way the research was undertaken. 
Its design is as a case study, and this chapter will provide an outline of the 
case. The rationale for undertaking the case study was that it allowed a 
critical analysis of discretion through the exploration of the interaction of 
factors at street level. As explained in Chapter IV, there is evidence to 
suggest that Social Services are street-level bureaucracies, and that they are 
also sites in which managerial and professional discourses are influential. 
As Gomm et al (2ooo) point out, it is important not just to assume 
transferability or fit, but to demonstrate it (ibid io2); and this chapter will 
outline the case context and seek to demonstrate its appropriateness as a 
site to explore conceptualisations of social work discretion. 
The idea of 'fit' is important in qualitative research: it involves identifying 
similarities between the basic conditions within which the original theory 
was developed and the situation to which it is applied; but also recognising 
important differences between the original and the new setting (Lincoln 
and Guba2OOO: 40, Schofield2000: 76, Gomm etal 2000: 93)- MY aim is 
twofold: to compare the case with street-level bureaucracy theory and to 
identify how the theory can illuminate the situation; and to contrast the 
case with the theory, in order to critically examine and consider the 
contribution of other perspectives on discretion. In addition, the case 
description will provide basic background knowledge to inform the 
findings. In this respect this chapter also addresses itself to the first set of 
research questions identified in Chapter III. 
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Is the research authority characterised by the conditions of 
street-level bureaucracy? VP%at additional contextual factors 
contribute to the extent and nature of discretion within the 
research site? 
Street-level bureaucracies are certain forms of public bodies providing 
direct services to citizens, and are characterised by wide-ranging goals, 
policy complexity and insufficient resources for demand for services. In 
Chapter III I argued that Social Services Departments conform to the 
basic conditions of street-level bureaucracies, but that they are also the 
sites for conflict between professionalism and managerialism as service- 
organising discourses-and that, as such, they provide a useful location in 
which to compare and contrast the different analyses of discretion 
identified in Chapter III. 
FvI%II 
I here follows a description of the local authority in which the research was 
conducted, and the two adult social work teams studied. Characteristics of 
participants in the case study will then be outlined, and their possible 
effect on perceptions of the world of practice which participants inhabit 
will be considered. This will lead to consideration of the authority's recent 
history and its legacies in the current organisation and practice. 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE TWO TEAMS 
The study authority, here caffed'Newunit', is an English unitary local 
authority which has a population of around -i5o, ooo and is primarily rural, 
though dominated by its market town. The main call on Social Services, as 
measured by expenditure, is older people's services. The council has a long 
history of 0: )nservative control, but in the past decade control passed to 
the Liberal Democrats. Newunit is a relatively new Social Services 
authority and inherited this responsibility from the former county council 
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authority, which ceased to exist in April 1998, and which is here referred to 
as 'Old shire'. 
Oldshire was a large authority with a population of around three quarters 
of a million in a mixture of rural and urban communities. During the. 198os 
Oldshire was controlled by the Conservative party, but in the early 19gos 
the county moved to no overall control. The authority saw itself as 
businesslike, with the Social Services Department, for instance, welcoming 
the White Paper CaringfirPeople (Department of Health 1989) in terms of 
creating a mixed economy of care with greater private provision, and 
pointing out that: '... we are ahead of the White Paper ... in ... the work 
which has been set in hand to establish Quality Assurance in the 
Department, the developed management initiatives which win give our 
providers a head start... ' (Oldshire Social Services Committee Paper 
March 19go). 
Within Newunit the research looks at two different social work teams: an 
older persons team (OPT), and a community mental health team (CMI-IT). 
These teams are made up of a number of staff; my interest is in the 
professionally qualified social workers, who enabled me to look at street- 
level bureaucracy as mediated by professionalism. Two different adult 
teams also provide an opportunity to compare and contrast the impact of 
managerialism and professionalism on discretion within different working 
contexts. 
The council recently reorganised its structure, with Social Services now 
split between children's and adults' services. Adult community care 
services, which include services for older people and people with mental 
health problems, were recently amalgamated with housing. The corporate 
director (Community Care and Housiro was also the Director of Social 
Services (see Figure 1). 
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Within the elderly and physical disabilities service (EPDS) the 
split between commissioning, such as care management, and si 
provision, such as home care. There are two, geographically orl 
persons teams (OPTs); both are care management teams respe 
assessment, care planning and commissioning. The teams are r 
social workers and occupational therapists (all employed by th, 
and take direct referrals and referrals from individual and othe 
looked at one of these teams. The OPT structure is summaris( 
2. 
Fig. 2 OUDER PERSONS TEAM: ORGANISATIONAE CHAR 
Older Persons and Physically Disabled 
Persons Services Manager 
Older Persons Team (East) 
Manager 
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Social Workers 
(Professionally Qualified) 
Occupational Therapists 
(Professionally Qualified) 
Community Care Officers 
(Not Professionally Qualified) 
Assistant Manager 
H 
H 
Social Workers 
(Professionally Qualified) 
Occupational Therapists 
(Professionally Qualified) 
L Community Care Officers 
(Not Professionally Qualified) 
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The community mental health team (CMHT) covers the whole area and is 
a joint Health and Social Services team made up of social workers, 
community psychiatric nurses, psychiatrists and a day service, with social 
workers employed by Social Services and other staff employed by Health. 
(The CMHT structure is summarised in Figure 3, below). 
Fig. 3 COMMUN19PY MEN9PAIL HEAIL9PH 9PEA-M: 
ORGANISA9PIONAIL CHAMP 
Mental Health Services 
Services Manager 
I 
Community Mental 
Health -Fearn 
Manager 
-1 I 
-I 
-1 
I 
Assistant Manager 
(Out of Hours Service) 
Assistant Manager 
(Community Psychiatric 
Nurses) 
Assistant Manager 
(Day Centre) 
Assistant Manager 
(Social Work) 
I 
Social Workers 
(managed) 
In the OPT the team manager and two assistant managers are all women 
who are qualified social workers. The assistant managers manage both 
occupational therapists and social workers. They also carry a small 
caseload. Newunit's publicity material about the service does not mention 
professional titles, only referring to the generic 'care manager'role. 
In the CMHT both the team manager (male) and the assistant manager 
(female) running the social work service are social workers. The manager is 
a joint Health and Social Services appointment, and is employed by the 
local NHS trustl. The assistant manager is employed by Social Services, 
manages the social work team and runs the Approved Social Worker 
(AS'W) service, and is also a practising ASW. The CMHT is a specialist 
mental health service combining commissioning and provider services, and 
takes referrals only from other agencies, mainly general practitioners 
(GPs). 'Core services' provided by Social Services to the CMHT are 
described in the official documents in broad terms, including: '... ongoing 
intervention and interaction with clients and carers' (Newunit 
Community Care Planlggg-2000). 
My focus in both teams is on social workers and their line managers. All 
the social workers and managers interviewed are qualified. There are six 
social workers in the OPT and in the CMHT. In each team one social 
worker declined to participate in the research. The social worker in the 
OPT sought me out to tell me that her decision stemmed from her anger 
about the authority's cuts in older people's services. The CMHT social 
worker's reasons for declining are not known. 
In the OPT three of the social workers interviewed are full-time and two 
are part-tune; all the CM11T social workers are full-time, as are all 
i There are other assistant managers-for instance, a community psychiatric 
nurse (CpN), who manages the CPNs. 129 
managers in both teams. Most managers and workers are women: of the 
five managers one is a man; eight of the ten social workers are women. All 
but one of the people interviewed are White British. 
In the CMHT both managers have been managers for over io years. In the 
OPT only the team manager has extensive management experience (u 
years). The other two managers have two years' and one year's 
management experience respectively (see Table2, Appendix 4). 
While there is a range of experience both as social workers and as 
employees of the authority in both teams, a significant difference in the 
pattern of worker experience is demonstrated in Table 2 (Appendix 4), 
which sets out the number of years each interviewee has been qualified and 
the amount of time worked for Newunit or its predecessor authority. 
From the table it is clear that the two groups of social workers and 
managers in each team are quite different in relation to their career 
histories. Most workers in the OPT have worked in the authority since 
they were qualified (one social worker appears to have extensive experience 
outside the authority, but this is mainly the result of a career break; 
another person worked for the authority for some time before being 
sponsored to undertake social work training). The exception to this 
pattern is the team manager, who has worked in social work teams 
elsewhere. By contrast, in the CMHT all the workers and managers have 
been employed as social workers by other authorities than Newunit or 
Oldshire. 
In order to understand the current organisation and issues in Newunit, it 
is necessary to review the recent history of the teams and the department. 
Despite recent changes at the senior level of Social Services, the day-to-day 
organisation-care management and Social Services policies and 
systems- were largely developed in Oldshire, then taken over and 
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continued by Newunit. Recent policy initiatives, such as the control of 
financial overspend, can be understood only in the context of Oldshire's 
legacy, which is outlined below. 
The Implementation of Care Management 
A pivotal point for adult Social Services in England and Wales was the 
implementation of the NHS and Community Care Act in 1993 (Hill 
200oa: 7), which was central to the intrusion of managerialism into adult 
Social Services (HarriS2003: 43)- Oldshire embraced the reforms of adult 
Social Services in the early -iggos. In implementing care management, local 
authorities had to consider the context within which it was to be put into 
effect, particularly the idea of Social Services as an enabling authority, and 
the idea of a market of care, which distinguished the roles of purchasers 
and providers of services within social care (Hi11200od: 164, HarriS2003: 
43-46). 
Oldshire took a proactive approach to implementation of the new 
community care. The form of care management adopted in the county was 
strongly administrative and based on a clear purchaser/provider split. The 
authority saw itself as blazing a trail for care management and a more 
market-based approach to care provision. In a Social Services Committee 
paper, senior officers comment thatt 'Many of the ideas contained in the 
White Paper are already to be seen in the way in which we work in 
[Oldshirel', and that the consultation primaily sets the scene and asks 
questions about how, precisely, the authority should go forward. For 
instance, in its role as enabling authority, it predicts that: '... a clear 
distinction will need to be made between the purchasing and providing 
functions within the local authority' and emphasises the need for a training 
and personnel strategy focusing on new skills for'case managers' (sic) in 
negotiating and designing care packages and financial management for 
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managers (Oldshire Social Services Committee Paper March 19go). 
Alongside organisational changes within Oldshire, the community care 
reforms were- accompanied by important changes, closely associated with 
the purchaser/provider split, in the authority's view of professionals such 
as social workers. Social workers became care managers: 
... social workers as care managers or whatever, they were put in 
commissioning. You were buyers or you were sellers. Social workers 
were buyers, and what they bought were services from providers. So 
the sense that social workers could be providers as well-it was still 
acknowledged verbally, as, oh yeah, well of course, we might be 
providing a service as well. But we were situated on that kind of a 
divide (OMv ). 
While these changes had a significant influence on adult community care 
services, a range of other factors seemed to reduce their impact on social 
workers in the CMHT. In relation to the community care reforms, 
national policy reinforced the separateness of mental health. In putting 
forward its community care policy, central government went against 
Griffiths' proposal and split lead responsibility for community care. While 
local authorities were responsible for most community care, it gave 
responsibility for mental health planning to the NHS (Shaw 2000:. io7). As 
care management was being implemented in Social Services, a different 
but parallel form of care management, the Care Programme Approach, was 
implemented in mental health. 
In Oldshire, mental health services were not a priority. Before these 
reforms there was a third lower investment of social services resources in 
mental health services locally when compared with the national average for 
Social Services (201b of annual revenue expenditure, as opposed to 3010) 
2 For explanation of source code see page 120. 
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(Social Services Inspectorate Report 1989). There was an emphasis on 
joint Health and Social Services provision and CMHTs were developed in 
Oldshire, one of the first of which was in what would become the Newunit 
area (Oldshire Three Year Plan 19go). Social workers within the team felt 
that mental health was increasingly marginal to the local authority: 
I remember going up to Shire Hall, a group of us here, because we 
were feeling so frustrated that there didn't seem to be any policy, 
there didn't seem to be any overall views ... mental health seemed 
the poor cousin. There was more emphasis on elderly and children 
and families, and we just felt there wasn't any strategy (MS2). 
Team Work and Professional Social Work 
Both the CMHT and the OPT were and are, in Ovretveit's terms: 'Formal 
multidisciplinary community teamIsI. a working group with a defined 
membership of different professions, governed by an agreed and explicit 
team policy, which is upheld by a team leader' (Ovretveit 1993: 64). Under 
the umbrella of formal teams, Ovretveit distinguishes different forms of 
organisation and using his typology helps clarify the differing ways in which 
these two teams were organised, and how this organisation has changed 
over time. 
At the time of the introduction of community care, Oldshire was 
organising its teams in terms of client groups. In the older people's 
services, this involved teams of both social workers and occupational 
therapists. In Oldshire, the OPT was a'fiffly managed multidisciplinary 
team[sl: team members from different professions, fully managed by the 
team manager' (ibid 75). The team was made up of social workers, 
occupational therapists and unqualified staff, who were employed by Social 
Services and jointly managed by the same managers. The CMHT, on the 
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other hand, corresponded to another type of formal team identified by 
Ovretveit: the 'managed-core and coordinated-associate team'. Here, some 
team members are line-managed by the team leader, while others come 
under another organisational structure; their contribution to the team is 
negotiated and coordinated (ibid. 68). At team level the leadership role was 
taken by the consultant psychiatrist, although, as the following comment 
from a practitioner suggests, this leadership was not accepted uncritically 
by all: 
The mental health team was set up 15 years ago; it's been looked 
after by two consultants up to last year-white, English middle class 
and paternalistic. They were keen to educate up the social work staff 
in the medical model. They left last year. It's been a big change, it's 
been a steep learning curve (Field note: CMHT, comment by social 
worker, December2001). 
When Social Services were transferred to Newunit, the CMHT remained 
unchanged: it was already geographically based in the district. The OPT 
was reconstituted with some geographical changes to its boundaries and 
with social work staff previously based in hospitals brought into the team. 
The internal organisation of the OPT as a single agency (Social Services) 
multi-disciplinary team has, then, remained the same, although the 
particular geographical areas to which the team relates changed slightly 
over recent years. 
In2OOOthe CMHT was reorganised into a jointly managed, multi-agency, 
multi-disciplinary team with a team manager (from a social work 
background) appointed by Health and Social Services. Amongst other 
things, the team manager oversaw community psychiatric (CPN) nurses 
and social workers. However, unlike the OPT, where occupational 
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therapists and social workers are managed by the same managers and share 
the same room, in the CMHT there are separate CPN and social work 
teams, each led by a member of its own profession; and the social workers, 
who are still employed by Social Services, work within both Social Services 
and local trust policies. Social workers and CPNs as professional groups 
occupy different rooms. 
The picture that emerges from the CMHT is of social work in the context 
of entrenched and strong professional identities, central to the defMing of 
role. One practitioner who worked in adult services in the early 19gos (and 
subsequently moved to the CMHT to be the assistant manager) contrasts 
the impact of community care reforms in both teams in terms of a 
continuing professional identity-. 
r"UNI 
I he adult and disability team embraced care management fiffl fold; 
we took on joint working very readily. I learnt a lot about OT, and 
understood buying and selling services between each other. In the 
mental health team they had their profession, they were not going to 
be care managers. From the outside they were seen as isolated, 
peculiar (Field note: CMHT, comment by assistant manager, 
December zooi). 
All interviewees in the CMHT make a point of drawing a clear line 
between their roles, -which they characterise as continuing to have a 
'clinical' dimension-and that of workers in the OPT, which is more 
administrative. This point is echoed in the authority's Community Care 
Plan, which, in contrast to other adult client groups, talks of care managers 
in mental health providing'... ongoing intervention and interaction with 
clients and carers' (Newunit Community Care Plan1999-2000: 28). 
The structure of Social Services budgets for the OPT and the CMHT 
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reflects these different roles. Forty-four percent of the current mental 
health services budget is spent on 'assessment and care management' (even 
after allowance is made for ASW assessment time), whereas in the OPT 
the percentage of budget covering the cost of professional staff is much 
lower, at . 13.2% (Newunit Community Care Plans 1999-2000: 29 and 
2000-2001: 34). The proportion of professional time, as compared with 
the rest of the budget, may be higher in the CMHT because there are 
fewer funds for the purchase of services and lower in the OPT because of 
economies of scale. Nevertheless, even taking this into account, there 
remains a significant discrepancy between the two teams'budgets for 
professional staff-a point underlined in a recent SSI inspection report, 
which points out the low proportion of professional social work staff in the 
OPT compared with other authorities. 
Lmpact of Local Reorganisations 
The picture so far in adult services has emphasised the impact of care 
management reforms, and therefore of managerialism, particularly in older 
persons services (see page 131). However, a number of limiting factors 
within the organisation, particularly the effect of the reorganisation of 
Social Services inr998, have curtailed management influence within 
Newunit. 
Newunit became a Social Services Authority following the abolition of 
Oldshire. In a national study of the partial reorganisation of local 
government in England, Craig and Manthorpe (iggg) find Social Services 
Departments expressing concern about reorganisation because of loss of 
central expertise, having to refocus existing service provision in line with 
new local priorities and losing economies of scale. 
Senior managers within Social Services criticised the local government 
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commission proposal to abolish Oldshire and shift Social Services to six 
district authorities. They questioned the capacity of the unitaries to 
provide Social Services and support professional staff, and argued that the 
change would result in increased management costs (Oldshire Social 
Services Committee Paper, July1994). A report by the Director of Social 
Services also points out problems with budgets: '[Oldshirel spends 
significantly above its Standard Spending Assessment on social services-a 
seamless transition of services will only be achieved if this level of funding 
is matched' (Oldshire Social Services Committee Paper October 1994). A 
year later the Director of Social Services reiterated her concerns that the 
reorganisation was likely to lead to an increase in costs, disruption and loss 
of momentum in the implementation of community care (Oldshire Social 
Services Committee Paper March 1995). 
The new unitary authority was able to attract senior figures from 
Oldshire's Social Services: the Deputy Director of Social Services, for 
instance, became Newunit's Director of Social Services, and a previous 
senior planner is the current director of Social Services. However, Social 
Services' move from the shire to the unitary disrupted central 
management control in a number of ways. 
As part of the management reforms associated with community care, 
Oldshire introduced a'client record and information system' (CRIS), 
designed to computerise records and manage and monitor case 
management. The computer system was countywide, and with the 
reorganisation it had to be disaggregated to operate at district levels. 
Within Newunit this resulted in its largely becoming a basic case- 
recording system, a situation reflected in the SSI's observation that: '... it 
was unable to meet modern management information needs' (Inspection 
Report 2oo2n para 9-9). 
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Another significant issue for management and control within Newunit was 
its ability to support a strategic management and control function. This 
largely seems to have been related to fimding problems inherited from 
Oldshire, which will be discussed further below. 
In relation to older people's services, a recent SSI inspection report 
highlights the problem of insufficient strategic management capacity to 
develop the service (ibid. para 9-3)- 
The impact of the move also resulted in a loss of expertise at the centre. 
Newunit carried over and continued to operate policies developed within 
Oldshire, but the senior staff who developed them were distributed 
amongst the six unitaries. For instance, one practitioner, who moved from 
Oldshire to Newunit, comments that in terms of local procedures relating 
to the operation of the Mental Health Act: 
We used to have a county-wide legal team, who had a lot of 
confidence ... who had a lot of knowledge of mental health law, and 
we then had to use our own lawyers in [Newunitj and basically had 
to help train them up, because they actually came in completely 
naive on mental health ... a lot of mental health legislation is not just 
going to the books: it's people's knowledge of such situations (MS2). 
Alongside changes in Social Services, both teams have had to cope with 
changes in the organisation. of local Health services and central 
government emphasis on partnerships across Health and Social Services 
(Hill 200OC: 154-157), involving the pooling of budgets and integration of 
services (Mitchell2ooo-. i[88-igo). Cross-agency work with Health has 
been problematic because of continuing changes in local NHS 
organisation-a point noted at national level by the Chief Inspector of 
Social Services (Social Services Inspectorate2ooi, para- 5.41-)- In this 
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context, the OPT has set up working relationships with the two primary 
care trusts (PCTs) to which it relates, and with them has agreed a joint 
assessment document and eligibility criteria. The situation in mental 
health is slightly more complicated and was described by one manager as 
'planning blight' (MM2). While the OPT is a primary care service, the 
CMHT is a specialist secondary service, with working relationships 
between Social Services and Health and a provider trust. The Local 
Priority Needs Trust (co-terminous with the unitary authority) was 
abolished and replaced with a Mental Health Trust, which was co- 
terminous with the old county. There are plans for a new trust to be 
developed which corresponds to the two PCTs, covering and extending 
just beyond the unitary authority. 
Pressures on Resources 
Fundamental concerns about reorganisation are also voiced in terms of the 
resourcing of Social Services and the ethos of the new authority. Several 
practitioners in the OPT contrast the current resource problems in 
Newunit with their experience of the resource situation in Oldshire: 'All I 
know is that all the time we were a big authority, there just was not that 
restriction on resources' (OS4). 
A recent Audit Commission/SSI joint review notes that: 
In 1998/9, the new Authority inherited a level of expenditure 
significantly above its Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) and 
increased Council Tax by 22%in order to cover planned 
commitments and avoid any disruption to services for users. There 
was a further 6% increase in 1999/2ooo. ... This higher 
level of 
contribution from local revenue, however, is more due to a relatively 
low central government grant settlement than because the 
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Authority is a high spender (Inspection Report 20OI: para 1-3-0- 
The report criticises Social Services' incremental budget-setting and calls 
for the development of budget-setting based on'year zero'needs. 
(Incremental budgeting involves using the previous period's budget as the 
basis for the next period's budget, with additions for new items. In 
contrast, a zero-base budget is where'... a manager responsible for its 
presentation is required to prepare and justify the budget expenditure 
from zero base ie assuming there is no commitment to spend on any 
activity' 11-lussey 1999J). The report emphasises the need for politicians to 
make decisions about the levels of services they are willing to provide. 
As a consequence, Newunit Social Services have seen attempts to reduce 
spending. The Director of Social Services, for instance, points out that: 
'[Newunitj is facing severe budget problems this year, and Social Services 
has to take its share. This means we are looking to make significant 
savings in the budget of adult services (Newunit Community Care Plan 
2000-2001: 1). 
However, within this overall picture funding for different teams within 
adult services has been uneven. In-1999-2000older people's services were 
funded at 3% over national average provision, while mental health services 
are 40% below national fiinding levels (Inspection Report, 2001: para 
1-3-2). The focus for cuts has been on older people's services. Mental health 
services during the research period have been receiving increased funding 
in the form of specific grants from central government associated with the 
modernisation programme in mental health; but alongside this 
practitioners and managers describe core funding for care management in 
mental health as insufficient. In the older people's services, cuts are not 
just to bring expenditure in line with other authorities, but are also used 
more aggressively to reduce the level of Social Services fiinding: 
140 
I asked when the savings would be achieved. Apparently the elderly 
team needed to save a quarter of a million, but so far they've saved 
nearly half a million. They're stiff being asked to make savings, 
because other adult services haven't managed to make savings. In 
part it's because the elderly services are easier to cut, because there's 
a high throughput and high volume-this will bring down costs 
quicker! (Field note: OPT, conversation with manager, November 
2.001). 
The department has used two techniques to deal with its financial 
problems in the older persons service. Eligibility thresholds for service 
provision have been raised (this threshold was higher in the OPT area than 
in CMHT). There have also been active moves to reduce spending through 
the imposition on the OPT from the centre of a policy of 'two out, one in': 
for every new hour of home care allocated, two hours of the existing service 
have to be cut, for both domicillary and residential care. This process of 
budget-cutting, however, seems to have gone beyond what is required to 
reduce the OPT budget. 
Risk 
Another factor that appears to differ between the OPT and the CMHT is 
the role of the idea of risk. Contemporary society is centrally concerned 
with the identification and management of risk (Lupton 11999: io2)- It has 
been argued that the presence of risk, insofar as it entails uncertainty, can 
contribute to a professional orientation within work contexts Ijamous and 
Peloille IE970)- Within the mental health services, concern with risk has 
been central since the early 19gos, reflecting a shift in national policy to 
concern with risk, dangerousness and community (Department of Health 
1[995, Muijen 1996 and Reith 1998). This concern is, according to one of 
the mental health managers, echoed in the culture of the mental health 
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service: 
I think we probably encompass risk in mental health in [sic) a 
greater extent. I suspect policy has pushed that along over the last 
io years. You'll be aware that most of the press going back 8, io 
years was about risk-taking and disasters happening in the 
community'(MM2)3. 
While risk, as uncertainty, can contribute to indeterminacy in that it 
reduces the capability of managers to predict and control practice (Jamous 
and Peloille 1970), it also gives rise to concerns that can result in increased 
monitoring of practice (Hood et al. zoo o, Munr02Oo4). For instance, 
practitioners in the CMIIT see increased discussion of risk at policy level 
and the introduction of risk polices as a means of checking up on 
practitioners, as much as a means of improving practice: 
There's much more conscious consideration of risk, on the risk 
assessment forms, which are helpful, because they help you focus a 
bit more ... [but] there is a 
little bit of a situation where, unless 
you9ve filled in the form, people are assuming you9ve not weighed up 
the risks (MS2). 
While in mental health the focus of concern has been on violent or 
aggressive behaviour and suicide (ShaW 2000'. 113-117), concern in older 
persons services, locally and nationally, has been slower to develop, and has 
focused on vulnerable adults' risk of victimisation-particularly abuse and 
exploitation in residential care (Newunit Community Care Plan 
1999-2000: 47). Newunit acknowledged national concerns in this area and 
identified it as a high priority locally, pointing out that: 'On average there 
3A M2 -refers Here to the7iigh public profile of mental health services and risk 
management following the publication of a report on circumstances surrounding 
the miirder ofjonathan Zito by Christopher Clunis (Ritchie etal z994). 142 
has been one incident [in adult services) requiring investigation over the 
past year' (ibid 43). Local multi-agency procedures were developed which 
the authority felt raised public and professional awareness Ubid 43). The 
Community Care Plan noted the intention to launch new procedures and 
develop a training programme (ibid ri). Vulnerable adults procedures were 
introduced in line with central government guidance on the introduction 
of a framework for multi-agency assessment and coordination 
(Department of Health and Home OffiCe 2000). 
However, one social worker in the OPT points out that in the 
implementation of the plan, planned funding for staff training did not 
materialise (OSi), and another practitioner voices concern about the way 
risk is understood and used in local policies: '... there is a perception that if 
something does go wrong there's some sort of culpability there ... although 
you're sharing it with your line manager (OS2). 
MODERNISATION: INTENSIFICATION, CHANGE, FOCUS 
AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
At the same time that Newunit acquired a responsibility for Social 
Services, the New Labour government came to power, promising to 
modernise public services. In relation to Social Services, this process 
involved building on the community care reforms, with an intensification 
of market and managerialist approaches (Mitchell 200o, HarriS2003: 49). 
The preceding account of the policy and financial context of social work 
practice in Oldshire and Newunit mentions the increasingly problematic 
financial context of service delivery, with expenditure subject to increasing 
scrutiny concerning Newunit's ability to fund the continuing 
level of Social 
Services (a classic situation in street-level bureaucracies). 
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Modernisation reforms have exacerbated this situation. The programme 
of modernisation is wide-ranging and complex (Mitche11200o). Key 
elements which are relevant here are the emphasis on a performance 
management culture, which involves both a strategic framework and a 
mechanism for monitoring and achieving that framework and the use of 
ring-fenced budgets to drive forward specific modernisation projects. In 
adult Social Services, these moves have been clear in the government's 
development of National Service Frameworks for mental health 
(Department of Health 1999) and for older people's services (Department 
of Health20oi). The National Service Frameworks are part of a process 
Hudson has described as the nationalisation of Social Services: the 
increased control and direction of local services by central government 
(Hudson2000: 224). They: '... lay down models of treatment and care 
which people are entitled to expect in every part of the country... fandl 
spell[sl out national standards ... 
[ofj what they aim to achieve, how they 
should be developed and delivered and how to measure performance ... ' 
(Department of Health iggg: i) The Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF)j '... a set of indicators for adult services intended to reflect 
"effectiveness of service delivery and outcomes... (Netten2005: 97), is 
integral to this process. The PAF was first published in the form of league 
tables in2001. Increasing central government funding for personal Social 
Services has increasingly taken the form of special and specific grants tied 
to satisfactory performance and Outcomes (SSI 2001: 
io5-io6)-completing the performance management circle that underpins 
the modernisation agenda. 
The local implementation of modernisation initiatives has exacerbated the 
tensions of management control, policy clarity and resources that already 
characterised the context for social work practice in Newunit. Under 
modernisation, the policy context of practice has been characterised by 
continuing change. This is particularly evident in reorganisations within 
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Social Services and in relation to other organisations. Modernisation has 
emphasised the need for multi-agency and multi-disciplinary work to 
provide 'joined-up', seamless services. Social Services has been reorganised 
at a corporate level. When the department transferred from Oldshire, it 
retained the fiffl range of responsibilities across children and family 
services and services for adults. However, more recently the authority split 
Social Services in line with anticipated moves in government policy 
towards the establishment of corporate children's services (Department of 
Education and SkilIS2003), with children and families going to Education 
and adult services joining up with Housing under the former Acting 
Director of Social Services. At CMHT and OPT level, however, this split 
does not seem to have had a significant impact. It is unclear how far this 
reflects the division between adult and children's services that developed 
over the past iio years (Hill 2oooc) or whether the impact of this sort of 
change takes time to work its way through. 
One of the key elements of national frameworks is the reiteration of the 
need for cooperation across care agencies. This includes the development 
of pooled budgets and possibly the development of joint Health/Social 
Care agencies (Health Act iggg, Health and Social Care Act 2001). In 
Newunit, the impact of this push has reflected national policy, with more 
explicit and shared frameworks for funding community care-for instance, 
in the older people's services, a joint framework for assessment and 
eligibility criteria for provision has been agreed between Social Services 
and the area's two PCTs- 
Within the CMHT, the team has moved from joint but separate 
management to joint management under Health leadership. During this 
period there were also a number of reorganisations in the health service, 
and more are planned. These have contributed to what the CMHT 
manager characterises as 'a policy vacuum' (MM2). 
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The impact of demands for change and implementation have highlighted 
problems of management capacity within Newunit (see pages -T37--138)- 
Alongside policy developments, there has also been an increasing emphasis 
on regulation and review-a situation which, Power (1997) has argued, 
reflects a general tendency in modern government to require the 
demonstration of compliance and performance through the exercise of 
audit, which he calls the 'audit society. The OPT and the CMHT were 
subject to a number of audits prior to my period of fieldwork. The 
continuing impact of this programme is perhaps captured in the following 
quote from a practitioner: 
Because we went into unitaries it's been absolutely relentless, the 
change, or it feels like it has. Shortly after going into unitaries there 
were various reviews. Again, that's just ongoing, from different 
areas, from different departments, internally and externally (OSO. 
Performance monitoring has also become more prominent with the 
development of the PAF. The performance of all Social Services in England 
is monitored against common standards and recently Newunit was 
identified as a poorly performing authority. There have been two 
immediate consequences of poor PAF performance: management energies 
have been redirected to develop systems for the capture of performance 
data, in order to improve the authority's star rating; and it has fed into the 
local debate about Social Services funding in the council and in the press. 
At management level, the poor PAF performance of the adult services has 
resulted in sigpificant activity to review systems for recording; failure to 
routinely capture data is seen as the main problem, rather than actual 
performance. At the same time, PAF status is seen by managers as crucial 
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to securing funds and retaining their freedom to manage. As one OPT 
manager puts it: 
... it's mostly a data entry problem ... But it still does matter, 
actually, because if we're performing badly on that, or appearing to, 
and on other things, that affects the amount of money we get. It 
affects the fact that we may get told that we're put under somebody 
else's control ... So those things that seem bureaucractic are actually 
important (OMO. 
Local press reports have focused on the underfimding of Social Services, 
especially in terms of service cuts and the authority's poor performance 
against the PAF targets. Headlines such as: 'One star council needs more 
cash to twinkle' and 'Council act over fimding crisis' have raised the 
political profile of older people's services. 
Another element of modernisation generally has been funding to support 
service development. In both services, managers and practitioners 
comment on the inadequacy of core funding and set this next to new 
money coming in to Health and Social Services, which is ring-fenced for 
specific services. They point to the value of many new services, but 
criticise the assumption that existing provision is sufficient. In the 
CMHT new monies are seen as bringing in necessary services and bringing 
the national framework into effect. In the OPT new monies are welcomed, 
but at the same time they highlight core funding problems and cuts 
experienced in core services and also create inequities, with people in 
certain hospitals having access to monies that are not available to those in 
other hospitals (fiinding to facilitate discharge is tied to only one of the 
hospital trusts used in this area). 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the 'fit' between a range of ideas about the 
nature of social work discretion in Social Services through an examination 
of the case study authority-Newunit. 'Fit' is the idea that the basic 
conditions assumed by a theory can also be found in the area under 
investigation. 'Fit' does not have to be exact: it is more like a family 
resemblance, in which, alongside similarities, there are also significant 
differences. Newunit, I have sought to demonstrate, is an appropriate site 
within which to explore the ideas of discretion discussed in Chapter M. 
Historically, Newunit and its predecessor authority, Oldshire, have been 
proactive in their implementation of managerialist reforms in Social 
Services. However, within this environment the key conditions associated 
with discretion in street-level bureaucracies-policy uncertainty and 
resource and policy mismatch-have also been identified. Practitioners 
and managers talk of relentless policy change and the tension between 
focusing resources on those in greatest need and, at the same time, 
undertaking preventative work, within the broader context of a budget 
crisis identified by the Director of Social Services. Alongside the 
significant influence of managerialism within Newunit, continuing 
elements of professionalism have also been noted in both teams, though in 
different ways, with more official recognition for the professional role in 
the CMHT and acknowledgement of professional status by local managers 
and practitioners in the OPT. 
In the foregoing account I have sought to demonstrate the basis for my 
assumption that Newunit provides a valuable research site to explore 
street-level bureaucracy in the context of professionalism and 
managerialism. Additionally, the picture that I have presented of Newunit 
provides a backdrop against which to understand and consider the findings 
that will be presented in the following chapter. 
148 
CHAPTERVI 
FINDINGS: VOICES FROM THE TEAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapter the key characteristics of the research authority 
and the two adult teams were outlined and the 'fit' between the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective and the research authority considered. The idea 
of 'fit' raises questions of not only the similarities between the theory and 
the empirical study, but also areas of significant difference. Social Services, 
as the domination managerialism perspective argues, is strongly influenced 
by managerial concerns but the key characteristics of the street-level 
bureaucracy account of discretion-policy imprecision and insufficient 
resources to meet policy goals-are also present. However, significant 
additional factors, which contribute to discretion but which are not 
central to these analyses, have been identified, namely the complex nature 
of management in terms of its structure and different motivations of 
managers and the continuing influence of professionalism in the 
structuring of official discretion within the organisation. These 
observations relate to the first series of research questions structuring this 
thesis: 
Is the research authority characterised by the conditions of 
street-level bureaucracy? What additional contextual factors 
contribute to the extent and nature of discretion within the 
research site? 
This chapter will consider in more detail some of the points raised in the 
preceding chapter, in relation to the nature of discretion within these 
social work settings. This will be done by considering the data from the 
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case study in relation to the following questions, which arose from the 
review of literature in Chapter III (see Pages 95-97): 
What is the nature of management within Social Services as a 
street-level bureaucracy, particularly at the interface between 
street-level and front-line management, and between front-line 
managers and senior managers, in terms of its structure and 
range ofmotivations ofmanagers? 
Strategic managers exercise control of local discretion through 
control of resources and use ofprocedures. 
Is control through resources and procedures exercised uniforndy 
across all areas of social work or only in certain areas? How 
effectively do these strategies control local discretion? To what 
extent can street-level practititioners resist? What role do local 
nmnagers play in enforcing resource and procedural controls? 
What is the nature of relations between local managers and 
street-level practitioners, and how does this influence the nature 
of their discretion? To what extent is it structured by the idea of 
conflicting interests of managers and street-level bureaucrats? 
To what extent is it influenced by shared connnitments and 
concerns, particularly around professionalismlý' 
While it is possible to distinguish these three areas analytically, it is 
important to remember that they are also interconnected, particularly in 
considering the impact of local management on discretion and the ability 
of practitioners to resist control. 
Within the empirical study the interviews with practitioners and 
managers within the two teams form the main basis of these findings. In 
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these findings the managers within the two teams-team managers and 
assistant team managers--are referred to as 'local managers'. Managers 
responsible for strategic policy within the authority are referred to as 
(senior managers'. The account given in this chapter of senior managers is 
from the perspective of local managers and street-level practitioners. 
THE NATURE OF MANAGEMENT 
Managers are presented by Lipsky and the domination perspective as a 
unified groupt they implement policy, and they seek to control the 
discretion of street-level practitioners. Despite the differences in these 
two perspectives about the effectiveness of managerial control (which will 
be discussed below), they both assume that managers accept and seek to 
implement the policy required by senior managers. (On this basis, for 
instance, Lipsky assumes that discretion is located at street level: managers 
implement policy, and any deviation from policy is due to street-level 
discretion. ) 
Managers' Views ofthe Organisation 
The first area examined here is the views of managers about the 
organisation within which they work, particularly of the policies and 
procedures that structure their work. In contrast to the view that 
managers accept organisational priorities and policies, the evidence from 
local managers intez-viewed in this study is that they are far from uncritical 
about the policy they have to implement, and most have major misgivings 
about the policy context within which they work. 
The managers and assistant managers were interviewed in each team 
studied. The preceding chapter indicates that these two contexts involved 
organisational structures sufficiently different to require separate 
'5' 
examination of the two sets of managers. The primary organisational. 
difference is that, while the older persons team (OPI) largely operates 
within the organisational context of the local authority, the community 
mental health team (CMHT), as a joint Health and Social Services team, 
operates in the overlapping context of Social Services and Health. 
Older Persons Team 
Local managers in the older persons team have strong misgivings about the 
authority's policy in relation to older people's services. They feel that the 
council and senior officers devalue their client group and lack commitment 
to professional social work with older people: 
We had to reduce our qualified staff numbers, so that only half of 
our field staff were qualified staff, and the other half were, I wonýt 
say were untrained, but were an unqualified community care outfit 
... it's a fmancial move. It's cheaper. ... and that's not 
been a view 
that's been taken with any other service ... my feeling is, it's a 
lot to 
do with the way elderly people are viewed in society, as being in a 
way people who only need practical services (OMO. 
This local manager-the team manager-goes on to identify the 
authority's approach as ageist, and sees this as a wider discriminatory 
approach in society to older people: 
... you 
know, the rhetoric about bed-blockers ... all hides the 
fact 
that what you're talking about is people. They are an institutional 
nuisance ... There would 
be a national outcry if people starting 
calling people of any other age bed-blockers (OMO. 
Local 
managers feel that the real importance of older people's services to 
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the council and senior officers lies in their cost and in the need to reduce 
the general Social Services overspend (see Page 137). They feel that older 
people's services are used by the council as an easy way of cutting costs, 
through tightening eligibility criteria and through an additional rationing 
filter, where resources are not released to new eligible cases until twice the 
equivalent resource is saved: the 'two out, one in'poficy (see page 141)- 
Local managers are highly critical of this policy, to the point where they 
describe it as illegal, but they also see it as difficult to chaflenge because of 
the compromises and comer-cutting they and practitioners sometimes 
employ to get the work done: 
We've had this ... confirmed again by the solicitors this week... if 
somebody ultimately does go to a judicial review about it Newunit] 
will almost certainly lose the case. So I suppose there are 
calculations about avoiding situations where people are most likely 
to go for that ... I think most of us Ilocal managers] would be quite 
comfortable for something to go to a judicial review-but we want 
to be sure that it's a case where we haven't compounded errors with 
other things ... you want to be, sure that the policy issue isnýt going 
to get lost in a whole load of stuff about someone didn't do this, or 
they didn't fill in that form properly (OMi). 
In this setting of resource cuts, care management, which is seen by the 
council as the primary role of social workers (see page -148), 
becomes 
increasingly difficult. Managers express frustration about a failure to 
recognise the resultant pressure on care managers and on them-that not 
having the resources to care manage creates more work, not less: 'How do 
they [care managersl find time? They find it at the expense of our waiting 
list getting longer, really. That's the only leeway there is' (OMi). 
However, alongside this sense of conflict between local and senior 
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managers, there is also an area of collaboration over achieving targets set 
for the authority by central government, particularly in terms of the 
performance assessment framework (PAF). Adult services, which were 
'named and shamed' (see pages 146-147), seek an acceptable star rating in 
order to access 'pots' of central government money and supplement 
insufficient core Social Services funding. Local managers express concern 
that the equity of services offered is compromised in this process: 
The Bed Clearance Programme (BCP) money is tied up to 
performance indicators, and this distorts services. It's only 
discharges from the ftownj hospitals that the money can be used for 
... The team 
know the targets are distorted, and that people in other 
hospitals, e. g. Jlistj, are not getting the service they should be 
getting, and that there are inequities. But unless they meet the 
performance indicators to discharge from the Itownj hospitals, they 
wonýt get the money next year (Field note: OPT, information from 
manager, November2001). 
For local OPT managers, meeting performance targets is necessary not 
only to gain access to central government funding, but also to avoid being 
subject to special measures and replaced by other managers. Concern 
about the impact of poor performance ratings can be seen in local 
managers' reaction to an SSI inspection-. 
It's the consequences. I mean, nobody likes to be seen as failing 
when you think you're doing good work, but it's also the practical 
things. We don't want outsiders scrutuinsing us even more closely 
over a longer period. We don't want to be put under special 
measures (OM3). 
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Mental Healtb Team 
The CMHT combines Health and Social Services teams. However, local 
managers do not see the the two services within the team as integrated to 
any significant degree. 'While the team manager-who has a social work 
background-manages both Health and Social Services staff, below this 
level the management structure reflects the Health/Social Services divide, 
with different assistant managers for the day service and social work team 
(Social Services) and for the community psychiatric nurses (Health). The 
team manager and the assistant managers responsible for supervising the 
social workers both see mental health as marginal to Social Services 
concerns. One manager's frustration is evident in this summary of the 
organisation of the team-. 
I still manage Health staff and local authority staff, who still see 
themselves, there's still a divergence of what they do ... I mean, the 
idea of integrated teams is to have one set of procedures, but we're 
still responsible to different forganisationsl-well, three-a PCT 
[primary care trustj, health trust and Social Services (MM2). 
For different reasons, local managers feel that the team operates in a policy 
vacuum in relation to the local Health service. The team manager 
emphasises the problem of 'planning blight' on the Health side because of 
continuing structural reorganisation, and subsequent problems in the 
development and implementation of policy: 
The other thing ... that sort of 
kaiboshes us a little bit is, if you like, 
the [newl trust is probably going to have a very limited life anyway... 
we've gone from two trusts, one big trust for a limited period of 
time, and then we'll move back into probably six PCT-based 
155 
community mental health teams (MM2). 
The assistant manager acknowledges the connection between Health and 
Social Services, but for her this is less of a problem; her concern is that the 
social workers in the CMHT are 'semi-detached' from Social Services: that 
mental health is not seen as one of Social Services' priorities, and that 
Social Services policies do not often fit the particular needs and issues of 
mental health: 
I think that we're often forgotten about, because they're [senior 
Social Services managersl talking about children's services, adult 
services, and they just forget that mental health does actually 
need that little bit of a different approach (MMi). 
She is also highly critical of what she sees as Social Services' active neglect 
of mental health, pointing to inadequate Social Services resources for 
mental health, and to the shifting of costs to local Health providers: 
We're going pre-Seebohm; we're going to be swamped over by 
Health, because Social Services is strapped with the poll tax and 
that; people will go into Health more and we'll be squeezed down 
and we'll have nothing to play with, social work-wise (MMi). 
Overall, local managers in both teams are critical of the policy context 
within which they operate. However, this evaluation arises from two quite 
different organisational. experiences. In the OPT criticism focuses on 
senior managers'view of the service in terms of cost-cutting opportunities 
and meeting performance targets, rather than as a client group or 
profession to be valued. Local OPT managers express frustration that 
senior managers do not understand the practical difficulties of having a 
care management role without resources to care manage. However, they 
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also cooperate with senior managers to achieve government-set targets. In 
the CMHT, managers feel marginal to the organisations in which they 
operate. They talk of a policy vacuum in relation to Health because of 
continuing structural changes. In relation to Social Services they talk of 
feeling 'semi-detached'. Managers in both teams (with the exception of the 
CMHT team manager) voice concern about the underlying values of the 
policy they must implement, which they contrast with their own 
commitment to their client group, and to the value of professional social 
work. 
Local Managers'Views of their Role as Policy Implementers 
Managers in Lipsky's Street-level Bureaucracy and in domination 
managerialism. are portrayed as committed to policy implementation. 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to distinguish two approaches to the 
understanding of policy implementation: a top-down approach, where 
policy is specified by senior officers and implemented according to their 
instruction in a chain of command running down the hierarchy (Hogwood 
and Gunn 1984); and a bottom-up approach which emphasises the 
problems of translating centrally formulated policy into local practices, 
giving local actors a key role in interpreting, adapting and choosing policy 
according to local conditions and concerns (Barret and Fudge ig8i). 
Lipsky's account, for instance, employs both these views of policy 
implementation but locates them in two different occupational groups 
within street-level bureaucracies: managers are characterised as top-down 
policy implementers, who have to struggle to control and curtail the 
bottom-up policyý-making instincts of street-level bureaucrats. 
Older Persons Team 
In the older persons team, managers describe a change in their role in the 
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Organisation, arising from their changing relationship with more senior 
managers in the organisational hierarchy over the past decade. They talk of 
a diminution in the professional element of the relationship, which is now 
better understood in terms of the interface between the two different 
worlds of business plans and professional practice. This change, the team 
manager feels, has to some extent been liberating: 
It's a business plan approach to the Social Services department. I 
think in the old days it used to be the people at the top, at least they 
were expected to be professionally qualified ... they would look down 
almost as if they were a social worker or whatever, but they're higher 
up so they're taking a broader view of it ... I don't have the sense 
that it's like that, now. I think firstly at the top you're not even 
expected to be a professionally qualified person. It's not required. 
There's a much greater divorce between that and what people are 
really doing, in the sense that at the top what you're doing is setting 
out what the objectives are, and broad strategies. But-and in a way 
this is good-you know, you're expecting other people below you, 
which sort of empowers them ... I'm employing you to know how to 
do that. You get on and do it ... it's not my concern exactly 
how you 
did it, providing you're not doing it in a way that comes back to my 
ears as being grossly unacceptable (OMO. 
Managers feel they have wide-ranging, if unofficial freedom, but that this 
tends to be a limited freedom to be pragmatic. Procedures and guidance 
are seen as overelaborate and there is believed to be a tacit acceptance 
from senior managers that local managers can be selective in applying 
them: 
... there are so many rules and procedures and everything else that 
you know, no-one's got the memory of an elephant, so everybody's 
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got a whole load that they can't remember. So there's a sort of 
ignoring of certain things ... And in a sense I think that's quite 
tolerated (OMi[). 
Procedures must be tailored to the day-to-day conditions of practice 
within the organisation: 
I think what happens a lot is that the written policies and 
procedures are almost over the top on the side of the worthiness 
and including everything under the sun and every 
consideration-in a way that is totally unrealistic, given the 
resources that are actually devoted to doing the assessments 
... You'd get through about two a week if you do them like that 
(OMI). 
In this respect, local managers are as subject as street-level practitioners to 
the conditions of policy uncertainty and insufficiency of resources. In 
these conditions, they too make discretionary decisions about policy 
operation and implementation, and about which policies to follow 
through. Local managers are acutely aware that their flexibility is 
constrained by the core concerns of the organisation-the 'must dos': 
... the must-do things is 
tsid very much centred round money. 
Anything that causes a problem around money is a definite no-no! 
Getting expenditure properly authorised and things like that. 
Making proper orders and so on. Must-dos will be around doing 
assessments in a fairly recognisable sort of format, a fairly acceptable 
way of doing it (OMO. 
Financial pressures connect with the need to attract central government 
fimding by meeting performance targets, and feed into the requirement to 
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capture performance measures through the correct processing of 
paperwork. However, even in relation to budgets, local managers have 
developed a system to allow some financial flexibility in mitigation of the 
more extreme aspect of this requirement (see page 182). This relieves 
pressure on the margins, while the fundamental problem of financial 
restrictions remains a dominant issue. 
Local managers' compliance with some of these 'must-do' procedures is 
related to their analysis of the poor PAF performance as primarily a 
recording problem; underlying practice is seen as sound. Accordingly, OPT 
managers focus on developing paperwork procedures, and see policing the 
paperwork as a major source of concern, particularly for the assistant 
managers: 
The PAF indicators get checked very regularly and we get feedback 
from people that deal with our stats ... There's extra pressure on 
that at the moment; our PAF indicators led to us being named and 
shamed. So we want to improve that, which is fair enough. But 
sometimes the professional bit doesn't seem to fit too squarely with 
the paperwork. [The team managerl says it does, but it doesn't quite 
feel right to me sometimes (OM3)- 
In order to present the team's work in a way that will be valued by 
inspectors, special efforts are made to ensure that paperwork is up to date 
and properly presented: 
There are some people working until three or four in the morning 
on various pieces of work and ... We've got some help in, students 
helping to sort the files out, and a bit of overtime's available to cope 
with waiting lists (OM3)- 
16o 
In this context local managers make the point that they are 'playing the 
game'of senior managers and the government, but also seek to distinguish 
themselves from other players. They must negotiate, adapt and 
manipulate, and think about presentation of data: 
I don't think we live in a very numerate culture, and one of the 
things that I just noticed gradually by experience was that when you 
had to write reports about things, or report on things with figures, 
how impressed people are by any old numbers or percentages, 
regardless of how rubbish the methodology was by which you 
reached them! ... Sometimes to get what you want-I almost feel 
that as long as you don't go so far that you kid yourself, that you 
really take yourself in with your rubbish figures ... if you're using 
them to get what you need and what you want, why not? Everybody 
else is doing it ... They're obsessed with having good percentages. 
Good places in league tables (OMO. 
This manager distinguishes 'the game' from the reality of practice: 
For a lot of years I've looked at other things that go on and you learn 
not to say things, as well, in meetings, and ... what you want to say is: 
but the emperor hasn't got any clothes on! ... And after a while you 
learn that sometimes it's better not to ... You work towards the 
same end but you kind of go round things in another way... So 
instead of coming straight out with it, you kind of work around 
while still keeping people's egos intact (OMO. 
The criticism of policy and procedures outlined above provides evidence of 
the nature of integrity in local managers'views. This entails a nibcture of 
commitment to older people as a disadvantaged client group; 
identification with professional status, and loyalty to the local team. It also 
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entails a contrast with 'management': one local manager contrasts 
professional action to achieve improvement in resources, with managers, 
who are there to run systems efficiently- 
What's worrying is that we know we're doing this as a means to an 
end. What's going to happen when others come in to take over the 
system? You can see this in Health, where the new generation of 
managers see that the system is working in its own terms, and it 
becomes the end (Field note: OPT, comment by manager, 
November 2001). 
While generally it has been possible to present the findings in terms of 
differences between local and senior managers, it is also important to 
acknowledge that pressure on the authority, in terms of management 
capacity, has tended to blur the distinction somewhat. Local managers 
describe being pulled in two directions-towards strategic planning, and as 
practitioners, stepping in to fill gaps in services. The authority is small and 
the team manager, particularly, is pulled into strategic work, leaving day- 
to-day management to the assistants: 
But some are like [team manager's name), for instance, doing an 
awful lot of development work and not ... well, she's here, and we can 
refer to her, and she's very good, but it's sort of... I think she sort of 
passes down to us management and running of the office sometimes 
(OM2). 
g alk of being drawn in to the practice Meanwhile, the assistant manai! ers t 
role to deal with pressing problems, thereby blurring the distinction 
between managers and street-level bureaucrats: 
I do find my role is very much this front-line stuff... which needs 
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to be done immediately. And then I'm also on ... a 'lone workers' 
group looking at how we can protect ourselves; I'm on an EMI 
group looking at trying to develop services and create a service 
for older people with dementia or older people with mental 
health problems, and ... various other groups, you know ... I'm 
always pulled towards the immediate work, because it is 
immediate (OM2). 
Mental Healrb Team 
The two local managers in the CMHT have differing perspectives on their 
role in the organisation. The team manager sees the implementation of 
top-down policy as central to his role, while the assistant manager sees 
central policy as a sometimes helpful but more often frustrating element of 
the work environment. 
The team manager, who, amongst all the managers interviewed, most 
closely meets Lipsky's characterisation of a manager, describes his role in 
terms of a chain of policy implementation, running down from the top via 
management to the front-line staff. However, he also describes a dual 
process of policy being disseminated and dissipated as it is passed down 
the hierarchy-. 
It would be really good if the strategic goals of [Newunitj were the 
sort of things that every member of the team-from social worker, 
receptionist, community support worker-could see what they were 
doing as contributing towards those ... I think the further down the 
structure you go, the less those strategic goals are apparent to you. 
So for my senior manager, the strategic goals of the council are 
bread-and-butter, dayý-to-day stuff. When you get down to my level, 
strategic goals make sense; perhaps what I'm doing is converting 
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those into operational practice. And then the supervisors below me 
is [sicl about, you know-I won't say just my goals; my 
interpretation of what the strategic goals of [Newunitl are, and how 
we can make that a client goal (MM2). 
For the team manager a key problem in the process is that managers at his 
level are not involved in advising and educating members about the 
'business'of the authority: 
I see no evidence at my level of councillors being helped to 
understand the, business ... I think at my level and the first-line 
manager level, that's where perhaps the most valuable things can be 
said directly to them ... 'this is how our business works'... There are 
times when I wonder whether members are aware of our 
contribution towards people with mental health problems, or 
whether they see that as a wholly Health issue (MM2). 
In contrast to this top-down view of policy implementation, the assistant 
manager, who manages the social work staff, is more critical of policy and 
sees the professional role (and her professional stafO adapting and 
interpreting policy creatively to make it workable: 
You can get very hide-bound and say, 'the government says we've 
got to do this, so I'm only going to do that, and my manager says 
I've got to do this so I've got to do that'. I think if you're sensible 
and if you take your profession seriously, I think you can, on a day- 
to-day basis, practise quite autonomously, really. It is dependent on 
having management structures that aren't overtly bureaucratic. And 
it's like anything else - you could actually, though, make yourself 
paralysed because you'd say, well, the bureaucrats say you've got to 
do this and this. So I think it's very much how you decide you're 
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going to go for it (MMi). 
In part, this approach to policy implementation is pragmatic; for instance, 
instead of using the formal caseload weighting system: 
I just do hassle value, basically, one to five, you know, on the people 
I supervise. You know, I will do supervision, I took down, I say, 
'right: hassle value. Are you visiting once a week? Once every three 
weeks? ý--whatever. But it's very crude. But it's better than nothing. 
And I'd sooner do that than wade through a load of paperwork 
(MMI). 
But there is also a criticism of policy (see page 156) and of the bureaucracy 
and lack of trust of professional staff: 
One of my big arguments--nobody will ever take me up on this-is 
a GP can write a prescription in three minutes and you know there's 
going to be a lot of problems with that prescription. They have quite 
a big budget and, OK, they have a lot of training, but now so do we 
... you know damn well that you go to see the clients, you know they 
need A, B and C and then you've got to go through all sorts of silly 
tricks to get it ... I 
don't see why we have to write three-page reports 
on everybody ... I let lots of things go as a manager. Somebody wants 
a community support worker-I just say yeah, you know. I just trust 
them (MMO. 
The role of the CMHT team manager is more fixed than that of the OPT 
team manager, and this is a source of frustration for him, as he believes 
that he should be more involved in strategic decision-making. However, 
like the OPT assistant managers, the CMHT assistant manager is also 
involved in practice, primarily as an Approved Social Worker-again, 
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blurring the distinction that Lipsky emphasises between managers and 
street-level workers. 
Local managers in both teams see themselves as policy actors-in the sense 
of interpreting, adapting and choosing policy. In part, this was a role given 
within the organisation, but it is also a response to the situation in which 
they find themselves-having to juggle conflicting policy requirements and 
insufficient resource s-rather like the street-level staff they manage. Most 
local managers criticise their senior managers' perceived policy stance and 
seek to use their discretion to reduce the impact of what they see as 
damaging policies. 'While one manager-the CMHT team 
manager-characterises his role (and that of the assistant manager) in 
terms of officers within a hierarchy, carrying out their instructions, the 
general picture that emerges here is of managers who do not conform to 
this picture of organisational compliance. These managers criticise policy, 
and seek to mitigate its impact in line with their professed commitment 
to service users and professional social work. 
The distinction that Lipsky draws between managers and street-level 
practitioners is also problematic. Managers, like street-level practitioners, 
are subject to the discretionary conditions of street-level bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the assistant managers in both teams straddle the divide 
between practitioner and manager, supervising staff but also working on 
cases to reduce the number waiting for allocation. 
0 The Practitioner's Role: Conception and Control 
The question of managers' control of practice presumes a dissonance 
between managers' idea of what practitioners should do and practitioners' 
conception of their role. The following section will consider this point 
before examining the nature and effectiveness of management strategies in 
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controllinp, discretion. 
The street-level bureaucracy perspective and domination managerialism 
emphasise the basic conflict between managers and street-level workers, 
with managers seeking to control and limit street-level practitioners' roles. 
Evidence from the case study points to clear conflict between some 
practitioners and the organisation in terms of their role. The OPT 
practitioners claim not to be allowed to practise as social workers, and are 
constrained by budgets and procedures into a much narrower care 
management role. However, the CMHT is less congruent with the picture 
of role conflict. In this team, the discretion of professional social workers 
is seen as acknowledged by the organisation, and practitioners' concerns 
revolve around fears of a change in the current situation (in which they 
retain considerable professional discretion) and (for a small group of 
practitioners) the current extent of officially recognised professional 
discretion. 
The emphasis in Newunit is primarily on social work in terms of care 
management, as an administrative task, although there is greater 
acceptance of a broader social work role in the CMHT. Practitioners in 
both teams characterise senior managers'view of social work as primarily 
administrative care management. All, however, feel that social work is, in 
fact, a wider role, involving particular skills and a focus of interest that do 
not always sit comfortably with Newunit's version of care management. 
The role prescribed by Newunit is identified as an actual or potential 
limitation on their professional discretion. 
Older Persons Team 
In the OPT care management is seen as the role prescribed for social 
workers by the authority. Amongst practitioners in the OPT there is 
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general disquiet that social work skills and values are being squeezed out by 
a narrow and administrative form of care management. Here the issue is 
not necessarily care management itself-which many practitioners see as 
having positive aspects: 'In some ways I think because of the care 
management [sicl there is more variety available, because people have got 
one eye on the cost. The good side of that is that I think it has improved 
the range of services available to people' (OS4). Frustration is chiefly 
expressed about the highly administrative version of care management 
involved, focusing on crisis work; all the practitioners contrast this with 
social work, which is seen as more wide-ranging in terms of skills and of 
goals and values. 
These concerns are reflected in two strands of comments from 
practitioners. The first is that care management restricts their deployment 
of interpersonal skills, which they see as central to their professional 
identity-. 
So as a care manager, I think I tie it up to services and arranging 
those services; whereas as a social worker it's what I'm bringing as 
an individual to, say, my relationship with the client (OSi). 
I think with care management it's very focused on assessment, care 
planning, care implementation, monitoring, reviewing, and that 
there is quite a pressure, I suppose, to close cases when they're 
stable and move on to new work. And there isn't so much room for 
perhaps the counselling role (OS3). 
The other concern is the way in which care management changes the 
nature of practitioners' relationship with service users. One practitioner 
explains the nature of this shift as concern for money intruding into care 
for the person: 
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I was trained as a social worker, not as a care manager. I think the 
management of the whole package for me involves-that's what 
takes you over into the finances, into the commissioning of services 
and costing the package, which I certainly wasn't trained in. I was 
trained in much more looking at what a client needed and trying to 
find it (OS4)- 
rVIINII 
I he financial context is also a prevalent issue, in terms of time and 
resources. A widespread concern is the increasing withdrawal from 
preventative work. When care management was first introduced in 
Oldshire, councillors-against the advice of senior officers-required 
inclusion in the care managers'role of responsibility for 'preventative' 
work and a budget for this (Oldshire Social Services Committee Papers 
May and September 1993). However, following the move to the unitary 
authority, the preventative element of the care management role has been 
lost in the tightening of eligibility criteria and this was a source of 
frustration for the practitioners: 
Because [Newunitj has designed an eligibility criteria tsid which is 
very high threshold, and ... is not doing any preventative work ... 
it's 
a vicious cycle, because there's no preventative work, so people 
whom we could have helped when their needs were not complex, 
their needs escalate and they become worse. And we are actuaUy 
taking those people when they reach crisis point (OSS). 
This shift is felt to weaken practitioners' ability to practise in accordance 
with fundamental professional principles: 
Going back to when I applied for my CCETSW training ... I 
suppose I saw Isocial work] in terms of empowering people and 
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facilitating and advocating for people .... And I still see those roles as 
being relevant. But working, for instance, in the kind of field I'm 
working now, with ... older people and increased eligibility criteria ... 
you're limited in some things you can do, so you become a bit more 
of a sort of agent of social control, in a way (OS2). 
The general impression among OPT practitioners is that their employing 
authority fails to understand or value them as professional social workers, 
and seeks to restrict significant aspects of the freedom they consider 
necessary to do their job, by casting their role in terms of narrow, 
administrative care management: 
For me social work is about supporting people and enabling people 
and empowering people to help themselves, and to sort out their 
own problems without me taking over from them. And that is by 
means of giving them information, directing them to the right 
places and, obviously accessing them to services which they're 
entitled to, and looking at ways of being able to help themselves ... I 
think [Newunit) has got a certain different concept of what a social 
work person is, in that the social worker is really very constrained 
with policies, and with the guidelines and with what the local 
government expects social services as a department to do for the 
community. Because most of that is resource-led, most of the time 
it doesn't actually look at what social work is all about. So a lot of 
times, a social worker feels as if they're [sic) negotiating and dealing 
with money, and dealing with things like getting resources for their 
clients, but not really doing the actual social work itself, which is 
about being with people and actually enabling people (OSS). 
OPT practitioners see their freedom to act in terms of their professional 
role, constrained by policies, procedures and resources that focus their 
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work on the much narrower care management role; and they see the 
emphasis on managmg resources within care management as sitting 
uncomfortably with professional values. 
Mental Healib Team 
The situation in the CMHT is quite different. As seen above, social 
workers'professional role is both acknowledged and resourced in mental 
health. Practitioners see care management as a strategy to which the 
organisation is committed, but one which is not applied strictly within the 
mental health setting. However, the organisation's commitment to care 
management is an issue of dispute within the staff group, in terms of the 
continuing necessity for professional discretion. It is possible to identify 
two different stances on this issue. 
One group-three practitioners-sees care management as a restriction 
on professional social work discretion; but these practitioners, who 
identify themselves as social workers, indicate an ability to work in line 
with their own ideas of practice, because of the more flexible idea of care 
management within the CMHT than in the rest of the adult service. This 
flexibility, they claim, allows practitioners to continue in the role of direct 
service-providers: 
I'm probably much less orientated around care management, and 
more orientated around direct intervention. So rather than ... 
purchasing care, or purchasing packages of care, to make direct 
provision for people through other agencies, I would be tending to, 
through the referral system, take on clients who I feel that I could 
do direct work with (MSO. 
This group believes that practitioners are given the space and flexibility by 
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their managers to act professionally, because of the complexity of mental 
health work and the specialist nature of services within this area of work: 
... there was a very strict care management model a few years ago. 
We weren't supposed to do anything other than care management. 
It's a bit of a misnomer, because there's not much to care manage. 
And in most situations, particularly in mental health, you're actually 
still the main resource-your relationship with the client or the 
family or the provider-so you're actually still doing what you've 
always done in social work: you get to know somebody, get the 
relationship going and negotiate (MS2). 
The other two practitioners evaluate the relationship of care management 
and social work from another perspective. They positively identify 
themselves as care managers: 'I think I see myself more as a care manager 
than the majority of social workers'(MS4). One claims that social work is 
no longer relevant: that care management offers a clearer and more 
focused role for practitioners, reducing responsibility in constraining 
freedom, and making the role more amenable: 
... social workers are 
dinosaurs. There are no social workers any 
more. It's just come down to a title on a piece- of paper ... Itstopped 
with care management. So we're not overly concerned any more 
with what I call'care'. We are far more governed by fuuncial 
constraints and matrices and the old-fashioned social worker that 
worked within a margin of welfare just doesn't exist any more. I like 
care management. I always have done, because my recollection of 
social workers was that they were always overswamped ... I think 
care management actually empowered social workers, and clarified 
the role of social workers, and gave us some direction and more 
focus and more policies, procedures and there were more rules 
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(MS5). 
Across both teams, social workers contrast 'social work'with 'care 
management'. While in the OPT care management is consistently seen in 
negative terms, in the CMHT a smaU group of practitioners portrays it in 
a positive light, as more focused and practical than 'social 
wo&-although these practitioners express concern that they are not 
supported by the organisation to practise as such. This contrast is within 
a context of a more widely defined idea of care management than that in 
the OPT. However, for other social workers in the CMHT, it is still seen 
as a potential limitation on their practice. 
Practitioners also talk of the strategies used by the organisation to control 
and constrain the social work role, and point to the central role of the 
control of resources, in terms of purchasing services (especially in the 
construction of eligibility criteria), doing the job (resources for staffing), 
and procedures and guidance for practice. This area is examined in more 
detail below. 
REMOTE CONTROL AND LOCAL RE Sl STANCE 
Domination managerialism, in contrast to the street-level bureaucracy 
perspective and discursive managerialist analysts, characterises managers 
as not only seeking control but also being in control. This section will 
consider how senior managers seek to control street-level discretion. In 
the earlier account of the managers' role, the distinction has been drawn 
between senior managers, working at a strategic level, and local managers 
in dayý-to-day contact with team practitioners. Resources and procedures 
are the primary mechanisms by which senior managers seek to control 
local practices. In examining these mechanisms, the following questions 
will be considered: 
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Is control through resources and procedures exercised uniformly 
across all areas of social work or only in certain areas? 
How effectively do these strategies control local discretion17' 
To what extent can street-level practitioners resist? 
What role do local nmnagers play in enforcing resource and 
procedural controls? 
The first point to note is that the use of resource management and 
procedures is not the same across all adult services. Within the OPT, both 
resource management and procedural guidelines have greater significance 
than in the CMHT. This seems to reflect the more significant place of the 
OPT in the authority's budget, and perhaps a greater recognition in the 
CMHT of a professional social work dimension to care management. 
Supervision plays an equally important but different role in both teams. 
Control Through Resource Management 
Older Persons Team 
Restriction on fimding is seen by OPT practitioners as a fundamental 
constraint on their discretiow. 
... everything is resource- and money-led, so you rea. 
Uy have got, each 
and every time, have to check what you can use money on, or what 
you can't use money on ... You have to conform with what the 
procedure says and what the system says and what the department 
has agreed to (OS5). 
The OPT has been increasingly subject to financial constraints by the 
authority, and as a result, not only are resources more restricted, 
but 
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financial decision-making has been shifted up the organisational hierarchy 
from team managers to a service-led resources panel 
Qualified social work practitioners tend to deal with complex cases that 
often involve costly care packages. Due to tighter budgets, the Social 
Services fimding process entails exhausting all other funding sources before 
committing Social Service money. The process for fund approval is, in 
part, integrated into care management procedures: team managers must 
endorse practitioners' decisions on eligibility following assessment, but 
also obtain permission from a higher level within Social Services, via the 
resources panel for most Social Services funding, and via the Health 
hierarchies for any joint fandi Mg. 
Eligibility criteria are the primary means of controlling expenditure within 
Newunit's care management regime, and these have been increasingly 
tightened. The service uses a matrix: type/area of need on the horizontal 
axis; and level/urgency of need on the vertical axis, ranging from 8 (low-level 
need) up toi (urgent need). Recently the level identified by the authority 
as need that will be met has moved from level 3 to level2. 
However, even within the contraints of these tightened efigibility criteria, 
OPT practitioners see room to exercise discretion. Eligibility criteria are 
seen by all practitioners (and local managers) as open to interpretation. 
The criteria rely heavily on professional knowledge and judgement to be 
put into effect, and this allows for professional discretion: 
I think in practice, because they feligibility criterial are so broad 
and open to interpretation, if we as the care managers strongly feel 
that a particular client needs our service, we would give them a2and 
make them eligible (OS4). 
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In one sense I think it's clear, in that it's trying to give examples of 
'this is the sort of level of dependency we're looking at in order to 
provide a service'. But then there's still, I think, scope for 
interpretation. So it's like with anything that's written down: you 
could interpret it slightly differently, or perhaps you might interpret 
the risk somebody is at in a slightly different way ... I can't 
remember all the wording, but I think it's like with anything, it's a 
substantial amount of care, but what do you mean by that word 
tsubstantial', or 'imminent', a situation that's imminently going to 
break down? (OS3)- 
Practitioners adopt two stances with regard to their discretion in 
interpreting and applying the criteria. One position focuses on 
understanding the criteria in terms of justice and fairness, and is 
uncomfortable about practitioners' defacto discretion (see Chapter III). 
The two practitioners adopting this position recognise. scope for 
interpretation, but are also concerned about the inconsistency this creates 
in applying the rules: 
... my impression is, the eligibility criteria 
has Isicl been laid down 
and for me it has to be looked at in the light of that ... there might 
be people who have a need, but whether or not we can act upon that 
would always be seen in the light of the eligibility criteria (OS3). 
However, three other practitioners' approach to the interpretative 
discretion is guided more by a sense of seeking to achieve their own 
perception of just outcomes: 
... a 
leaflet came out that said changes to eligibility criteria, round the 
clients, which said if you've got a carer who does this, this probably 
means that we won't be able to support you. But I've always treated it 
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that you're looking at the needs more of an individual ... So there is a 
judgement there, I think, that we make, about how we apply those 
criteria. Because, I mean, if I had a client who, all they wanted was 
help with shopping and their daughter was doing it and the daughter 
was managing and wasn't under tremendous pressure ... I would use 
that eligibility criteria [sid as my defence. But there might be other 
times when I may treat it a bit more subjectively (OS2). 
In this context, team managers are generally seen by practitioners as 
supporting their eligibility determinations: 
And that comes down to my professional judgement, I suppose. I 
think, weU, I can see that if we donýt do something about this we're 
going to have a problem, you know. Or that client will continue to 
deteriorate 
... there may be the straw that breaks the camel's back ... 
And I think we're allowed to operate a bit of discretion there, and I 
think our supervisors will go along with that quite happily (OS2). 
Both groups acknowledge that local managers encourage flexibility in their 
approach to eligibility criteria, in the sense of achieving'sensible 
outcomes', but they express different views about this freedom in terms of 
the emphasis on outcomes over process. The first group expresses disquiet 
about the encouragement of practitioners to apply eligibility criteria in a 
flexible way, seeing this as unfair to those clients who do not receive the 
same degree of flexibility-. 
And the word that was used at the time was 'it's like adopting a 
pragmatic approach'. I like to think that it's a level playing field, 
personally, but there we go ... 
Q: Who described it as a pragmatic approach? 
A: It was a manager who said that (OS. O. 
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The other group is more comfortable with defacto discretion and its 
endorsement by local managers: 'It is actually working at the moment, and 
... our managers are agreeing with who we're classifying as is and2S' 
(OS4). 
However, there is a limitation to practitioners' willingne ss to operate with 
defacto discretion. Several interviewees refer to a situation in the 
preceding year, when, alongside the published eligibility criteria, 
instructions came down byword of mouth from senior managers that the 
criteria should be applied in a tighter and narrower manner than officially 
acknowledged: 
When the decision was made that we would be providing services 
for matrix ii and 2 clients, that wasn't supported by a policy, like a 
written document to support that. It was a policy decision that was 
agreed with local councillors. So we had a verbal directive. We had 
no written statement to support that, which made the job ... of 
having to share that information with clients and support people 
with that information-it made it much harder, because I think 
people could give different accounts of that policy (OS. O. 
Practitioners were concerned about this, not least because of their 
position with clients who met the formal criteria but were below the line 
set by the informal criteria. They objected to the authority's failure to 
acknowledge its tighter criteria publicly, and its perceived use of 
practitioners to mask a political problem with funding. The practitioners 
as a group wrote to senior managers to register their disquiet and demand 
that the authority formally acknowledge the tighter criteria it was seeking 
to operate. The authority eventually published the tighter criteria and 
cases were reassessed against it (Brayne et al. 2001: 317-318)- 
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One of the local managers describes senior managers' reaction to the 
reassessment exercise: 
There was quite a lot of suspicion when the matrix changed from 
only providing services for i to 21 1 to 3; suddenly every client became 
a2. I'm sure there was a lot of suspicion in terms of the [seniorl 
management. But it [practitioner's reassessment] wasn't just about 
people saying, oh, I'll have to move you to a2because you won't get 
a service otherwise. It was a lot to do with the fact that they had 
been 3 throughout the years but nobody'd put the change in the 
matrix as they'd deteriorated, you know, because it wasn't 
important (OS2). 
This quotation reinforces the sense of different relationships between 
different levels of management and street-level workers. It indicates 
suspicion of senior managers and distrust of local decision-making. This, 
perhaps, has contributed to the insertion of an additional decision-making 
level within the care management process, alongside the new, tighter 
criteria: a resources panel to manage budget cuts for adult services. The 
panel- receives applications from practitioners who have assessed service 
users as eligible, to decide on the allocation of resources. 
One local manager in the team explains the panel process as follows: 
... to get a 
lot of resources people have to go through our resource 
panel, and through their assistant team manager, and I think things 
will be put back to people if they're not that clear, and I suppose the 
kind of questions that we're pushing people to ask themselves is... 
what will happen if we don't do anything? What is likely to happen? 
You have to say, OK, how likely are they to have a fit, what will 
777he Panef is ma&e up oT the service manager and other team managers or their T 
deputies. 
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happen if they have one, what difference will it make if we put 
the-will it make any difference? And if so, what? Whereas I think 
in the past when resources are not so tight you just think, oh, 
yes-bit risky, that, you know (OMi). 
Practitioners criticise the panel process for the delay created in providing 
service and the unfairness and distress created for clients awaiting 
resources. One practitioner, in describing the process of presenting cases, 
claims that applications are usually returned with requests for further 
information: 
it's usually very simple things like 'have you explored Health funding 
for this particular client? If not go away and do so, and if it's not 
appropriate bring it back'. Again, it's not usually a case of turning 
things down; just wait, on the whole, just wait (OS4). 
Related concerns voiced about the panel process are the amount of 
paperwork involved, and the knowledge required of how to present 
paperwork for positive and quick decisions: 
It's got to be seen by the team manager, then it goes to the service 
manager to be signed, then the service manager, sometimes he 
hasn't even read the paperwork, because there's a huge wad of work 
... But 
he's got to sign it, then back to you. And then you can look 
for all the other assessments, and he's also got be sent those: the 
nurse)s assessment, the consultant's assessment-and they have got 
to be put together, sent off to him, then they come back to you, and 
then that's when you can actually forward them to the PCT 
[primary care trustl. But before you do that you've got to collate all 
these assessments ... By the time it gets to the 
PCT, they look at it 
and they decide, Oh, this is nothing to do with us, we're not going to 
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fund this--so effectively you've lost about two weeks running 
around trying to look for fiznding. So when the PCT says, No, this 
doesn't meet our criteria, then the papers come back to you, then 
you have to start over again because then the resource panel meets 
only once a week. So if you've missed that week it means now you're 
going to have to go in the third week to put it in to go to the panel. 
So effectively you're going through the systems for about three 
weeks, before you can know whether you're going to get this funding 
or not (OSS). 
Another concern, expressed across the board, is about the role given to 
practitioners of communicating panel decisions to users and carers waiting 
for services. This is referred to as 'the Thursday chore': 
'Sorry, your care package didn't get agreed this weeký. You think, 
Oh, don't tell me that, what am I expected to do? And you as a 
social worker have got to deal with it. We're always at the rough end 
of that (OS5). 
Overall, practitioners see this process as a severe limitation on their 
discretion and ability to meet clients'needs in line with their professional 
judgement. Serious misgivmgs are voiced about the panel process, even in 
terms of the narrower, care management role. 
Despite these misgivings, practitioners work with the panel process 
beyond the passive sense of making their cases on paper; they are involved 
actively in comparing the urgency of cases and prioritising those going 
forward to the panel: 
... it)s when you've got people 
in hospital needing residential nursing 
beds. That's when we do negotiate, very amicably, between ourselves 
... when 
[the assistant managerl knows there's a vacancy coming up 
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she'll say, WeR, your client is actually at the top of the list, but 
[name of colleaguel's client has got X reasons why, or whatever, and 
we usuaUy resolve it ... it wouldn't be suggested if there wasn't a very 
real reason why. And then again, if I felt strongly that my client's 
needs were greater then that would be respected as well (OS4). 
While practitioners do not discuss their reasons for working with the 
panel process in this way, one of the OPT managers believes that the local 
nature of the panel, including team and assistant managers, makes a 
difference: 
... it's 
because you have to keep the process fairly open ... I think if 
you took the process even one more step, so that the people making 
those decisions weren't in day-to-day contact with their team ... it's 
almost people don't feel too uncomfortable-I won't say without 
exception-the fact that they know, if they're really worried about 
something, they can come to [name of other team manager) or me 
easily. We're here. We're people they know. We're not people they're 
going to find difficult to approach ... (OMII). 
Practitioners, too, note that they can present an argument for urgent 
funding to local managers, who were involved in setting up the panel 
system and built in the flexibility to use short-term money for pressing 
cases: 
What happens in this team for home care, is, if it's urgent it will be 
agreed on a temporary basis and it will carry on being temporary 
until they've got sufficient hours to make it permanent. 
So in a 
sense they give you the package when you need it. It's just a way of 
working the system, which I respect (OS4). 
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Mental Healib Team 
Practitioners in the CMHT present their resource situation in a more 
positive light than those in the. OPT. They express concerns about 
shortfalls, which are viewed in different ways by different groups of 
practitioners (see below). However, overall they present their position as 
better than that of other social workers in adult services, both in the level 
of resources and in the process by which resources are obtained for service 
users: 
Well, we've probably been really fortunate ... I understand adult and 
disability always have to apply-they now have to go to a panel, 
which we don't have to do; for respite we don't have to go to a panel. 
So in that way I think we're very fortunate ... And we have a 
community care budget, so if we want support to go in, then we 
have to get it authorised by our manager (MS3). 
Working in a multi-disciplinary team and with new legislation gives 
practitioners access to new sources of funding: 
... it's pooled budgets now. Under the NHS Act iggg, Health and 
Social Services now have the legislative power to pool budgets and 
resources and chop and change money, and ... increasingly so under 
the new PCT arrangements. So there has been a new core of money 
that has come into the service. But not necessarily for care 
management (MS3)- 
Alongside a recogniton of an improving resource situation in some areas, 
there is concern about significant gaps in service and the fact that 
substantial mental health resources are tied up in particular services: 
183 
I think we've got better resources now. They're developing, 
compared to when I first started. Got more accommodation. More 
day activities happening. But we're stiff lacking resources for young 
people with mental illness. ... We're not catering for particularly the 
young males, who really don't want to come to the day centre, that 
kind of thing. We haven't yet tackled that (MS3)- 
In response to this situation this group-practitioners characterising 
themselves as 'social workers--concludes that: 'it's very much down to the 
individual worker to try and find something to replace that need, which is 
very difficult' (MSO. 
However, as outlined in the case study chapter, the level of funding for 
social work staff in the CMHT gives both professional freedom and time 
to act as direct service-providers, alongside care management: 
You're actually still the main resource-your relationship with the 
client or the family or the provider; so you're actually still doing 
what you've always done in social work: you get to know somebody, 
get the relationship going and negotiate (MS: z). 
The two practitioners who identify themselves as 'care managers' 
emphasise the absence of resources to purchase services and see it as a 
more fundamental problem, limiting the service they can provide: 
We have very, very poor resources ... We have X number of 
hours 
with home care, which are not a good service for our clients, because 
they're not trained in mental health, and it's only the home carers 
that show a specific interest in working, you know, and they're few 
and far between (MS4). 
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They talk of having to respond to the situation by using their own time, 
but not in the sense of using a valuable resource, as expressed by the 'social 
work' group of practitioners. Rather: 'You use yourself a lot. You use 
whoever you can find, really' (MS4)-to create an informal economy of 
care which can be managed: 
But I will go out and do stuff I will go out and do some shopping 
and I'll ... Simply because noone else to do it, it needs doing, it 
maintains that person and it's easier to do it. Now I know that I 
shouldn't be doing those tasks, but I do it. ... you know, you're 
running down town and thinking, 'this is mad'. I must be the most 
expensive shopper in [Newunitl (MS4). 
This practitioner is concerned about having to use her own time to fill the 
gaps, as it risks undermining the argument for more resources to enable 
practitioners to act as care managers: 
... and the thing that concerns me more than anything is, the more 
we do it, the more you accept, if you see what I mean, the more part 
of your work it becomes. Which to me is wrong. I should be able to 
pick up that phone and get somebody to do that task for me (MS4). 
The key point here is the differing evaluations of the same resource 
context, in terms of its impact on discretion. The main resource is seen as 
social work time and those practitioners characterising themselves as 
social work professionals feel that they have professional discretion, 
backed up by the appropriate resource (i. e. time). Those who see, 
themselves primarily as care managers see their freedom as limited by the 
lack of resources to purchase services, and use their time to create an 
informal economy of care and enable them to practise more as care 
managers. 
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In the CMHT the relationship between practitioners and the eligibility 
criteria within the service differs from that in the OPT. The CAMT is a 
specialist secondary service, accessible only by referral from primary care 
services. The primary role of eligibility criteria for these practitioners is to 
control access to them as a provider service. Within the CMHT two sets 
of eligibility criteria operate for the social work practitioners: Social 
Services criteria, and the NHS Mental Health Trust's criteria for 
identifying patients suitable for treatment by a specialist mental health 
service. 
Practitioners in the team view the Social Services eligibility criteria in two 
different ways. One group emphasises their uncertainty, underlining 
problems in applying them to complex situations, which create room for 
interpretation: 
They're not that clear. For instance, it would say something along 
the lines of 'is this person at risk of being socially isolated? '. Well, 
what does that mean? It's a very loose term. It could be somebody 
who just likes their own company and like many other people 
chooses not to socialise that much and have a limited circle of 
friends. Or it could be somebody who's developing a schizophrenic 
illness and is displaying negative symptoms and is staying indoors 
because they're worried that somebody out there is out to get them 
or they're being spied on (MSi). 
and the volatility of mental health problems: 
... you could 
have quite a few clients who, if you were just to look at 
them, it's not a picture of how they are today. You might say, weU is 
she fimctioning? Yeah, she's fimctioning fairly well ... But you then 
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set that against the broader picture of something-got a well- 
documented bipolar disorder, iio admissions under Section 3-sO 
they're actually well just now, but ... we wouldn't be closing that case. 
Whereas adult disability-they put in a package of care and it's fine 
and then close it, or put it onto a once-a-year sort of thing (MS2). 
These practitioners see Social Services eligibility criteria as setting an 
appropriate general level of entitlement, while allowing them discretion 
and flexibility in their application. 
The other view is that the criteria are clear and unambiguous. However, 
those who see the criteria in these terms differ in their understanding of 
the basis of this clarity. For one practitioner: 'Oh, it's very clear. It's 
written down. We have a matrix on it, setting down what it is ... Very 
specific, yes' (MS3). For her, the criteria are a restriction on practice. The 
remaining (two) practitioners claim certainty about what the eligibility 
criteria entail, rather than clarity in the criteria as such: 'I mean, it's very 
clear, the eligibility criteria; you know, completing that, they either meet it 
or they don't ... ' (MS4). This certainty seems based less on a detailed 
knowledge of the criteria than on a personal understanding and 
commitment: '... gosh, I don't know when I last looked at the eligibility 
criteria. I think a lot of it for us is around suicide risk and self-harm and 
those sorts of... there clearly is a need for a service if they're presenting as 
threatening' (MS4). 
The main concern for CMHT practitioners is the impact of the wider 
NHS eligibility criteria on their role, which they identify as working with 
people with serious mental health problems. They express concern that the 
wider criteria will overwhelm them, and will prevent them from operating 
according to their professional judgement. 
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All practitioners agree that demand is outstripping their ability to provide 
a service. The main cause for this is seen as inappropriate referrals from 
GPs accustomed to referring all mental health cases, rather than just 
serious cases, to the mental health team. Practitioners express frustration 
that GPs do not deal with minor mental health problems in the surgeries, 
in line with the national service framework (Department of Health iggg: 
28), but continue to refer them to the CMHT. As a result practitioners are 
asked to take on cases which do not meet social services eligibility criteria, 
but which do meet the Mental Health Trust's more inclusive criteria. 
Practitioners criticise this situation and the uncertainty and conflict 
caused-both within the team and across disciplines. They call for greater 
clarity: 
CPNs have been so used to working to GP practices and just-can 
you see this person? -they would see the person, do an assessment 
and then say, no, we don't need to see them any more, we suggest 
this or that. So they're saying, a lot of them, how do we know this 
person doesn't need this service unless we see them? While some of 
us are saying-it's quite clear they don't need it ... really, I suppose, 
we should either be working to their matrix or they should be 
working to ours, or we should have a compromise and we go from ir 
to 3 or 4 (MS3)- 
However, there is some disagreement about the source of the problem. For 
three practitioners (those who identify themselves as 'social workers), it 
comes down to organisational management and agency politics. For this 
group the tighter use of eligibility criteria is a way of managing 
demand-an alternative solution would be a waiting list-and allowing 
them the time to focus on their work as service-providers and on a priority 
group of younger people with severe mental illness. They see the situation 
in terms of Political problems between Health and Social Services and 
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hiatus in policy development: 
... there aren't any real strong protocols about what we do, and I 
think that is possibly deliberate, because it is so difficult to get a 
consensus of agreement between Social Services and Health. And 
when I say Health I include the GPs and consultants when 
necessary-, at the primary care trust level, it's very difficult to get 
people to sign up. Because obviously the GPs are inundated; they 
want to offload onto us; we're saying, 'hang on a minute, there's a 
Social Service organisationý, we're saying 'don't meet our criteria'. 
But a consultant will say, 'well, look, this person has been prescribed 
anti-depressants; the GP is concerned; we've got to see them. ' I 
think that's why it's very difficult to have these joint criteria (MSO. 
For the other-'care management--group the problem is managers) 
failure to take charge of the situation. They call for stronger team 
management to enforce criteria and to enforce care management 
procedures in the team: 
I mean we have our criteria, but we don't stick to it. We are still 
taking the lower end of the scale as well. And I think that's because 
management don't like to turn these people away. And fine, you 
know. I agree that these people could do with a service. But not 
from the mental health team, because we've moved on from there 
now. We can only deal with the severe and enduring [mental health 
needsl (MS4). 
This group is critical of managers' perceived inability to manage: 
... our managers 
don't know how to manage because they don't have 
to manage ... We should 
be managed on the input of casework, 
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allocation; we should be managed on the waiting list ... Because none 
of us want to do poor work. We try to do quality work. Quality 
work needs a certain time (MS5). 
The control of resources to purchase services is less a focus of concern for 
CMHT practitioners than for the OPT-although there is a division 
amongst practitioners, as mentioned above, and for those who identify 
themselves as 'care managers' this is a more significant issue. However, 
there are two general areas of widespread concern about resource 
management in the team. 
The first is the introduction of tighter controls on smaller and smaller 
amounts of spending. There is a view that controls are necessary for 
allocation of large amounts of money, but a feeling that the controls now in 
place for'petty cash', requiring the approval of managers, places 
inappropriate limits on practitioners' professional discretion: 
Well, I think if I had to go through for that [funding for a 
placementl, I'm not critical of them, because that is a lot of money 
... It's probably smaller things 
like getting support workers, getting 
home care, can you access some groups, things like anxiety 
management, anger management ... I think then you're 
back to what 
model do you have for your team, how you're going to use your 
professionals (MS2). 
The second concern amongst the practitioners, all of whom are ASWs, is 
their lack of discretion to commit resources to prevent compulsory 
admission under the Mental Health Act 1983, and the requirement for a 
manager to authorise the funding: 'I mean, to try and get hold of one of 
the managers here and say you want to do that. Because home care would 
say, whose budget is it coming out 00-'(MS3). They express 
frustration 
Igo 
that, while practitioners try to balance concerns with risk and liberty, the 
authority's prime concern seems to them to be control of expenditure and 
bureaucratic procedures. 
Control of resources is a major focus of the management of discretion. 
Eligibility criteria have been developed to structure decision-making in 
both teams. However, eligibility criteria themselves are seen as open to 
interpretation and, in fact, requiring professional judgement-for 
instance, around ideas of risk and need-to make them operate. Within 
the OPT the pressure to control resource use is more acute: resources are 
actively being cut; whereas in the CMHT the main resource is the 
practitioner's own time, and additional resources are also being brought in 
to fund development associated with the national service framework. In 
the OPT, whide eligibility criteria are being tightened, decisions about 
resource allocation are shifted up the management hierarchy to counter 
what senior managers see as practitioners' subversion of eligibility criteria. 
Procedures 
Alongside the management of resources, the other key mechanism of 
remote control of practice discussed by practitioners and local managers is 
the procedures developed under the auspices of senior managers. 
Procedures are often difficult to distinguish from financial management, 
particularly in relation to care management, where eligibility criteria are 
central to control of expenditure as well as assessment and provision of 
care. Here 'procedures' is used to refer to guidelines on the practice of key 
aspects of work- 
In both the OPT and CMHT, formal procedures are identified by the 
organisation as an important part of the practitioners' context of work. In 
the care management procedures, which apply to children's and adults' 
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services, it is stated that: 
This policy and procedures are [sic) designed to enhance our service 
to users, by promoting and enabling good practice in our 
interactions with people who come into contact with social services. 
Secondary to this, but also of vital importance to an efficient and 
effective service, is the need to fulfil local and national data and 
administrative requirements (Newunit Care Management 
Procedures: 4). 
These procedures are a significant recent development. Care management 
policies across the organisation have been reviewed and relaunched, giving: 
... much greater guidance through the structure of the forms as to 
what should be included in assessments, support plans and reviews 
(Newunit Care Management Procedures: 7)- 
However, a close examination of the care management document reveals 
that, while it talks of applying to all Social Services and includes a range of 
different matrices for children's services, mental health, older people and 
physical disabilities services, the pro-formas provided are more limited. 
The document distinguishes forms for children's services and adult 
services, but the adult services forms are headed 'elderly and physically 
disabled' (copies of this document were collected from both the OPT site 
and the CMHT site). 
Local policies are also set in a wider framework of national policies and 
directives (Newunit Community Care Plans . 1999-20oo and2000-2001). 
On the ground, the national initiatives of direct concern to practitioners, 
and which they discuss as impacting on their practice, are the 
performance assessment framework for the OPT (Department of Health 
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and Office of National StatisticS20oi) and the national service framework 
for the CMHT (Department of Health z999). In both teams the formal 
recognition of risk and the need to record assessments are also notable 
themes, including the development of vulnerable adults procedures. 
As established ways of acting and prescribed modes of conduct, 
procedures are contained in written guidelines and policies. However, 
within teams, practitioners tend to talk of having to'muddle through'in 
the face of the volume of and continuing changes and additions to these 
procedures. Here the, understanding of procedures is largely located in 
informal knowledge and expectations within the teams: 
Care management procedures are being reviewed because we've 
recently had introduced the joint assessment form, which youýve 
probably seen-the whole point of that is it's a joint assessment. 
it's a further change. It's a further adjustment. Another form to get 
used to. So if you were to follow me from start to finish with 
assessing a new client, you would find that I'm continually asking 
other colleagues'Which form should I be using now? Have I 
covered this? Have I covered that? ' And that's the feeling that I feel 
as an individual I'm left with all the time. So in terms of applying 
any policies and procedures, I never feel that I'm totally on top of it. 
it's always changing (OSO. 
Older Persons Team 
In the OPT procedures are seen as fimdamental structures governing the 
work, but are characterised more as a framework than as a straightjacket: 
I don't think it is strictly specified. I think the core of the work is 
probably seen as the care management tasks ... the assessment, care 
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planning. I don't think any sort of other aspects of the work are 
rigidly laid down, so I suppose that's where you'd bring your own 
skills and discretion in with regard to what you need to do in your 
work with your client (OS3)- 
However, in addition to the processes of obtaining funding outlined above, 
there is also increasing pressure to practise- care, management by the book. 
This seems to arise more from Newunit's concern to represent itself to 
central government than from a particular commitment among senior 
managers to enforce procedures as such. This was particularly evident 
during the interviews because they coincided with the 'naming and 
shaming' of the authority's adult services by the Department of Health for 
their poor performance against the performance assessment framework 
standards (see pages 146-147)- In order to ensure better performance 
against the indicators in the next round, managers reviewed the way in 
which data on performance were captured within the department, and 
concluded that the problem was a failure to fill in the right paperwork at 
the right time and in the right way and the consequent failure to collect 
activity property on the computer system. According to one practitioner, 
for instance: 
More recently it seems that a lot of our data collecting hasn't been 
that efficient, and that's influenced where we stand. So care 
management procedures will be reviewed from the basis that data is 
tsicl recorded accurately to record our performance (OSi). 
Accordingly, managers are involved in a tighter enforcement of the care 
management process as a paperwork practice: making sure that forms are 
completed when they should be, and that the right form is used and is 
correctly filled in so that the activity can be recorded on computer 
for the 
PAF indicators. 
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Local managers and practitioners now regard following procedures by the 
book as a 'must do': 
There are certain expectations that in the assessment process you 
would use that paperwork and then you might need to go on based 
on your stage i assessment to your stage2assessment if it was more 
complex, and-yeah, the actual paperwork you use is very much part 
of the [Newunitj structure (OS3)- 
There is an increasing emphasis on data collection. Forms used to 
be separate from data collection (for performance indicators); there 
would be a data form at the end to be completed. Now there are new 
forms-data collection is now in the body of the assessment-to 
ensure data are collected. Practitioners understand it's important to 
obtain good PAFs and how it will impact on finances for the 
department, but as a social worker I feel it's not one of my primary 
roles to collect performance data. Now data boxes will need to be 
completed within the body of the care management forms. If they're 
not done there'll be a problem-it would be sent back to you or 
filled in by the senior. Things are being seen and signed more-back 
to accountability. For care management forms and data collection 
but not for social work (Field note: OPT, information from 
practitioner, November2001). 
However, even within this tightening focus on following procedures, 
practitioners still feel they can adapt the system: 
I think there's always an element of interpretation, because if we 
talk together as a team, we sometimes find out we've used different 
paperwork for the same thing or you might find a way to cut a 
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comer with the paperwork and think, well, I can miss out that form 
because I've got the same information on another form. I think to a 
certain extent people adapt the paperwork to what makes sense to 
them (OS3). 
... some people might write up a support plan as soon as they've 
completed the assessment, so they would send to the client an 
assessment summary with the action they will be taking, which 
might be applying to a resource panel for funding for home care, for 
example; whereas some of us would actually carry out the action, and 
then write up the support plan at the time that you've got 
everything concretely in place ... So in that sense we would have all 
followed the procedure of doing a support plan and giving that 
written summary to the client, but we might have done it at slightly 
different stages (OS3)- 
Another recent development in the proceduralisation of work is the 
implementation of a vulnerable adults policy, in Line with central 
government guidance (Department of Health and Home Office2Ooo). A 
point of interest here is the structural formality of the procedure itself but 
the lack of follow-through by the organisation. in its implementation. The 
policy involves a bureaucratic procedure relying on a programme of 
training to give it effect but, following the establishment of the structure, 
the training required to bring it into effect was not carried out because of 
lack of resources, leaving the policy as an empty framework: 
Social workers tend to deal with the more complex cases. With our 
vulnerable adults procedure that must be one of the department's 
expectations. The vulnerable adults policy goes across aft adult 
services: I believe within all these procedures there's the expectation 
that the work is done by staff with appropriate training ... There is a 
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vulnerable adults coordinator ... 1whol ... runs case conferences and 
whose role it is to write procedures/training ... Although I should 
have had training I haven't. They developed the training but then 
decided it was too expensive so it's been done on a 'trickle-down' 
principle. I think that's poor practice (Field note: OPT, comment 
by practitioner, November200I). 
Mental Healtb Team 
The CMHT characterises procedures as sparse and their role as low-key. 
Overall procedures are characterised as flexible and allowing for 
professional discretion. 
We've got sort of a mission statement for the team about how we 
treat people, you know, and those sort of policies, but ... it is very 
much up to the individual worker how you determine the piece of 
work you do and in what way you do it. If somebody presents with 
depression, then it's up to you to decide how you want to work with 
that depression (MS4). 
In contrast to the emphasis on strict adherence of pro-formas in the OPT, 
CMHT practitioners feet they have more flexibility-. 
It's carte blanche, really. All the pro-formas are doing is prompting 
you to ask the right questions. So it's a prompt to take a history, 
rather than a prompt to look at a specific level of need, or an 
absence of a service that would benefit ... There's no set format for 
presenting a level of need (MS0. 
Paperwork is characterised as adaptable and allowing for individual 
approaches to come through-a usefiA guideline, but not a constraint- 
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I think the frisk assessmentl policy is that there should always be an 
updated risk assessment on file, and that is it. It doesn't go in to 
expl, ain what that means-you know, dated when, or how often or.. 
it's that simple. An updated risk assessment on the file. And people 
interpret that however they choose to interpret it (MS4). 
Furthermore, practitioners believe they are afforded considerable freedom 
in terms of the style of work undertaken with clients: 
I would think we're fairly autonomous ... my sense of professional 
responsibility is, if I felt there was somebody I was concerned about, 
somebody may harm themselves or harm somebody else, I would 
actually report that back. Or if I felt a person was vulnerable in some 
way, by a number of symptoms, I would kind of alert management 
to that, which is, I think, a sense of professional responsibility ... or 
fifl there are complaints coming in about something, anything like 
that. But outside of that I suppose we're fairly autonomous. I will 
make decisions on a day-to-day basis (MS3)- 
Practitioners within the team feel that they are afforded wide-ranging 
discretion by the organisation. Procedures are characterised as few and 
flexible. There is, however, a small group within the team (two of those 
who identify themselves as 'social workers', see above) expressing concern 
about the increasing impact of procedures on their professional freedom. 
One of these practitioners calls into question the level of management 
surveillance: 
Lots of things have to go through your line manager and every time 
you do this, CPA, form goes through to be signed off by them ... 
After it's completed they're supposed to sign it before it goes 
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through the computer system. I suppose that's a way of ensuring 
quality, I don't know. To me as a professional worker I don't think 
that's always necessary (MS2). 
The other practitioner sees a degree of management oversight as 
important, but is concerned about increasing intrusion of management 
direction into professional discretion: 
I suppose it's probably about right, although I think it's changing. I 
think because of accountability, people are feeling that managers 
have to be more on the ball in relation to what people are doing and 
not doing. And that's come from the government down. It's been 
very prescriptive about what you should and shouldn't be doing, and 
you have to meet ... my suicide rate's got to be cut dramatically by 
300,10 or something. 2 SOI think from outside you're expected to 
meet certain targets, or perform in a certain way. So by its nature it 
would not always allow for autonomy or individual discretion (MS3)- 
Recent developments in the CMHT have included a requirement to see 
new referrals within a certain time scale, and a more formal risk 
assessment procedure. Other practitioners in the team, however, do not 
see these as constraining and even see increasing proceduralisation of 
practice as necessary to support professional good practice. 
One area of dayý-to-day practice where policy is felt by practitioners to be 
prescriptive is that of response times to referrals, which falls within the 
requirements of the national service framework and national standards: 
ri"I 
I here are criteria in terms of... the time scale between when you 
2 The NationalService Framework: Mental Health, Standard 7 'Preventing 
Suicide', calls for a reduction in the rate of suicides nationally by at least 2o% by 
2.010(Department of Health 1999: 76). 
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send that letter of appointment and when you actually see them. We 
have guidelines for that: we have to see people in a certain amount 
of time ... we are allowed to operate a waiting list, as long as you 
justify how your waiting list works and if people are prioritised 
within that waiting list. So people who need seeing quickly... it's 
about how you prioritise who requires an urgent service and who 
doesn't 
... but there is no rubric about how you prioritise. There is 
no written protocol about how you prioritise who will and won't 
receive a same-day service (MSO. 
Another development is a policy on risk assessment: 
... our assessment 
document's quite new. So ... 
before, we would do 
our own assessment and just make up our own typed-up assessment 
forms, in whatever format we chose to do it, you know, we'd always 
do different. And then we'd do a risk assessment separately. But in 
the assessment document there was no part to record risk ... 
Nowwe 
do a blue form [the risk assessment form) with the assessment 
document, so whenever we do an assessment the risk assessment goes 
with it ... the managers now expect that, and will ask you now, 
'where's the risk assessment? ' (MS4). 
Practitioners criticise what they see as unwieldy paperwork or 
bureaucratic intrusion into their practice and value the fie3dbility currently 
enjoyed, but they also welcome the introduction of policies and procedures 
which simplify processes or which support professional practice. For 
instance, one practitioner comments on the recent work undertaken by 
managers to integrate care management and Care Programme Approach 
procedures: 
We'd fill in a CPA form and then we'd have to fill in a [care 
ZOO 
management) review form, because it went on two different systems 
... And we used to have to fill out care plans, plus the CPA, because 
we'd have our own set of forms. But in the last year ... they've agreed 
and brought somebody in to review everything (MS3)- 
Another notes that: 
... there are some god-awful practitioners out there, and they're 
always the ones who come to the headlines... is sort of increasing 
momentum for this sort of social work council to impose guidelines 
and guidance on social workers ... which I think is useful, because I 
think we all need to be working to a professional standard. But 
equally my concern would be that that would restrict our ability to 
decide how we work and who we work with (MSO. 
While most practitioners feel positive about the level of discretion 
afforded in their work, some concerns are voiced. One sees the breadth of 
autonomy as an occasional burden: 
... sometimes it feels as though you're expected to resolve something 
where you're not able to, reaUy. Or you can end up feeling 
incompetent, that you don't have that effect on that person to 
resolve it (MS3). 
Another has a wider concern about the level of professional discretion and 
accountability; for this practitioner, there is too much freedom, in the 
sense of demands on her time: 
We have far too much discretion. I would have to advocate strongly 
bringing back the old school approach. So what's wrong with 
clocking on and clocking ofP At least I got an honest day's pay for 
201 
an honest day's work. That's the taxpayer's money. So if I sit for an 
hour that's the taxpayer's money I'm sitting on (MS5). 
The discussion of findings in relation to financial management and 
procedures has so far highlighted the way in which financial controls and 
procedural guidelines rely on their interpretation, not only by practitioners 
but also by managers, pointing to the central process of their negotiation 
within the manager/worker relationship. This will now be considered in 
more detail. 
The background account of the authority in the preceding chapter 
underlined its budgetary concerns. Senior managers are concerned about 
expenditure and seek to cut it. Within adult services, the OPT is the main 
spending service. The CMHT's budget is not only smaller but differently 
structured, with a much larger proportion of expenditure on staffing than 
in the OPT. The data presented above indicate that the emphasis of 
efforts to manage resources is on the OPT. Procedures are another 
element of the means of controlling practice employed by senior officers, 
and again are not as evident in the CMHT as in the OPT. Many 
procedures are not only local initiatives but are also related to central 
government requirements. Here there seems to be an important 
distinction between those procedures relating to the government's PAF 
and procedures relating to good practice-primarily those discussed above 
in relation to risk. Procedures concerning the monitoring of care 
management processes are related to the PAF. These, in turn, are seen by 
senior and local managers to relate to continuation of funding sources and 
to non-interference by central government in local management. These 
procedures were enforced. Others, relating to good practice around risk in 
both teams, are more lightly managed. Furthermore, there is an interesting 
distinction between the bureaucratic nature of the risk management 
system set-up for vulnerable adults, primarily used in the OPT, and the 
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more professionally focused risk assessment recording procedure in the 
CMHT. Control through resource management and procedures is more 
intense in the OPT than in the CMHT. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETW EN PRACTITIONERS AND 
LOCALNIANAGERS 
Practitioners and local managers disagree with key elements of central 
policy as expressed through the management of resources and elements of 
procedures. Local managers support street-level practitioners in extending 
the discretionary potential of the interpretation and application of 
eligibility criteria etc.. Furthermore, local managers use their discretion to 
extend the scope for street-level discretion, especially in relation to 
resource management, where they are able to use resources from different 
budget areas to circumvent restrictions in others; for instance, using short- 
term funding to resource long-term care while waiting for formal resources 
to be freed up through the panel process. The relationship between street- 
level practitioners and their local managers is clearly a key area in 
understanding street-level discretion and the findings in relation to this 
area will now be explored, primarily through an examination of 
tsupervision' and how this is viewed, and with particular focus on the 
f6flowing questions: 
To what extent is the relationship structured by the conflicting 
interests of managers and street-level bureaucrats and 
characterised as a managerial encounter in terms of 
organisational superior and subordinate? 
To what extent is it influenced by shared commitments and 
concerns, particularly around professionalism, in which 
practitioners are held to account for their practice 
but in a 
context in which the relationship is also seen as one of 
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PrOfessional peers? 
Supervision 
In formal organisational terms the relationship between local managers 
and street-level practitioners differs considerably in the two teams. 
Organisational documents and procedures indicate that practitioners in 
the CMHT have substantial formal discretion and are acknowledged as 
professionals; while in the OPT the practitioners' role is seen as less that of 
social worker and more a constrained role of care manager (see page 132), 
bound by restrictions controlling their practice. This would suggest that 
relationships between managers and practitioners in the OPT might be 
more akin to Lipsky's model of relationships between managers and street- 
level bureaucrats, while those in the CMHT more closely fit the 
professional supervisory relationship characteristic of bureau-professional 
regimes. 
However, the findings of this research suggest that professionalism is a 
significant element of the relationship between managers and practitioners 
in both teams, but that, because of the organisational. context, this is 
expressed in a different, less formal way in the OPT than in the CMHT. In 
the OPT, practitioners appear to have a cooperative relationship with 
local managers. Their concerns focus on negotiating the pressures and 
requirements imposed both by senior managers and by councillors. There 
is an element of conflict in their relationship: local managers express 
concern that practitioners are not proactive decision-makers, and do not 
live up to the requirements of a 'professional'. In the CMHT there is 
disagreement among practitioners in their approach to supervision, and 
this mirrors disagreements about professional roles, and different attitudes 
to local managers and to the idea of 'management'. 
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Practitioners and local managers in both teams identify supervision as the 
focus of the management of discretion within the team. Supervision can be 
an informal, continuing relationship, involving exchange of information 
and advice, as well as a formal process. Here the focus will be on the formal 
process of a meeting in which supervisor and practitioner engage to review 
work-but there will also be reference to aspects of informal/ongoing 
supervision, as in the discussion of resource management and procedures 
above. 
Local managers of both teams are located on site and are easily accessible 
to practitioners. In the OPT social workers are supervised by two assistant 
managers, themselves qualified social workers, as is the team manager. In 
the CMHT practitioners are supervised by the assistant team manager, 
who is a qualified social worker and a practising ASW. (One practitioner 
also has a specialist, forensic brief and is supervised in relation to this 
aspect of her role by a different manager, who is not part of the social work 
team. ) The manager of the CMHT also has a social work background. 
Older Persons Team 
Practitioners in the OPT talk of supervision as a place where they engage 
with local managers in discussing professional issues, as well as considering 
the implementation of policies and procedures. Different practitioners 
focus on different aspects of supervision while, at the same time, outlining 
it as a place where their work is managed and as a professional space where 
they can explore their practice. 
There is a strong organisational element for supervision, in the sense that 
cases are monitored and accountability sought: 
within supervision, or within part of the supervision, we'll be 
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talking about what points we've got to, why we're doing something 
with a client, why we need to stay involved, what work we're doing 
with a client, and whether that needs to continue (OS3). 
It is also a place where practitioners work with local managers and where 
organisational procedures are discussed and approached with a degree of 
pragmatism (see page 177)- 
Supervision provides practitioners with an opportunity to review 
professional issues, and this is particularly valued: 
... a good sounding-board, so that you don't become too prescriptive 
in: X has got this problem therefore you need A, B, C. It's good in 
supervision to say have you tried, have you thought of, have you 
spoken to, to make you a bit more creative. I think a very good 
balance, here (OS4). 
'While these three elements--organisational, professional and 
pragmatic-are present in supervision, the organisational element is seen 
as more prominent and as emphasising management concerns. There is no 
formal policy for caseload management, but there is an expectation that 
cases will be dealt with expeditiously. The idea of appropriate time spent 
on a case is linked to the pressure of cases waiting to be allocated, and an 
idea of practice that emphasises short-term, focused casework to meet a 
crisis and, once the problem was solved, withdrawaP... And there is a kind 
of pressure to keep cases ticking through and moving on, rather than going 
for a very complex solution'(OS2). 
While the general pressure is to close cases and move on to the next case, 
managers also claim to trust practitioners' professional judgement about 
their work: 
2o6 
If someone's performing really well and I would trust their 
judgement on when to close a case, I might not set a target date for 
when they should close a case ... Whereas someone I knew who was 
very slow and I thought a piece of work was actually complete, I'd 
say I want that closed by next time (OM3)- 
There is also a professional dimension to decisions about continuing a 
case: 
Where people need ongoing social work support, they discuss that 
with me in supervision and, again, give me evidence as to why it's 
necessary to keep a case allocated to someone and I would generally 
say, yes, I agree: that person needs ongoing professional input 
(OM3)- 
These two factors are reflected in practitioners' accounts of discussion in 
supervision. Practitioners value the opportunity to continue with longer- 
term work, which they feel allows them to introduce social work skills 
alongside managing packages of care: 
I have kept about five, six cases now, for the last one year, because 
they still need social work intervention. The ones which continue to 
need social work intervention are cases which you feel that they still 
need you to go in and advise on some aspect of care, or their needs 
change so quickly that this week they're all right, next week the 
whole support system is falling apart (OS5). 
However, while believing that managers respect their professional 
judgement about the need for such work, practitioners also note increasing 
pressure from managers to close cases because of the level of 
demand for 
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care management assessments: 
... in supervision you discuss whether a particular case needs to 
remain and your judgement is respected. I think there's been 
pressure recently that you shouldn't have quite so many on-going 
cases. I mean, there were-I've been here just over six years and I 
certainly carried cases for over two years at one point ... There is 
this pressure to close cases, to bring you up, to take up more cases, 
otherwise the waiting list will just grow and grow, so there is that 
(OS4)- 
On the face of it, practitioners have a significant advantage in their 
relationship with their supervisor, in that they possess more detailed 
information about their clients. However, in the OPT, practitioners feel 
that the small size of the team and the role of supervisors in allocating 
cases and constantly signing paperwork make it impossible to undermine 
supervisory control by tailoring information about cases: 
I wouldn't just be looking to suddenly out of the blue to say this 
person needs residential care ... she's allocating work, so she knows 
what the referrals of information are; she's seeing the joint 
assessment form-all the way through there's a multitude of 
signatures going on this ... I don't think we get to the point where ... 
I'm saying we're looking for residential and all of a sudden she's 
going to disagree with that (OSO. 
Nevertheless, decisions about how to work with people are based not only 
on facts and raw information, but also on the way this information is 
interpreted and contextualised: that is, on professional judgement. In 
supervision practitioners can use their claim to professional judgement to 
achieve, what they see as appropriate results, or to enable them to work in 
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their preferred way-. 
I suppose you could potentially keep a client on forever. You could 
always create further issues, you know-well, you've got that home 
care, it's going well, but I'm not too sure, you know, there was a bit 
of concern a few weeks ago about this ... you could do, if you wanted, 
you could keep going and going into the minutest detail, if you 
became quite possessive about it (OS2). 
This practitioner points out that the issue of trust in the relationship 
between practitioner and supervisor is central in this process: 
I think that one of the skills of work is knowing how, when to take 
things from clients and when to put them back, and I think if you 
can balance that, then our supervisors will give us quite a lot of 
autonomy, and they will trust us that what we were doing was at the 
right level. But if we were getting it wrong I imagine they would be a 
lot more rigorous, saying, no, you've got to give that back to the 
client and get that case closed (OS2). 
During the interview process it became increasingly evident in the 
comments of both practitioners and managers that, while certain tasks are 
performed in supervision-management of caseloads, exchange of 
information and discussion of case issue s-something less tangible but 
more significant takes place simultaneously, namely the negotiation of 
trust and respect between managers and workers. As can be seen above, 
managers are concerned with 'performing really well', 'judgement, and 
practitioners with 'autonomy' and 'doing ... at the right leveV-and both 
are fimdamentally concerned with'trust'. This seems to go to the heart of 
the nature of the relationship between local managers and practitioners. 
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One practitioner, for instance, describes a process of building trust with a 
supervisor which involves a changing and developing relationship, moving 
from close supervision to increased autonomy-. 
I think when I started work obviously the monitoring was closer, 
but 
... once we got a kind of trust going and understanding, I think 
she trusted me and I knew her. It became more informal, and ... I 
grew to having a bit more autonomy about how I pushed clients 
through the system. As long as I was being sensible and I was 
moving clients on (OS2). 
This practitioner also recognises that the trust is not unquestioning: 
autonomy continues only as long as decisions are 'sensible' (according to 
managers) and clients kept moving along: 
I think if you've got the right kind of relationship you get given the 
kind of responsibility, but ... if I went into too much 
detail or I 
overstepped professional boundaries-if I was going round to a 
client's house and doing their shopping, you know ... I'm sure there 
would be a lot more scrutiny and I'd have a lot less autonomy in 
what I do (OS2). 
A manager explains this process of building trust and delegation and the 
contraints that apply to it: 
I think it's probably fair to say here that I think authority and 
decision-making is delegated down to the lowest point it can go, 
almost. I mean, in a way, we would like to have the care managers 
deciding about the resources, but for reasons of having to 
amalgamate them-that's really the main reason we 
have it a tier 
up-because you can't amalgamate knowing what you've got and 
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sharing it out on an individual basis, or it would probably bring 
things down to pots so small that nobody could use their pot, if you 
see what I mean. But I think there is quite a high level of support of 
expecting people to make decisions, and also, as long as they're 
reasonable ... of supporting them, even if afterwards you think they 
could have made a better decision. 
Q: What's a reasonable decision? 
A: I suppose it's something about expecting everyone to have a 
sense of judgement that's appropriate to their station, in a sense. So 
for the care managers, I suppose, or the assistant team managers, if 
they're qualified working, you don't expect to need to be on 
somebody's back. You expect them to be making decisions that are 
neither putting the authority at huge risk nor clients at huge risk 
nor themselves at huge risk, without you having to watch them 
every five minutes to make sure they're doing that (OMO. 
This account of building trust, delegation and autonomy involves two 
elements. One focuses on practitioners as employees, workers-the agents 
of the authority in carrying out its responsibilities. There is a symmetry in 
the accounts of practitioners and managers that suggests an effective and 
accepted process. The other-professional-dimension to the relationship 
of practitioner and managers is professional supervision, a meeting of 
equals where the manager is not in control but acts in a consultancy 
capacity. Here, however, managers express frustration and concern about 
what they see as the limited sense of professional responsibility amongst 
practitioners: 
One of the things that worries me is the things that sometimes 
people ask me, as their boss ... almost to tell them what to do, in 
situations in which I would feel it's appropriate to consult me, but 
it's not for me to tell you what to do. That's what you're employed 
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[for), to work out what to do; you're a professional person (OMO. 
In part, this criticism is tempered by a perception of the impact of the 
declining value of social work in Social Services and the historical emphasis 
on care management as the primary fieldwork role: 
We don't do any supportive visiting generally speaking any more. 
There's less exploration of people's family history, if you like. I think 
sometimes they struggle to think about what they can do that's 
special. I think they do do things that are special: working with 
families; group work; counselling-not in. --depth long-term 
counselling, but giving people in distressing circumstances tune to 
resolve feelings and talk about things (OM3). 
This view is echoed by practitioners, who refer the impact on them of 
working within an increasingly resources-driven and resource-starved 
service, in which it is difficult to sustain the idea of professional practice. 
As one practitioner explains: 
[Social work values arel ... 
kind of discussed in supervision, but the 
choices you make are still very limited by services. So I suppose we 
kind of always have the issues of user empowerment and choice and 
listening to the client up to a point. But at the same time it's kind of 
restricted by what realistically we can offer (OS2). 
The pressure is felt not only from the upper tiers of the organisation, but 
also from within the professional peer group: as an awareness of demands 
on colleagues and the number of people waiting for a service: 
I think there's two things, reaffy. Colleagues ... the kind of peer 
pressure; coUeagues, are taking on cases, and that is keeping pressure- 
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up. Clients might be waiting for a service ... I suppose if we gave 
them more of a Rolls-Royce service, we'd just have very few clients, 
and we wouldn't be able to work with the number of people we do. 
So there is a tension there as well-if we restrict our service and go 
down very complex solutions, then there isn't [sid people who are 
coming through (OS2). 
However, the same manager continues: 
I think social workers need to, perhaps, work a little bit more than 
they do on keeping up their professional standards, keeping up to 
date with changes in legislation (OM3)- 
Another manager also notes social workers' failure to challenge and 
question the authority's policies, contrasting this with her own experience 
as a social worker in the 1970s, working in a team where practitioners 
protested and challenged management and changed policy. While she now 
regards that level of activism as impossible, she still sees a critical role for 
professional social workers and expresses frustration at practitioners: 
... it almost seems that the whole job gets subsumed into carrying 
out the authority's instructions ... I find it disappointing how little 
resistance there is to a lot of things. Why aren't you saying to me 
'You can't tell me to do that'ý There doesn't be any sort of 
groundswell ... it seems to me that part of our role is to 
be advising 
the authority as social workers about things and saying: you're 
employing us as professionals, not as dogsbodies ... I don't think we 
do enough of that. I think it's partly because it's easy and 
comfortable not to, really, and to have the good excuse of, oh well, I 
can't do that because I've been told to do this (OMO. 
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One explanation offered by this manager is in terms of individual 
motivation: that it suits some practitioners to limit their professional 
discretion, in order to avoid responsibility-. 
I think it quite suits some people, actually- to lose the sense that 
they have any autonomy or that they ought to be making 
professional decisions. 'Oh, it's not my fault because'.... I think it's 
a kind of screen for people to hide behind in some sense, and not 
take responsibility for their own professional development and 
thinking about things for themselves. ... You know, it's quite nice to 
say, well, I haven't got any choice because they told me to; they take 
all the burden of responsibility of doing that. And just shed all the 
other bits that actually they're not telling you to do (OMO. 
The relationship between social workers and their local managers is more 
complex than Lipsky's account suggests. Managers seek to ensure 
accountability to the organisation, but this is understood by them as a 
professional, as well as an organisational accountability. Practitioners 
speak of being encouraged and supported in approaching their work in 
professional terms and being professionally accountable. There is some 
conflict between managers and practitioners, but this is largely expressed 
by managers themselves in terms of their frustration with practitioners 
not behaving as professionally as managers think they should. 
Mental Health Team 
Within the CMHT the team manager does not directly supervise staff, 
but does deal with requests for fimding. The assistant manager, who is a 
social worker, practises as an Approved Social Worker and is employed by 
Social Services, has responsibility for the day-to-day management of social 
work staff. These two local managers characterise. the role of professional 
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staff (and their relationship with them) in quite different ways. 
The team manager (who has little contact with staff, except when they 
need agreement for funding) sees care, managers as having a valuable and 
more focused role than 'old fashioned' social work: 
It's much more focused and much sharper now. For me, where I was 
working at the time, the NHS Community Care Act did ... ration 
the services much more. Not a bad thing, really (MM2). 
He also emphasises the formal and discrete nature of the different roles of 
practitioners. Most social workers in the team have had extra training as 
Approved Social Workers (ASWs), and work within the team as both 
social work practitioners and ASWs. (All the practitioners interviewed are 
also ASWs, as is the assistant manager. ) The team manager sees these roles 
as distinct, and does not see practitioners' ASW status and authority 
having any impact on their dayý-to-day social work role. In contrast, the 
assistant manager takes a wider view of the role of practitioners, and sees 
the ASW role as reinforcing the status of social workers. She criticises the 
narrowness of the care management role in mental health: 
... sometimes I 
do think care management's not good for mental 
health, because ... you get some workers who aren't comfortable 
with clients and they just get everybody else to do the sort of, if you 
like, the work, and they just oversee and care manage ... social work 
is supposed to be a profession and you're supposed to have 
professional skiffs, so it's about how you value those and which 
direction you're going, really (MMO. 
She emphasises the way in which social workers who are also ASWs carry 
that status into their other work: 
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[It) makes you think more legally, more laterally; you're more 
conscious about people's liberties-so I think it's just another layer, 
if you like, in the orange, really [sicl ... I think you've got status as an 
ASW ... I think you're more confident, because your general work's 
put you on that level of being quite a pivotal role in the assessment, 
and ... So I think you just carry that round with you. You don't 
change. You're who you are when you're practising (MMO. 
The role of ASW is different from that of day-to-day social work practice 
within the team, but practitioners' status and training as ASWs are seen 
both by them and by their line managers as contributing to their 
professional authority in other areas of practice and influencing 
supervision: 
... the fact that you're an Approved Social Worker kind of adds 
weight to things, because they see straight away that you've had 
extra training and that you've had to have so much experience, 
should have so much experience before you go on to the training, so 
I think they see it that you're kind of much more up on that kind of 
thing ... I can be more authoritative and say that I need to see this 
person ... we need to get this organised 
(MS3)- 
Both managers identify a split in the team in how staff approach their 
work, one group seeing their role in terms of professional social work, the 
others in terms of care management: 
I think historically the mental health team thought that they were 
above such things as care management, because they did see it as 
devaluing their skiffs, really. So I think we have a mixture in the 
team. We have some that are reasonably pro-care management, and 
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some that see ... care management as a bit useless, because they've 
nothing to buy and they'll just do it themselves. So they're not that 
positive about care management (MMO. 
The assistant manager, who is responsible for day-to-day management of 
the team, describes her management style as permissive and her 
relationship with practitioners as employing trust in them to act 
responsibly and professionally, but also managing with an idea of 
accountability (as opposed to control): 
... the process is there to be accountable, because then I agree with 
them, I say'well, look, are we going to do that? Or are you going to 
have approached somebody by such a date? 'And sometimes if they 
haven't I say, 'well, come on, let's do it now. You know-let's write 
the letter now, get it out of the way. I'm not particularly for 
catching people out and saying, well, you didn't do it last time, so 
we)re not going to do it now (MMi) 
and enforcing her idea of their professional responsiblity: 
Sometimes it's really difficult, because I very often find people are 
going out of our way to make sure people aren't in the matrix-you 
know, can we shove them to this place, can we put them to that 
place-and I'm thinking, no ... there are certain workers who 
I 
think do it more than others ... I'm saying, you mustn't 
keep passing 
them on; or they'll say Well, I've done that, now. I've closed the 
case'... but then in about two weeks Mrs Bloggs comes back ... and I 
feel like saying to the worker, 'well, I'm sony-you have to have 
them back. It's no good passing them to somebody else' (MMi). 
The relationship between practitioners and the assistant 
27 
manager-particularly through supervision-is the main mechanism for 
the management of discretion and accountability of professional social 
work staff The Primary areas of focus are on professional practice and the 
management of caseloads. The assistant manager sums up the purpose of 
supervision as follows: I... it doesn't matter who you are, you get your 
monthly supervision; that's formal. That's your accountability stuff That's 
your cases' (MMi). 
However, from the practitioners' point of view, the role and nature of 
supervision is a point of conflict. Practitioners can be divided into two 
groups according to their view of its purpose. One group (three 
practitioners) sees supervision as a place where they are accountable and 
where they engage in consultation with their manager as a fellow 
professional: 
In supervision, I suppose the role is and probably has been ... 
discussing any clients I'm kind of stuck on. And I suppose I see that 
as using some people with other ideas, coming in with professional 
ideas ... (MS3)- 
These practitioners-the 'social worker group' mentioned earlier (see page 
17. r)--understand supervision in terms of a relationship with their line 
manager entailing professional interaction and negotiation, with 'trust' as 
a given: 
I think once you pick up the assessment through the allocations 
meeting, if you didn't want to raise that at your supervision with 
your line manager, you would not be asked why it hadn't been raised. 
You may be asked how you're getting on with that person. Youll 
say, fine, I've done the risk assessment, I've done all the Paperwork, 
I'm seeing them every four weeks, and that would probably be the 
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end of the discussion. So from that point of view you're just ... 
acknowled&g that this person is on your caseload, and that's 
usually sufficient (MSO. 
They see their supervisor as a fellow professional, albeit in a supervisor's 
role. Local managers are not a source of great concern, but these 
practitioners are concerned about the idea of 'management': the spread of 
management control, intruding on professional discretion. One person, for 
instance, in discussing the wider supervision of practice, talks about 
managers checking paperwork (see pages 198-igg), and feels 'as a 
professional' that it is not necessary for her work to be checked in this 
way. 
Overall, practitioners in this group characterise the supervisory 
relationship in the same terms as the assistant manager who supervises 
them, emphasising their professional role, and tending to see themselves as 
partners, fellow professionals in supervision, where they are able to take 
the lead and set the agenda. 
In contrast to this point of view the other two practitioners are critical of 
their supervisor, whom they describe as vague, and express a preference for 
supervision which is more management-led and directive: 
My supervisor is ... always on the go, always getting caught up 
in this, 
so actually when we sit down I'm not sure who's supervising who ... A 
good manager should have an ear to things. They should be chasing 
up things and ... actually 
having it clear in their minds about the new 
role of the social worker (MS5). 
They call for a clearer structure within which to work, and their primary 
concern is to be supported by managers in their role as care managers, with 
219 
clarity and consistency, with the application of rules and the management 
of workloads across the team. They are critical of supervision as it stands, 
as a nebulous and diff-use process: 
Because if you try to keep your supervisor down to a clear answer, 
you're not going to get one. I need to know yes or no, and I find that 
it's easier to go at her and say'l need a yes or no; I don't need that 
one-hour discussion whilst you think about this. ' I also need 
managers who can fight the good fight if there's an issue to be taken 
up QMO- 
These practitioners criticise the supervisor for not being, in their view, a 
business manager; they want more management and clearer direction: 
Our biggest disservice is that all managers are professionals. We 
need managers for managers. Managers who have no idea how to 
manage social work-who manage people, who do not manage 'the 
issue' or get sidetracked. And we probably don't need all the 
managers to do that, but we do need one ... They're not looking at 
the matrix, they're looking at procedures, they're going to keep you 
on line. They're not going to get sidetracked into 'get this person 
some help' (MS5). 
I mean, at times I'm not very clear about my role ... So I think the 
management hasn't got their bit sorted out, really (MS4). 
Caseload management is a point of contention within the team and an 
issue with which the supervisor is grappling. She explains that: 
Our management have tried to introduce caseload weighting. Now 
we don't really strictly do that, but we're supposed to be looking at a 
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weighting system which, then, each worker has a caseload of no 
more than so many points; no more than so many heavy cases. So 
that's kind of up here [pointing to her headl (MMO. 
The assistant manager's view of supervision as a place for discussion of 
caseloads and of her approach to managing practitioners'workload as 'not 
draconian' presents no difficulty for the 'social work'group of 
practitioners, who see caseload managment as a matter to be dealt with in 
the context of trust and professional discussion: 
There's no caseload waiting procedure. It's very much left up to the 
individual person about whether they can take additional referrals 
or not ... how you actually manage your own caseload, that's usually a 
supervision matter and negotiated in supervision ... If you felt that 
you were particularly busy and couldn't take any more cases on ... 
you'd have to justify why you felt you would not be able to take any 
more of those on, but there would be no caseload audit. That 
doesn't take place (MS. O. 
However, for the 'care management'group this situation is not 
satisfactory. They would prefer a more formal system, and express distrust 
of colleagues and concern that managers are not policing the situation 
robustly enough: 
... my point's always 
been that you can)t, in mental health work, you 
can)t just talk about numbers. Because one can have five clients and 
one can have25, and the one with five can be as busy or busier. So I 
think it needs a system where it's much fairer distribution (MS4). 
The assistant manager claims to have a good grasp of practitioners'work 
because the team is small and because of her day-to-day contact as an 
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ASW: 
Well., I've got a quite good memory, so that's really good. And I think 
I've got my finger pretty well on the ball for most things. There are 
some things that just slip me by, and I think, 'my word'... But I think 
generally I'm pretty red-hot, because my supervision's ongoing up 
here (MMO. 
However, practitioners generally see themselves as the experts in the cases 
they manage, and best placed to decide how to present their cases in 
supervision: 
... I suppose you have discretion in yourself when you decide 
whether youll talk it over with a line manager just now, whether 
you'll wait until next week or whether you'll wait until the next 
supervision 
(MS2). 
This is, nevertheless, understood within the context of accountability and 
responsibility to Social Services-. 
I remember a colleague who'd been a nurse saying one of the 
differences was that any information that as a social worker we had 
actually belonged to the local authority, whereas the Health 
staff-information could be kept between them and the client. I 
think that affects what you mean by discretion as well. A lot of 
things-because Social Services is a managed-in a lot of things you 
don't have discretion (MS2). 
Another practitioner recounts a story to illustrate the way accountability 
can include decisions about where to pass information, and when not to 
pass information to the line manager: 
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I had a client who both had a mental illness and a physical illness. 
I remember one time I saw him at a day centre and he was in 
love-super. Then I realised it was one of his carers that he was in 
love with, and he was convinced that this relationship was 
reciprocated. . .. My particular line manager-not anybody around 
just now-I knew was somebody who, because of things that had 
happened in her own life, would have immediately made it an 
enormous thing. And I didn't think that I could necessarily go by 
what that particular client was saying. I phoned and spoke to 
another senior manager who I knew very well, and we talked it over, 
and we decided there was no risk (MS3). 
However, practitioners identify two strategies in relation to disclosure of 
information that seem designed to resist management intrusion into 
professional decision-making. These two strategies involve quite different 
rationales. One strategy available to practitioners (who identify themselves 
not just as professionals but also as clinicians with specialist skills) is to 
question the ability of their professional manager to supervise apects of 
their work- 
One practitioner notes the distinction between clinical and administrative 
supervision, indicating that aspects of this work are not liable to lay 
management, and the assistant manager discusses a similar point: 
I do think that the nurses hide behind clinical stuff, because they say, 
"oh, this is clinical supervision; it's different from line management 
supervision'. And they don't understand how I can be a line manager 
and a, I would say, practice supervisor as opposed to a clinical 
supervisor. And now and again I can see their argument, because I'm 
not CBT fcognitive behavioural therapyl trained, so one of my 
workers is CBT trained, and he ought to get his CBT from somebody 
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that can do that. But as his line manager and as an accountable 
person, as a rate-payer, I've got to make sure that that CBT is going 
the right way and it's not taking too long to develop and ... you know. 
So I actually think that I can just about justify being a line manager 
and a practice supervisor (MMO. 
The second strategy is cruder, and involves the withholding or selective 
presentation of information. This is identified by the care management 
practitioners as a strategy used to obtain the desired decision in 
supervision. 
I'd do my assessment and I'd just stick it in the fide, and the manager 
would say, 'but we need to see this'. You know-why? It's OK ... You 
just make the decision, the sensible ones, you get on with your work 
the best you can and keep your head down and do what you know you 
do best (MS4)- 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the key findings of the study in relation to the 
research questions identified in Chapter III. In the following chapter 
these findings will be summarised and discussed in the context of the 
critical analysis of Lipsky's account of discretion and that of his critics and 
other analysts in this field. The aim of the discussion will be to evaluate the 
contribution of the street-level bureaucracy perspective and the 
domination and discursive analyses, outlined in Chapter III, to the 
understanding of social work discretion in adult Social 
Services. 
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CHAPTERVII 
DISCUSSION: THE DYNAMICS OF DISCRETION 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has explored the operation of discretion in Social Services 
through a critical examination of the street-level bureaucracy perspective 
in relation to domination and discursive analyses. These perspectives will 
now be discussed in relation to the findings presented in the preceding 
chapter. Discretion in the thesis has been treated as an area for 
examination-the area of worker freedom-and the different accounts of 
discretion have been concerned with its extent and its basis for social 
workers within Social Services. 
Lipsky's account of discretion, set out in Chapter II, suggests that we 
should look beyond formal accounts of roles and discretion to understand 
the extent of street-level workers' freedom in making choices about the 
delivery of services and policies. He argues that the difficult conditions of 
work in public service bureaucracies-strect-level bureaucracies-give rise 
to greater discretion on the part of street-level workers than their formal 
role descriptions suggest. They are faced with choices about interpreting 
vague policy, and decisions about prioritising insufficiently fiznded 
policies. 'While their managers seek to control and direct their practice to 
ensure compliance with the spirit, if not the letter of policy, they are 
limited in their ability to direct work and often have to accept, reluctantly, 
a wider degree of street-level discretion than they would, in theory, allow. 
Empirical research within the street-level bureaucracy perspective was also 
reviewed in Chapter 11. This research has tended to focus on 
demonstrating the extent of discretion of street-level workers, and in doing 
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so has concentrated on non-professional officials. However, one study has 
compared white-collar with professional discretion within street-level 
bureaucracies (Kelly 1994) and suggests that professional street-level 
bureaucrats have a significantly wider degree of discretion in their work 
than non-professional street-level bureaucrats. There has been little 
critical examination of Lipsky's characterisation of managers in street- 
level bureaucracies. He presents them as compliant organisational agents, 
seeking to implement policy and ensure that street-level bureaucrats 
comply with organisational objectives (Lipsky ig8o: i8-ig). There is 
evidence, however, that managers, like street-level bureaucrats, exercise 
discretion and influence the application of policy in line with non- 
organisational concerns (Weissert 1994, Keiser 1999). 
The aim in undertaking the field study has been to consider these 
questions about the influence of professional status on discretion and the 
nature of management within public organisations, through the 
examination of a professionalised street-level bureaucracy in the form of 
social work teams in a Social Services Department in England. Within this 
context it has also been necessary to address another argument: that is, 
that Lipsky's theory is no longer relevant, and that the organisation of 
Social Services has now moved on, with managers in charge and in control 
of practice to the extent that it is no longer sensible to talk about street- 
level discretion (Howe iggia). Chapter III suggested that Lipsky's analysis 
of street-level bureaucracies is closer to the picture of managed 
bureaucracies than his critics recognise: his argument is that, although 
managers in street-level bureaucracies employ a range of managerial 
techniques to control street-level practice, the conditions of street-level 
bureaucracies essentially militate against this attempt at close and detailed 
control and give rise to significant informal discretion. Despite these 
differences, Lipsky and his critics share the view that managerialism has 
undermined professionalism as an important element in understanding 
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discretion in the organisation of public services. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 111, while there is strong evidence pointing to the increasing 
strength of managerialism within the public sector, including Social 
Services, there is also evidence of the continuation of a professional 
discourse alongside managerialism in structuring street-level discretion. 
In the discussion of these issues in Chapter III, several areas were 
identified for particular attention. Lipsky characterises discretion in 
street-level bureaucracies in terms of particular conditions: resource 
scarcity and nebulous Policy (Lipsky ig8o: 28). Authors such as Howe 
(1986, iggia) and Jones (1999,2001)ý WhOM I have identified as domination 
managerialist analysts, have argued that managers now control 
organisations through budgets and policy specification, to the degree that 
the idea of street-level discretion no longer applies. In looking at Social 
Services generally, this view that discretion no longer exists has been called 
into question (Evans and HarriS2004a) and the importance of other 
factors, in addition to those identified by Lipsky (particularly the idea of 
professionalism), has been identified in understanding the extent and 
nature of street-level discretion (Clarke and Newman 1997). Lipsky and the 
domination managerialism perspective assign managers a central role in 
the operation of street-level discretion. However, their characterisation of 
management as an undifferentiated category, both in hierarchy and in 
motivation, has been called into question (Harris1998a, r9g8b). This, in 
turn, has raised questions about the impact on street-level discretion of 
management at different levels in the organisation. A persistent 
distinction in the empirical research looking at Social Services teams is 
between senior strategic managers, who set the context of work through 
their control of resources and development of procedures, and local 
managers, who are responsible for day-to-day management of staff, 
including the implementation of procedures and budgetary controls 
(Harris 1998a: 846-848). 
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In considering the impact of these factors on street-level discretion, the 
importance of professionalism has been identified, in the degree to which 
managers accept practitioners' professional claims to manage their own 
work. This issue has been considered in terms of the extent to which 
professionals' claims to discretion are recognised, whether this applies 
uniformly within the organisation and at what level and to what extent 
professionalism influences service managers'ideas about their role and 
that of the service they manage. The final area identified for investigation 
follows on from this: what is the nature of the relationship between street- 
level practitioners and managers, particularly local managers? Is it basically 
conflictual, as the street-level bureaucracy and domination perspectives 
suggest, or is there a cooperative dimension, relating to the principles of 
professionalism within the organisation-a possibility identified by the 
discursive managerialism perspective? 
Before considering how the case study findings help advance our 
understanding of social work discretion within Social Services in relation 
to these research questions, the method of research will be reviewed to 
consider its strengths and weaknesses and the weight that can be put on 
these findings as a critical analysis of the conceptualisations of professional 
discretion. The findings will then be considered in relation to two broad 
areas: the context of discretion; and the practices of discretion. 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Yin points to the importance of external and internal validity in the 
evaluation of case study research (Yin 2003: 36-37). External validity is the 
extent to which a study can be said to reflect the wider situation. 
This 
notion is often associated with the idea of statistical generalisation; the 
extent to which a study is a 
fair sample of a wider population and so can 
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represent that population. This study was not based on statistical logic. 
Newunit, for instance, is not a sample of one, and I do not claim that is it 
typical or representative of all Social Services Departments. Rather, as 
explained in Chapter IV, the study is designed as a theoretical case 
(Walton. 1992), which seeks to critically examine Lipsky's analysis of 
discretion in street-level bureaucracies and the nature of the relationship 
between managers and street-level bureaucrats, as well as being sensitive to 
deficiencies in relation to Lipsky's account of discretion, arising from the 
impact of managerialism and professionalism. However, while recognising 
the unique characteristics of Newunit, it is also possible to make tentative 
general points from a case study such as this in relation to the operation of 
discretion in similar settings. Social Services social work teams share 
important core characteristics: they are teams of professionals working 
within a public agency with complex goals and resource problems, and it is 
therefore possible to make cautious generalisations from one Social 
Services Department to others (Harris 1998b: 70- 
Internal validity of a study relates to two areas: the extent to which the 
research has actually picked up what it aimed to examine (Edwards and 
Talbot iggg: 82) and the extent to which the data reflect what occurs on 
the ground (Pole and Lampard2002: 208). Quafitative research tends to 
emphasise the second sense of internal validity (ibid. 2o 8). 
The following issues were identified in Chapter III to focus and structure 
the empMiCal investigation into the extent and basis of social work 
discretion in adult fieldwork within Social Services Departments: the 
nature of management; the effectiveness of management 
strategies of control, and the extent to which team members 
accept or are able to resist these; and the extent to which 
managerialist claims to control are accepted or rejected, 
particularly as against a professional discourse, and by whom, and 
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in which context. 
The methods used to gather data to address these issues were outlined in 
Chapter IV. They included observation (a short series of visits to each 
team at the start of the field work), and documentary research (official 
papers, reports, policies etc. ). The main method of data collection used was 
interviews with professional social work staff and their line managers. 
Social workers and managers were interviewed in each team to investigate 
their perception of the extent of their own discretion and that of others 
within the team and the nature of the manager-social worker relationship 
around the issue of discretion. These were semi-structured interviews, 
which addressed key themes (Appendix 5) but also allowed participants to 
move the interview in fine with their own particular concerns (see page 
117). This format seemed to work, in the sense that it allowed people to 
talk about issues which were pertinent and this, I would argue, is evident 
in the quality of the data and level of disclosure represented in the findings 
detailed in Chapter VI. 
The approach taken in the interviews enabled me to gather rich, detailed 
and sometimes unexpected data: I had not, for instance, expected the 
managerialist commitment of a group of practitioners in the CMHT (see 
page 172). However, the small number of people involved meant that, while 
it has been possible to identify trends and rough categories, these are 
inevitably impressionistic and the general points drawn reflect the art 
rather than the science of analysis. 
The research design gave interviews a central role in the data collection 
process. In terms of its internal validity this is open to criticism. It could 
be argued that interviews are not the best way to obtain the information 
sought on street-level discretion. Ellis et at., for instance, believe that direct 
observation is more illuminating of discretionary practices than'... 
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scrutiny of official documentation or interviews with senior managers, or 
even front-line workers ... ' (Ellis et al. 1999: 278). In response, I would argue 
that no single method of data collection is necessarily superior to any 
other; rather, the key issues are: the appropriateness of the method to 
answering the question, and recognition of the chosen method's 
limitations and the development of strategies to ameliorate these. 
Denscombe, for instance, points to a number of strategies--which I have 
employed-to ensure robustness of data analysis, including: checking data 
with other sources; looking for themes across subjects, rather than relying 
on individuals; and recognising the role of 'key players' in providing good 
quality information (Denscombe2003: M6--M7). 
I have sought to represent the full range of voices within identified groups 
as well as between them. However, in some situations I have quoted one or 
two individuals extensively, where they are in a particularly strong position 
to provide an overview or have particular insights (Denscombe 2003: 
i86)-for example, the OPT manager (OM) in relation to the financial 
situation of the team, and attitudes of senior managers to the work of the 
team. 
Another possible criticism of this approach is that interviewees' accounts 
are taken as fact (Ellis et al. -iggg). 
I have sought to address this by means of 
a triangulation strategy (Pole and Lampard2002: 295); that is, seeking data 
from more than one source-specifically practitioners and managers-and 
using these together with information from my visits (field notes) and 
review of key documents to contextualise, test and confirm the extent and 
use of discretion and the nature of relationships between street-level 
bureaucrats and their managers. 
The small numbers of interviewees in just two teams has raised difficult 
questions about the protection of the anonymity of interviewees. 
In this 
231 
setting confidentiality has involved two sets of issues. The first relates to 
the site. I have sought to give sufficient but not excessive information 
about Newunit and the two teams to provide a valid characterisation of 
the sites, and have used pseudonyms for the two authorities 
discussed-namely Oldshire and Newunit. In relation to such a small study 
it is also important to consider confidentiality of interviewees within the 
teams and the department. Viditch (1968), for instance, undertook a study 
in a small town-Springfield-and, in the final report, referred to its 
residents by pseudonyms. However, the subjects complained that they had 
been identified by others in Springfield because of details given about 
them. In order to maintain internal confidentiality I have avoided analysis 
on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and while participants are sometimes 
referred to by gender, this has been done on a random basis (see page 122). 
The main themes to emerge from the findings will now be reviewed and 
related to the questions, identified from the review of the literature, that 
have structured this study. My concern is to consider how the findings can 
contribute to advancing our understanding of the street-level bureaucracy 
perspective. 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF DISCRETION 
Is the research authority characterised by the conditions of 
street-level bureaucracy or not? Is professionalism an additional 
contextual factor that contributes to the extent and nature of 
discretion? 
The nature of Social Services as an organisation was considered in Chapter 
V. The aim of this first research question is to consider the applicability 
and the 'fit' of the (American) street-level bureaucracy perspective to the 
analysis of social work discretion in the context of a contemporary 
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(British) Social Services Department. 
In Chapter III the case for the appropriateness of applying the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective was set 'Out (see- Page 40), but within the context 
of recognising that some commentators are critical of the continuing 
relevance of the street-level bureaucracy perspective to managerialised 
Social Services and a separate argument pointing to the continuing 
recognition of professional claims to discretion within Social Services (an 
area of street-level theory identified as problematic in Chapter II). 
Lipsky's analysis of practitioners' discretion in public service 
organisations, and its relationship to two other accounts of discretion 
within contemporary Social Services---domination and discursive 
managerialism-were discussed in Chapters II and III. The view that 
Lipsky's work is no longer relevant because of the increasing influence of 
managerialism within Social Services was critically examined in Chapter 
III. The key issue of dispute between the two literatures is not, as Lipsky's 
critics suggest, the increasing influence of managerialism within public 
services (see page 47ý-Lipsky's work assumes that street-level 
bureaucracies are managerialised organisations (see page 44)-but the 
extent to which managerialised public services live up to their billing as 
rational and coherent organisations that have overcome problems of vague 
and imprecise policy and the mismatch between policy objectives and 
agency resources, and the degree to which managers have the capacity and 
the tools to control practice. 
On the surface, Newunit seems to conform to the picture of Social 
Services as the type of managerialist organisation suggested by Howe, 
namely Griffithian general management focused on financial management 
and clear lines of accountability and control (National Health Service 
Management Inquiry 1983, Griffiths ir988). Social Services in Newunit have 
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been inherited from Oldshire. In its adult services, Oldshire embraced the 
community care reforms of the early 19gos in a way which reflected a 
strong commitment to the introduction of market reforms and managerial 
strategies for Social Services provision. The authority introduced a 
purchaser/provider split, locating social work teams on the purchaser side; 
and in this market context also sought to recast the role of social workers 
in terms of an administrative care management role, assessing and 
purchasing packages of care, and emphasising the need for managers to 
develop skills in financial management, goal-setting etc. (with, as one local 
social work manager comments, 'social work in brackets) (OMi). In this 
role social workers/care managers were part of a larger system in which 
resources and polices were, in theory, brought into alignment by clear lines 
of responsibility and decisive management, for instance using eligibility 
criteria to remove rationing decisions from the street level and to ensure 
that policies and resources were better matched. 
However, as explained in Chapter V, in addition to inheriting these 
reforms when it took over the county's Social Services, Newunit has also 
inherited Oldshire's difficulties in matching its resources with its policy 
and legal responsibilities. Within Newunit there are clear reasons for 
questioning the assumption that the management system has resolved 
tensions within the organisation, in terms of matching policy and practice 
goals and the resources available to meet them. Newunit has tried to 
reduce Social Services expenditure in line with its more limited resources 
through the imposition of cuts in the older persons service (see page 140)- 
However, in this process it has promoted policy confusion, e. g. publishing 
more generous eligibility criteria than those it inforinaffy sought to impose 
(see page 178). Furthermore, the policy of reducing expenditure has 
increasingly come into conflict with other goals-to provide a welfare 
service, and to meet legal obligations and government targets. 
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The picture of Social Services presented by Newunit runs counter to the 
characterisation presented by the domination analysis of managerialism as 
a well-run machine, in which managers prescribe policy to be put into 
effect by drilled and docile workers (see page 46). Policy and resources in 
Newunit create work conditions of uncertainty and resource 
inadequacy-a situation reflecting Lipsky's portrayal of the corrupted 
world of work (see page 16), which is characteristic of street-level 
bureaucracies. This impression is further supported when Newunit's 
situation is considered in the wider national context of Social Services 
outlined in Chapter III, which also reflects concern about policy 
uncertainty and resource inadequacy (see pages 5o-5. i). 
Lipsky's analysis, however, also raises questions about the limitations on 
managers' capacity to control, seeing management as a limited resource 
with limited reach. This view conflicts with many domination 
managerialism analysts, who portray managers as ready, able and eager to 
take control in Social Services (Nixon -1993). This view assumes that the 
power and capacity of management to control practice is self-evident; but 
findings suggest that the capacity of management within Newunit is 
severely limited. 
An external review of older people's services raised serious questions about 
the capacity of management both to run the organisation and to cope with 
the demands for continual change by central government. Management is a 
scarce resource. stretched almost to breaking point: in the OPT, for 
instance, the team manager is pulled up into a more strategic role, while 
the assistant managers take on more team management responsibilities. 
Alongside this managers are drawn into reviews and audits of their 
services, in addition to their day--to-day mangement work 
(see page z6o). 
Information technology (IT) is also identified as an important tool 
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employed by managers to take control of and dominate the workplace 
Gones 11983, Harris 1998). The move from shire to unitary was identified by 
senior officers in Oldshire as likely to undermine key aspects of top-down 
control, such as IT, and within Newunit the IT system it inherited was 
broken up between the six unitaries and has not been developed as a 
financial control system but is largely used to store basic records. The IT 
system, while being developed within Newunit the better to monitor 
practice, has been identified in a joint review as insufficient for the 
purpose (see page 137)- Some of the problems concerning management 
capacity and ability to control though the use of IT are particular to the 
local government reorganisation-an experience shared with many other 
Social Services Departments in England (Craig and Manthorpe 1999). 
However, increasing diversion of management from control of practice to 
the performance of audit (Power1997) and implemention of the 
modernisation agenda supports Lipsky's characterisation of management 
as struggling and limited in capacity, in contrast to the domination view of 
omnipotent, intrusive managers who dominate and control practice. 
While Newunit therefore conforms to Lipsky's picture of a street-level 
bureaucracy, this is only half the picture. Other factors emerge as 
significant in understanding the organisational context of discretion which 
point to the limited nature of the street-level bureaucracy perspective's 
analysis. In Chapter III it was argued that managerialiSM's impact has not 
necessarily been to eliminate professonal practices, claims and 
assumptions, although it might modify them. Rather than assume a 
deprofessionalised workplace (as seems to be the approach of domination 
managerialism and the street-level presepective), the discursive analysis 
recognises that managerialist discourse can overlay and interact with an 
existing bureau-professional discourse, rather than replacing it (Clarke and 
Newman . 1997: 76). 
Both the street-level bureaucracy perspective and the 
domination managerialist analysis tend to play down the significance of 
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professionalism in the analysis of street-level discretion (see pages 33 and 
711-72). 
Community care reforms such as care management and eligibility criteria 
are closely associated with the rise of managerialism within Social Services 
(1-larriS2003: 43), but their impact has been felt unevenly across adult 
services. Their implementation nationally (Lewis and Glennerster 1996) 
and within Oldshire and, subsequently, Newunit has focused on purchasing 
care packages in a mixed economy of care, and the financial control of this 
process. Chapter V considered the impact of these reforms on the OPT 
(and its predecessors in Oldshire) and the CMHT. Comparing these two 
sites, it is clear that reforms arising from the implementation of 
community care in the early 19gos had a much more significant impact on 
the OPT than on the CMHT, giving credence to the discursive 
managerialist view that 'the impact of the developments is likely to be 
uneven and, at least in some cases, maybe open to negotiation... ' (Harris 
. 1998a: 858). 
Control of spending is a priority for Newunit (as it was for Oldshire), and 
this is reflected in a different emphasis in the two teams and the role of 
budget management and procedural controls. 
The OPT has been a particular focus for senior management intervention 
over the past decade, as a major user of community care spending; the 
CMHT, in contrast, is marginal in expenditure terms (see pages 132-133), 
and has been relatively untouched by much of this managerial activity. 
Local managers and practitioners within the CMHT portray the strategic 
level of the local authority (and Health management) as constantly being 
reorganised and marginal; historically, mental health services have not been 
seen as a significant local authority responsibility (see pages 155-. 156ý-a 
situation reinforced by central government's identification of mental 
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health as an NHS-led responsibility (Department of Health iggga). In this 
context mental health social workers not only retain a sense of their 
professional identity but also receive recognition of this from the 
authority, which acknowledges that their role is a broader one than care 
management, involving a social work contribution to mental health care 
(Newunit Community Care Plan1999-2000). 
Harris argues that the dominant mode of organisation within Social 
Services Departments prior to the community care reforms was bureau- 
professionalism (Harris 1998), but that this has been increasingly overlaid 
in Social Services by a managerial regime. While data from the OPT would 
support this view, data from the CMHT suggest another conclusion. 
Bureau-professionalism has continued to be an important factor in the 
official characterisation of the role of social workers in the CMHT and 
this is reflected in a recognition of the social work staff s professional 
role-a broad and wide-ranging role in which they can exercise their 
discretion in their practice. 
Data from the two teams suggest that the impact of managerialism in 
Social Services is not uniform across adult services. Its particular 
penetration perhaps reflects Sabatier's observation that, while policy 
claims may be characterised widely and as far-reaching, they tend to be 
implemented with vigour only in areas that reflect the core strategic 
concerns (Sabatier 1993: 287)-and in the case of community care that 
means the management of financial resources (Lewis and Glennerster 
1996). 
However, managerialism's uneven penetration of the organisation also 
seems to reflect the nature of the local economy of care, and how this 
supports (or not) the recasting of social work roles in terms of the 
purchaser/provider split and care management. The OPT has been able to 
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purchase services appropriate to the client group: there is a local market of 
care. The model of administrative care management (see page ioO 
adopted by the authority can operate in this environment and is seen as 
necessary to manage expenditure. The CMHT, on the other hand, does 
not fit this model very well. In the mental health context, the market for 
social care services is much more limited by both demand and supply 
factors. Practitioners are, then, limited in their ability to act as care 
managers-the care management model adopted by Oldshire and 
inherited by Newunit not only reinforces but also requires purchasing 
budgets-and are also, in the absence of specialist social care services, 
required to retain their traditional social work role as providers, as well as 
purchasers, of services. 
I do not mean to suggest, however, that the impact of managerialism is 
total in the OPT and absent in the CMHT. Professionalism is a factor in 
the OPT in a number of ways: managers are professionally qualified, as are 
the field social workers, and the professional dimension is an important 
aspect of their relationship. (This will be explored finther below. ) 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the Social Services management 
hierarchy, there appears to be a dual process at work in relation to 
professionalism. A recent audit commission report criticises the high level 
of qualified staff in the team and calls for the reduction in qualified staff 
and their replacement by unqualified staff (see page 152). At the same tune, 
alongside deprofessionalisation at the team level, there is a growing 
recognition of the role of professionally qualified staff in working with 
people with complex needs and at risk, particularly those identified as 
vulnerable adults. The vulnerable adults policy identifies this area of work 
as requiring professionally qualified staff, particularly social workers (see 
pages 196-197). Within the CMHT practitioners and managers talk of 
being subject to performance standards, budgetary controls and care 
management procedures, but tend to characterise these as adaptable and 
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flexible, recognising professional discretion. 
A factor that might help explain the differential impact of managerialism 
relates to the impact of concern about risk on the organisation of services. 
Hood has argued that management of risk, and of the risk of blame to the 
organisation, is an important factor in understanding the organisation of 
services that carry out risk work (Hood et al. 2ooo). Over the past decade 
mental health has been a primary site for concern about risk in adult 
services (Reith 1998). The emphasis on professional practice within mental 
health may reflect the influence of the role of ASWs in retaining a strong 
professional social work dimension in mental health social work (Rogers 
and Pilgrim 20oi), but continuing professionalism may also be a strategy 
for senior managers in the organisation. to guard against responsibility in 
this politically charged area, by emphasising the continuing role of 
professional decision-making and using the idea of clinical responsibility as 
a technique to distance managers from responsibility (see page 91). In 
contrast, in the OPT, where there is a degree of risk to the authority in 
relation to vulnerable adults, this is a relatively recent development. 
Historically, as mentioned above, the, most pressing concern for senior 
managers has seemed to be the risk to the organisation's finances in 
expenditure on older people's services. Nevertheless, organisational 
policies seem to be in the process of changing-and acknowledging 
professional skills--in that social work is seen as engaging with complex, 
risky cases, particularly vulnerable adults. 
In summary, the evidence from this research supports the application of 
the street-level bureaucracy framework to the examination of social work 
discretion within Social Services; but it also highlights the framework's 
limitations. It supports the widespread characterisation of Social Services 
as a setting within which managerial strategies are 
brought into play. 
Rather than exhibiting the rational coherence suggested by domination 
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theorists such as Howe, the workplace resembles the 'corrupted world of 
service', of policy imprecision and inadequate resources, described by 
Lipsky as characteristic of street-level bureaucracies. However, the street- 
level perspective's argument that such conditions are the primary factors 
in explaining the nature of street-level discretion (Brodkin 1997: 2-4) is 
problematic. The continuing influence of dimensions of a bureau- 
professional culture is evident within the site, although to different degrees 
in the two different teams. The situation within Newunit suggests a 
complex and varied work terrain needing further exploration to identify 
the influence of these factors on the nature of management, street-level 
discretion and the relationship between managers and practitioners, and 
the way these factors relate to the broader issues and debates about social 
work discretion that underpin the remaining research questions. 
THE NATURE OF MANAGEMENT 
What is the nature of management within Social Services as a 
street-level bureaucracy, particularly at the interface between 
street-level and front-line management, and between front-line 
managers and senior managers, in terms of its structure and the 
range ofmanagers'motivations? 
This second question seeks to explore the nature of management in the 
two teams. Lipsky (see pages. T7-iS) and the domination man2gerialist 
perspective provide a limited account of managers'role in the 
construction of street-level discretion, emphasising their attempt to 
control and limit it and to impose organisational priorities on 
practitioners (see page 56). From the discursive managerialist perspective, 
they do not give sufficient credence to the possibility that management 
could be an intemally fractured category, to the positive role that some 
managers may have in the construction of street-level discretion, or to the 
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interpenetration of managerial and professional discourse in particular 
sites of management. 
In contrast to the portrayal of managers as a cadre of obedient policy 
implementers by both Lipsky and domination managerialists, managers in 
both teams in this study are critical of strategic policy and strategic polic37" 
makers. Local managers criticise aspects of the policy they are required to 
put into force. However, the culture within Newunit gives managers 
significant management (discretionary) scope as policy implementers and 
interpreters. For different reasons-complexity of policy in the OPT and 
its absence in the CMHT-local managers in both teams express concern 
about and distance from the policy decisions of senior managers, echoing a 
strong theme in empirical research in Social Services teams, which points 
to a fundamental fracture in concerns and identities between senior and 
local managers (see page 6o). In the OPT local managers express the belief 
that senior managers see their service as important, but primarily as a 
means to an end: as a way of managing and controlling the overspend 
across the adult Social Services budget (see page 153). Local managers 
express the view that senior managers devalue the older people's service 
and service users, seeing the service as a convenient way to cut the 
overspend. They also feel that senior managers devalue professional work 
with this client group. Local managers have sought resources to increase 
professional staffing numbers, but feel that their arguments are not heard 
and perhaps not even understood (see pages 152-153)- In the CMHT local 
managers refer to mental health services as marginal to Social Services as 
an organisation. They see policies as developed for the main adult client 
group--older people-and mental health as difficult to fit into the 
assumptions informing the guidance (see page 156). The assistant manager 
criticises senior managers who, she feels, are trying to distance themselves 
from responsibility for mental health services. (She talks about this 
primarily in terms of avoiding cost by relying on the 
local NFIS provision. ) 
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The critical comments from these managers echo the NISW study, which 
finds many managers disillusioned and critical of the objectives of their 
departments (Balloch et al. 1995: 87). While feeling that they now have 
greater discretion as policy implementers and interpreters, these local 
managers-particularly in the OPT-feel under the scrutiny of audit and 
performance indicators. This suggests a level of distrust within 
management hierarchies of subordinates (O'Neill 2002: chapter 3), 
including subordinate managers. 
Both teams were recently subject to audit or inspection and the research 
findings reveal, alongside a sense of being'checked up', a shared interest in 
the successful performance of audit. Local managers, warned by senior 
managers about the internal audits and inspections, had time to get their 
paperwork in order. The OPT was also subject to external inspection-an 
experience that seems to have contributed to a sense of joint purpose 
between street-level workers, local managers and senior managers. The 
impact on the team of these inspections is significant, and is highlighted 
particularly by local managers, because of the amount of work created by 
preparation for the inspections in checking files and bringing them up to 
date, and the resources spent on preparation and drafting in student help. 
The whole sense of the inspection process seems to be one of presenting 
the best face possible to the world. Underlying this effort is real concern 
among managers about the impact of poor performance because of the 
threat of external managers being introduced to run the service if the 
performance is not adequate (see page 154). The sense emerging from 
interviews with local managers is of a fractured management hierarchy, in 
which shifting relationships between levels are characterised by shifting 
relationships of trust, distrust, antagonism and alliance (in a common 
cause in the face of central government pressures). 
Team management is no longer seen by local managers as part of a 
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professional line of direction of practice (which characterised traditional 
bureau-professional reguines-Harrisiqq8a), but is now regarded more as 
an interface between two different cultures, characterised as the 'business 
planning' culture of senior managers and the world of professional practice 
within the team. This change has given rise both to new freedoms and to 
new constraints. In one way it is felt that this change has freed local 
managers from the control and direction of their own work: senior 
managers are not concerned with the way goals are achieved, according to 
local managers, but purely with outcomes. Local managers identify this as a 
freedom, not previously known, to manage their staff However, this 
freedom is within limits: that is, the core concerns around financial 
management-control of spending, staff time as a scarce resource and the 
achievement of performance standards through key procedures (the 'must- 
dos). Over and above this, policy and procedures are extensive, but local 
managers believe that they have the tacit support of senior managers to 
exercise discretion in their application and use. Local managers are not 
simply mechanical implementers of policy; rather, they seem to conform to 
a picture of active policy interpreters (Weissert 1994, Keiser 1999). 
In the OPT local managers sometimes use their discretion as policy 
implementers to adapt policy to reflect their professional concerns. The 
team manager, for instance, has been involved in developing the financial 
monitoring system with other local managers, and describes using the 
system to bring forward funding for cases still awaiting approval by the 
resources panel, thus minimising the impact of resource cuts on service 
users (see page 159). However, local managers in the OTP are also aware of 
constraints on their discretion, primarily related to resource constraints, 
and the need to enforce paperwork procedures in order to ensure 
appropriate data collection for the PAF framework and secure 
further 
central government funding. In this respect the fundamental constraint on 
discretion, as suggested by Brodkin 4997: 24), is the resources context. 
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Local managers within the CMHT take different approaches to their role 
as policy implementers. The team manager stands out in presenting his 
approach in terms conforming to Lipsky's characterisation of managers as 
committed to the organisation. He sees himself as part of a chain of 
command, implementing the policy he is given, and requiring subordinates 
to follow policy instructions passed on by him, although he also recognises 
that, in his role as manager, he is involved in the translation of the policy 
and therefore its interpretation (see pages M3-M4). Even within this 
characterisation of the manager/practitioner relationship, he still sees a 
significant role for professional discretion, but employed by experts 
operating under superior instructions. ' 
Pirvi 
I he CMHT's assistant team manager takes a different view of her role as 
policy implementer. She criticises elements of policy and seeks to 
encourage professionals not only to come up with pragmatic, workable 
approaches to policy implementation, but also to engage in critical 
practice, which she sees as challenging the local authority's position, 
particularly its withdrawal from fimding mental health services (see page 
156). 
Generally local managers tend to identify themselves with practitioners as 
professional social workers. All the local managers of the OPT, and the 
assistant manager of the CMHT, identify themselves as professional social 
workers who are managers and from this position are critical of the 
authority. They see themselves as promoters of professional practice, 
which includes sometimes being critical of staff who are not thought to be 
operating professionally (see pageS211-Mand217). Within the OPT 
particularly, there is a sense of managers trying to maintain a professional 
- This is in a technical, rather than an ideological sense (Derber 1983): olicy sets 
the goals and outcome of practice (ideolo gical) and professionals use tge'ir 
technical expertise to decide on how best to achieve it. 
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dimension to the work of practitioners, both acting as advocates of 
professional practice within the organisation and encouraging 
practitioners to develop the professional dimension of their role (see pages 
2o6-207 and 215-216). These managers express cynicism and are pragmatic 
about management processes, and about the increasing emphasis within 
the authority on characterising the service in numerical and financial 
terms. They talk about having to 'play the game', but distinguish this from 
their underlying commitment to and idea of professional integrity, which 
involves commitments to clients, social work as a valuable profession and 
the locality. Particularly striking is the team manager's concern that she is 
playing the numbers game, and her feeling that new managers are coming 
along whose view of the service focuses on the managerial calculus (Clarke 
and Newman 1997: 64) (see page 161). The team manager in the CMHT is 
an exception to this general trend, emphasising the practitioners' roles in 
formal organisational terms, and focusing on their role as subordinates (see 
pages 163-164). 
In summary, the research findings challenge the view of managers in Street- 
level Bureaucracy and present a different picture of managers from that in 
the domination managerialist literature. Local team managers distinguish 
themselves from senior managers within Social Services. While managers 
are sometimes drawn into strategic decision-making, this seems to 
emphasise rather than reduce the distinction, with local managers critical 
of senior managers' concerns. One local manager-the CMHT 
manager-seems to conform to Lipsky's portrayal of managers in street- 
level bureaucracies. He identifies himself with the organisation, distances 
himself from practice, sees practitioners as the servants of policy and 
believes that his level of management should be be more involved with 
strategic policy-making. He is, however, the exception. The other 
managers' practices and ideas raise questions about Lipsky's picture of 
street-level bureaucracy management. They are cynical about management 
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intiatives, express concerns for the client group and for professional 
practice. They are critical of organisational policy and employ their 
discretion in ways that are sometimes unsympathetic to official policy. In 
the OPT, for instance, local managers view the social work role in ways 
that challenge the official emphasis on a narrow administrative care 
management, and are concerned with maintaining a professional social 
work dimension to the care management role, in contrast to the 
organisationally defmed role, perceived by them as minimising professional 
potential. 
Contrary to the tendency of Lipksy and domination managerialists to 
characterise managers as 'others', the assistant managers in both teams are 
often drawn into direct work with clients, because of the pressure of the 
waiting lists, and, in the case of the CMHT, because of the manager's role 
as an Approved Social Worker. This makes it difficult to distinguish their 
work from that of the street-level practitioners whom they manage, and 
reflects Causer and Exworthy's (iggg) observation about the mixed nature 
of many management roles in welfare services. 
The remaining two research questions relate specifically to the operation 
of practitioner discretion. Management control of discretion can be 
exercised in a number of ways. The first question focuses on the extent and 
effectiveness of 'remote' control through the management of resources and 
use of procedures. The second looks at more direct management of 
practice through the examination of the relationship of supervisor and 
supervisees in the teams. 
STRATEGIC AlANAGERS'CONTROL OF STREET-LEVEL 
PRACTICE 
In relation to the first of these questions, I have sought to explore the 
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following issues: 
Is control through resources and procedures exercised uniformly 
across all areas of social work, or only in certain areas? How 
effectively do these strategies control local discretion? To what 
extent can street-level practitioners resist? What role do local 
managers play in enforcing resource and procedural controls? 
Managers' need to control practice implies the actual or potential absence 
of compliance amongst practitioners. Across adult services, the prescribed 
care management role is seen as sitting uncomfortably with the broader 
role of a professionally qualified social worker. In the OPT, in particular, 
this constraint is felt acutely because the authority emphasises the care 
management role to a much greater extent in older people's services than 
in the CMHT, where it continues to acknowledge a more formal 
professional social work role. 
Evetts has underlined the importance of defming the term'discretion' 
(EvettS 2002: 340- She has argued that the idea of discretion as 
autonomy-that is, absolute freedom-is a myth: discretion is freedom 
within constraints. The approach taken to understanding discretion in 
this thesis, which is informed by Smith (iq&), is outlined in Chapter i. 
Here I wiff examine the extent of freedom and the nature of the 
constraints on this freedom experienced by the professional street-level 
bureaucrats in the two social work teams in Newunit. The key dimensions 
of practitioner discretion to be examined are: strategic managers' ability 
to manage street-level discretion through prescription and resourcing of 
practitioner roles and the use of procedures; and the nature of the 
relationship between local managers and street-level practitioners in 
relation to the construction of discretion. 
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The domination managerial perspective suggests that managers use a 
range of strategies to curtail practitioner discretion. Howe, for instance, 
suggests that managerial ideas of practice are hegemonic in older people's 
services, but that resistance within children's and families' services has led 
to the imposition of guidance and procedures to direct practice (Howe 
1986: 131). The findings from this study question this view of management 
control in older people's and other adult services. 
Prescribing and Resourcing Roles 
The care management role has been identified by many commentators as 
central to management strategies of control. However, rather than 
accepting it as the natural social work role within community care, as 
Howe's view would suggest, the practitioners are critical of it. 
In the OPT, care management is the role prescribed for practitioners in 
official policies. It is defined as a largely administrative role, assessing and 
constructing care packages. Practitioners within the team feel both 
constrained and uncomfortable with this role. Though not against care 
management as such-they see it as a valuable technotogyL-practitioners 
are concerned about the narrow way in which the care management role is 
drawn, particularly in view of the impact of tightening eligibility criteria. 
They express frustration that pressure to restrict resources (see page 169) 
leads to crisis situations, when earlier intervention could have led to 
preventative work. Related to this, there is also criticism of the way in 
which the purchaser/provider split structures their role (see page io5) and 
prevents them from using their social work skiffs to the extent they feel to 
be appropriate (see page 168). The care management role in the authority, 
they claim, is driven by concern for control of resources, and does not 
allow them sufficient room to engage with concern for people and their 
care needs. From practitioners' standpoint, the authority neither values 
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nor understands social work. 
In the CMHT, the official construction of the social work role is quite 
different, and perhaps represents the sort of role to which many of the 
social workers in the OPT aspire. The organisation recognises mental 
health social workers as both service-providers and service-purchasers, and 
allows for the use of traditional social work skills, such as counselling, 
within their role. Within the team, staff respond to this situation in 
different ways. One group sees it in positive terms, though expressing 
concern about the level of demand; another group criticises the role's 
vagueness and would prefer a clearer care management role to clarify 
practitioners' responsibilities (see page 47)- 
The literature discussed in Chapter III suggests that strategies of 
management control within adult services are similar to those Howe 
associates with children's and families' services: that is, primarily, 
restricting the social work role, using procedures to govern practice and 
using eligibility criteria to control access to services. However, as is also 
discussed in Chapter III, there are divergent views about how effective 
and extensive these strategies are likely to be. The domination 
mangerialist perspective suggests that they are both effective and 
extensive (see pages 46-47), identifying little continuing space for social 
work discretion. The street-level perspective, on the other hand, suggests 
that, while extensive, these strategies are very limited in effect, and that 
discretion, far from being curtailed, often arises from the imprecision and 
contradictions embodied in management tools such as eligibility criteria. 
Practitioners can use these problems of control to create extensive defacto 
discretionary space (see page 46). The discursive mangerialist perspective 
shares the street-level bureaucracy perspective's view of the possibility of 
defacto discretion, but also points to the possibility of professional 
discourse as a resource in creating discretionary space. Practitioner 
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discretion is contingent upon local circumstance and draws on a range of 
resources and alliances specific to locations (see Pages 74-75)- 
Within Newunit there is clear evidence of the use of managerial 
techniques to govern practice. However, they are more heavily located 
within the OPT. There is also evidence of resistance to a number of these 
controls, not by practitioners alone, but by practitioners in alliance with 
local managers to subvert the remote control techniques of senior 
managers. 
Another aspect of strategic control is the resources which are made 
available to the team for professional staffing. 
Hadley and Clough (1996) identify care management, combined with the 
purchaser/provider split within Social Services, as key techniques for 
management control of social work. This strategy is evident in the OPT 
but not in the CMHT, where practitioners are still recognised as social 
workers in organisational statements and in terms of relatively generous 
funding of social work input. In the OPT, practitioners feel restricted in 
their ability to challenge the official framing of their role as care managers. 
A key constraint here is funding for staffing. Demands on practitioners to 
assess clients and restricted staffing levels severely limit their capacity to 
redefine their role (Brodkin 1997: 24). This is recognised by local managers, 
who have sought additional fimds to support more professional work. 
Pressure to take on new cases and close existing cases is immense and is 
felt by practitioners both from local managers and as peer pressure. 
However, within this general constraint on practice, practitioners and 
local managers seek to maintain a professional dimension of practice, 
providing direct social work services to maintain a small number of clients 
on their caseloads with whom they are undertaking preventative, 
counselling and long-term work (see page207). It is unclear whether this is 
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an act of joint professional resistance or a skilled strategy on the part of 
management, allowing minor elements of social work while requiring 
practitioners to conform to the constraints of care management in most 
of their work (Fleming and Spicer2003)- 
Procedures 
Generally, procedures play a more significant role in structuring practice 
in the OPT than in the CMHT. However, remote control of practice is 
much less effective in this area, and supports Lipsky's view that procedures 
and guidance, while designed to constrain discretion, often give rise to it. 
Within the OPT, not all policies are followed. The distinction is made 
between general procedures, which are seen as extensive, constantly 
accumulating and impossible to keep up with or even, necessarily, apply 
and core, 'must-do' procedures, which are significant in structuring 
practice. These 'must-do' procedures relate to finance and the recording 
and ordering of care management paperwork, specifically to generate 
performance data for the national performance assessment framework. In 
relation to performance, practice also seems to be increasingly colonised 
by audit (Power 1997) but this is a constraint as much on local managers as 
on practitioners. Managers allude to their frustration with the paperwork 
but are anxious to ensure that practitioners present paperwork both in the 
right format and at the right stage in the care management process (see 
pages 1[94-195). To achieve this, the care management process within the 
team is increasingly integrated with the monitoring/data-colIection 
process. The care management procedures (which have recently been 
reviewed) demonstrate further this emphasis on care management as a 
monitoring, administrative exercise, with, for instance, several pages of the 
guidance document taken up with lists of data and budget codes (Newunit 
Care Management Procedures: 36-43). However, while practitioners are 
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constrained in the format required for presentation of assessments and 
cases for funding, they still feel that they have the freedom to use the 
forms, as far as possible, to achieve their professional aims. Practitioners 
still retain flexibility in relation to the contents of assessment, as will be 
discussed in more detail, with reference to eligibility criteria, below. 
In the CMHT, procedures are seen as more marginal to practice and 
where they do apply practitioners largely do not view them as onerous. 
They also point to recent integration of care management and Care 
Programme Approach paperwork as simplifying previous duplication. 
Generally, practitioners portray paperwork and procedures as flexible: a 
loose framework, allowing significant professional freedom. The major 
exception is the requirement that every case should have a risk assessment, 
but this is itself a minimal requirement, and does not specify the form or 
frequency of any assessment. Another requirement mentioned by 
practitioners is a national standard requiring response to requests for 
assessment within a fixed time. Within the team, practitioners are 
generally positive about their freedom, although some describe it as too 
wide-ranging, and raise questions about the need to clarify accountability 
for use of professional time. Practitioners also characterise procedures as 
sometimes necessary, as Robinson found (Robinson2003), not to restrict 
professionalism, but to set professional standards and enforce them 
against poor practice. 
r-ril 
I he evidence considered so far offers some support for the domination 
managerialist view of the curtailment of discretion (see Pages 71-72)- 
'While it is possible to identify areas in which practitioners have resisted 
these strategies, it would be disingenuous to describe them as other than 
marginal. However, this conclusion relates only to the OPT. In the 
CMHT the situation is very different, with more limited penetration of 
managerial techniques. Here practitioners are free to define their role in 
253 
terms they feel to be consistent with professional social work, and do not 
feel constrained by alien policies and procedures. This finding is consistent 
with the discursive managerialist argument that the impact of 
managerialism and continuing influence of bureau-professionalism will 
vary from site to site (see pages 72-73)- 
The care management role is centrally concerned with the 'balancing of 
scarcity and resources' (Challis 1994: r) through the use of eligibility 
criteria to govern service users' access to services. In this area a picture 
emerges from the findings which undermines the domination 
managerialism argument and points to extensive and significant 
practitioner discretion. 
In the OPT the primary means of controlling discretion in resource 
allocation within the formal care management system is the matrix of 
eligibility criteria. This provides the threshold against which the 
authority's responsibility to meet assessed needs is set. In Newunit's OPT 
the matrix is a detailed framework setting out thresholds of entitlement to 
support from the authority. These thresholds have become increasingly 
restrictive in recent years to the point where service users are entitled to a 
service only where there is a pressing need or extreme risk. However, the 
matrix is seen by practitioners as essentially open to interpretation, 
especially around the definition of the key terms 'need' and 'risk'. The 
authority does not provide a definition of these terms, and this is 
understood within the team to be due to the need for interpretation by 
professionally qualified practitioners with particular expertise in the 
analysis and application of these concepts. Local managers encourage 
practitioners to be pragmatic in implementing the eligibility criteria-to 
interpret them 'sensibly'; 'sensible' is defined in terms of the professional 
concerns shared by practitioners and local managers (see page 177)- Within 
the practitioner group there are two approaches to the local manager's 
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request for pragmatism. One group sees it as an opportunity to use the 
criteria in a way which better reflects their understanding of professional 
values and to ensure that people receive services identified by 
practitioners as necessary, for example, by extending the idea of risk 
beyond immediate crisis to anticipate potential deterioration. The other 
group expresses disquiet about pragmatism, which it sees as leading to 
special pleading, rather than consistency of services, and as undermining 
equality of provision and accountability. Nevertheless, this adaptation of 
the criteria takes place, with the active support and knowledge of the local 
managers, and therefore falls into the category of discretion necessary to 
do the job. 
This evidence confirms the research informed by the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective (Baldwin1998,20oo and Ellis etaLiggg), which 
has identified the continuation of extensive practitioner discretion within 
adult Social Services. The basis of this discretion is not clear. From the 
street-level bureaucracy perspective, it is available to any worker in a 
similar situation, because of the essential messiness of policy. Its 
imprecision requires workers to make choices, and managers collude with 
this to get the job done (Lipsky ig8o: 165). However, the centrality of 
terms such as 'need' and 'riský--key terms in the professional social work 
discourse (Barnes 1998)-and the role of managers who are qualified social 
workers, encouraging interpretations in line with professional 
commitments, suggests an identification of the basis of this discretion as 
largely professional. This issue seems to turn largely on the nature of the 
relationship between the practitioners and the local managers, and will 
be 
explored below. 
Eligibility criteria tend to be presented in the literature as an exclusively 
managezial tool. The relationship between practitioners and eligibility 
criteria in the CMHT illustrates the way in which they can 
be subverted 
255 
by practitioners and used as a tool of resistance to managerial pressures. 
The issues of resources and practitioners' relationship to eligibility criteria 
are different in the CMHT from those predominating in the OPT. 
Within mental health the mode of practice is more akin to traditional 
social work than care management. The main resource input of Social 
Services into the CMHT is the time of social workers. This is an 
important factor to consider when examining the relationship between 
eligibility criteria and managerial control. In contrast to the OPT, the 
efforts of practitioners in the CMHT are focused on narrowing the 
eligibility entitlement-excluding the lower health eligibility threshold in 
favour of the higher Social Services eligibility threshold. The role of 
eligibility criteria in mental health is about access to social work as a 
provider service and practitioners see their role as focusing on people with 
severe mental health problems, in line with national policy statements 
(Department of Health 1999a: standards 4 and 5). In contrast, local 
managers in the CMHT seek to apply broader eligibility criteria. The 
team manager's motivation concerns the politics of working with Health 
and social workers being seen to work with the same range of clients as the 
CPNs. The assistant manager, on the other hand, is concerned that 
practitioners should be working preventatively, as well as targeting services 
on clients in crisis. Eligibility criteria need to be viewed, then, in relation 
to their context. Practitioners, in seeking to restrict eligibility, talk of 
focusing on those most in need and being able to sustain the ability to use 
their own time to meet people's needs as they best see fit. They seek to 
retain their discretion (to work in the way they feel to be appropriate). 
The conflict here seems to be about the team manager )s intensification of 
labour, seeking to obtain more from the resources already committed to 
staffing, while, for the assistant manager, the extension of eligibility 
criteria reflects her idea of professional practice and her critique of senior 
managers' policy, in terms of narrowing of mental health services. 
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In the older people's service, alongside tighter eligibility criteria, senior 
managers have established a resources panel to micro-manage team 
expenditure and decide on the release of resources to meet needs already 
established as eligible for help. The panel is made up of local and senior 
managers. Practitioners express concern about the panel process at a 
number of levels. Personally they are annoyed at having to report to service 
users-who have been told they are eligible-that there are no resources to 
meet their needs. They also express professional frustration at identifying 
needs and seeing people's sit-uations deteriorate, while waiting for service 
provision. However, it is interesting to note the absence of concern 
expressed in terms of the authority's failure to meet its legal 
responsibilities and respect service users' rights, especially given the 
protests made by practitioners to senior managers about the instruction 
to operate a higher eligibility threshold than publicly acknowledged. Once 
eligibility is established, the local authority has a legal responsibility to 
provide a service (Brayne et. al. 2001: 317-318); but in this case the 
practitioners interviewed do not seem to identify for themselves a role in 
challenging and questioning the legality of the authority's actions. In fact, 
informally, despite their misgivings about the panel process, the 
practitioners as a group participate in prioritising clients for the panel, 
agreeing between themselves on the most pressing cases and advising their 
managers of this. While practitioners are formally excluded from making 
these decisions within the panel process, they are given this power to 
decide which cases should be given priority-that is, to exercise 
discretion-by local managers. 
Again, this raises questions about how to interpret their behaviour. Is it 
an example of what 1, eonard identifies as apparently free but ultimately 
unfree action (Leonard 1997: 92), because of the way in which managerial 
discourse constrains practitioners' freedom of choice? Or is it a strategic 
choice, seeking to ensure that professional concerns are reflected in the 
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decision-making process, which involves strategic decisions about 
compromise (Healy 2000: 135)? 
In considering practitioner discretion, a continuing theme has been the 
role of local managers in supporting and encouraging aspects of discretion. 
This reinforces the earlier observation that 'management' needs to be 
approached as a complex set of fractured layers and alliances, rather than 
as an homogenous and monolithic entity, as suggested by domination 
managerialism. In the discussion of Lipsky's analysis of the relationship of 
line managers in Chapter II, it was noted that Lipsky identifies, in passing, 
the problems of layers in management, but brackets them off in his 
analysis. In the preceding section this point was made in relation to 
managers as active policy interpreters, but the discussion here points to 
another dimension of management discretion: managers'role in 
recognising in their staff, or ascribing to them, a discretionary role. Lipsky 
argues that managers may collude with discretion to get the job done, but 
the findings summarised here suggest that they do more than collude in 
street-level discretion; they can actively promote it. This suggests that 
local managers perceive their role in terms of the bureau-professional 
peer/supervisor, rather than the controlling and directing manager. The 
role of local managers as discretionary agents themselves, and as 
supporters of street-level discretion, has perhaps contributed to the 
development of the panel process in Newunit's older people's services, 
particularly in terms of the senior managers' implied distrust of both 
practitioners and local managers. 
Control of expenditure is a clear priority for senior managers, and is 
focused on the older people's service as a prime target for service cuts to 
reduce the department's overspend. Practitioners and local managers work 
in a context in which financial control is increasingly tightened, as 
represented by the eligibility criteria. Senior managers are reported by a 
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local manager to have expressed suspicion about practitioners' allocation 
of eligibility levels, characterising them as too inclusive and seeking to 
undermine service rationing. This local manager denies the senior 
manager's reported view and interprets practitioners' actions as 
recognition of increasing need. The introduction of the panel (an unsual 
step within local authorities--Blaud et al. 200 0: 131) seems to be an 
acknowledgement on the part of senior managers of the failure of 
eligibility criteria as a managerial technique of control. It also suggests 
that they do not trust local managers to enforce the tighter criteria. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LOCAL MANAGERS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 
The final area of inquiry for the research was identified as the nature of 
the relationship between street-level practitioners and their local 
anaggers, and how this influenced their discretion. Aspects of this 
relationship, particularly the sense of professional alliance between 
practitioners and local managers (and against senior managers), have been 
discussed above. In this section the focus is on the relationship between 
practitioners and local managers through the prism of supervision: is 
there conflict, and about what? How extensive are alliances and 
on what basis are they built? 
Supervision is a key site within which to explore these questions (Seden 
and ReynoldS2003). It is, for instance, the key location in which discretion 
is reconstructed in the OPT. Here, accountability is examined, procedures 
are checked out, interpretations tested and professional status recognised. 
The preceding discussion of resource management and procedures 
emphasised the importance of the resource context as a tool of control of 
the local environment of work for senior managers. However, the local 
work context is not characterised as an iron cage-not only because 
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practitioners identify room for manoeuvre within procedures and 
guidelines, but also because local managers tend to lend their support to 
practitioner discretion. It is within supervision that the effective limits of 
discretionary interpretation-or the acceptable range of 
interpretations-are established with local managers, as, for instance, 
when local managers in both teams encourage the professional social work 
dimension of practitioners' roles. 
The street-level bureaucracy perspective characterises the relationship of 
line manager and practitioners in terms of conflicting interest, with 
pragmatic compromises necessary to get the job done (Baldwin20oo: 86). 
This latter point is the essential difference with the domination 
managerialism perspective, in which managers' and workers' interests are 
seen as essentially in conflict, but managers are sufficiently powerful to 
impose their will (Howe iggia: 218). Howe sees this power involving not 
only the use of overt techniques such as policy, procedures and monitoring 
but also a more subtle mode of control over practitioners' view of their 
work where they take management concerns and direction of practice as 
natural (hegemonic). The third view of the supervisory relationship, the 
discursive managerialism perspective, characterises supervision as a site of 
conflict and transition: managerialist discourse influences and changes the 
relationship between managers and practitioners, but alongside the 
continuing influence of bureau-professionalism, the balance between these 
two influences varying in specific sites (see page 70). 
In order to examine these issues I will consider the areas of conflict and 
co-operation within the supervisory relationship between local managers 
and practitioners in each team. 
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Older Persons Team 
In the OPT the areas of conflict raised by interviewees are, for 
practitioners, the narrow and limiting eligibility criteria and their task of 
communicating to service users panel decisions to postpone funds for care 
packages; and, for managers, aspects of practitioners' professional practice. 
Those areas of conflict identified by practitioners reflect common 
concerns amongst street-level workers about managers, but the concerns 
raised by managers are relatively unexamined. 
A key example of conflict between managers and practitioners over 
eligibility criteria is the instruction which came down the management 
hierarchy to run a narrow, covert eligibility threshold alongside the more 
generous but superseded public threshold. While local managers passed 
these instructions on to practitioners, it is interesting to note that they 
characterise this as a dispute with senior managers. In this situation the 
practitioners were prepared to challenge this practice and to point to the 
responsibility of the authority to act according to its published eligibility 
threshold. 
Another area of conflict over eligibility arose in relation to the panel 
process introduced to decide on the release of resources to service users 
assessed as eligible for local authority assistance (see pages 179-182). The 
nature of this conflict spreads some light on the relationship of local 
managers and practitioners. Unlike the earlier issue of the overt and covert 
eligibility criteria, practitioners have not actively challenged the panel 
process. They dislike it, but continue to work within it. What is the basis 
of this practice? Is it acceptance of the need to integrate concern for 
resources into professional decision-making-professional subordination 
to managerialism (Clarke and Newman 1997: 76)? Or is it strategic 
resistance (Healy2ooo), or one of the strategies of resistance described by 
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De Certeau as 'tactics', by which actors-in this case both practitioners 
and managers-can transform their experience of a dominant culture into 
something better, reflecting their own commitments through their day-to- 
day practices (Ahearne 1995)? Evidence from within the case study points 
to the second interpretation: both practitioners and their local managers 
talk of using their discretion to make the system work as best it can for 
service users. 
In a sense the ability of local actors to resist the panel process-as they 
resisted the covert eligibility criteria-is more difficult, because the 
location of possible dispute is less clear. Part of practitioners' dislike of the 
process is having to break bad news to eligible service users-and a sense 
that local managers, rather than they, should be 'taking the flak'. 
Nevertheless, there is a degree of alliance here between local managers and 
practitioners and local managers even refer to a recent legal opinion 
questioning the legality of the process (see page 153). 
What, then, is the basis of this co-operation? Is it, as Lipsky argues, a 
pragmatic move by local managers to take the sting out of practitioner 
resistance? The important question here is to what extent resistance is 
based on pragmatic concerns to ameliorate (but stiff perpetuate) a 
managerialist rationing logic and to what extent the local practices are 
guided by a different set of professional principles. Comments by the team 
managers about ethical and legal problems, and comments of local 
practitioners about the panel process (see pagesi8o-ii8i) point to the 
second interpretation. 
The other area of conflict within the supervisory relationship focuses on 
the nature of practitioners' professional responsibilities, a concern raised 
by local managers who feel that practitioners sometimes shirk their 
professional responsibility, not only to act with professional 
discretion but 
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also to speak up about problems within the service and to challenge 
practice. This raises interesting questions about the behaviour of 
practitioners. Practitioners talk about professionalism, which includes, for 
them, the struggle to achieve not only short-term crisis interventions, but 
also longer-term work with some clients, which allows them to employ 
social work skills such as counselling and preventative work. However, the 
managers do not feel that practitioners acknowledge their professional 
responsibilities within the role to maintain a certain knowledge base, to 
work proactively and to question and challenge. 
This emphasis on the responsibilities of practitioners again raises 
questions about how the conflict should be interpreted. Supervision is 
concerned with discussion of day-to-day work and the use of procedures, 
amongst other matters, but implicitly, through this discussion, it is also a 
place for managers and workers to establish trust as the basis of discretion 
in practice. 
One interpretation of these data is that they represent a more 
sophisticated form of management control than a crude, overt control. 
Katz (1973), for instance, identifies a process where autonomy is used 
within organisations to control subordinates, permitting workers freedom, 
but within the context of informal understandings of its proper use. 
Managers can be seen as disciplining and directing practice by setting the 
framework of practice in a manner that disciplines street-level work, but at 
armýs length (Howe ig9r: 2. r8ý SSI 2ooi[: 8). A similar strategy of control 
through allowing discretion is identified by discursive managerialism 
authors (Leonard 1997: 92)- 
However, a problem with this interpretation is that in emphasising 
practitioners' responsibility to keep up with professional knowledge, 
managers undermine a significant power differential between themselves 
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and practitioners. An aspect of the relationship between street-level 
workers and managers that is central to the process of supervision is the 
exchange of information. For Lipsky, information is a key area of power 
and conflict between them. Practitioners, he argues, manage disclosure 
information about their work to influence management and achieve the 
outcome they desire (see page22). However, within the team, this is not a 
strategy discussed by practitioners or a topic of concern to managers. 
While there is some evidence that practitioners might consider how to 
present information to achieve their goals, the overwhelming picture is of 
a small professional team, with constant formal and informal contact 
between practitioners and managers about cases, in which the asymmetry 
of information is not as marked as Lipsky suggests. Furthermore, this 
asymmetry appears to be reversed in relation to how the facts about a case 
should be understood and interpreted. Managers within the team are 
significantly more experienced as professional social workers than the 
workers they manage, further undermining the asymmetry argument 
(Appendix 4). In this context local managers, in emphasising the need for 
practitioners to develop their professional knowledge bases, make the 
balance of power between practitioners and managers more equal. 
Practitioners and local managers are critical of the emphasis on economic 
values of efficiency and financial effectiveness, and subscribe to what 
Lapsley and Llewellyn describe as the traditional 'tribal' commitments of 
social work to helping people (Lapsley and Llewellyn 1998). This 
commitment echoes what Leonard has described as welfare-building: '... the 
ethic of organized caring ... an expression of emancipation stiff residing 
there in spite of its accompaniment by surveillance and control' (Leonard 
1997*- 173)- Managers and practitioners work within the clearly managerial 
vision of care management and seek to subvert the financial monitoring, 
audits and increasingly constrained paperwork processes involved. 
Within 
these constraints, however, they seek to work together to extend access to 
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services and mitigate what they see as the worst excesses of the restrictive 
eligibility criteria within which they have to work. Managers' 
encouragement of practitioner discretion focuses on the idea of its 
tsensible use', defined by managers in broad terms as not putting the client 
or the worker at risk. 
This picture of professional passivity comes from one source-the local 
managers-and so needs to be treated with caution. The managers' 
frustration seems to be that the practitioners are too slow to anger. 
However, there is also a strong sense that the practitioners rely heavily on 
local managers for professional guidance. Local managers characterise this 
as withdrawal, not wanting to take responsibility, but local managers and 
practitioners also link it to a sense of hopelessness amongst practitioners; 
or perhaps as a reflection of the profile of experience within the team, 
where most practitioners are relatively newly qualified (Appendix 4). It is 
unclear which of these factors lies behind the behaviours: whether 
withdrawal as self-interest, as Lipsky suggests, or as a form of 'covert 
resistance' (Leonard 1997: 94); or relatively inexperienced professional 
practitioners who are not yet confident to operate within and extend their 
professional role (Maynard-Moody and MushenO 2003), or some 
combination of these factors. 
Mental Health Team 
The relationship between local managers and practitioners in the CMHT 
differs from that in the OPT. This reflects the different commitments of 
the two local managers-the team manager, who identifies primarily with 
his organisational role, and the assistant manager, who emphasises her 
professional commitment-and the two groups of practitioners: those who Cý' A 
identify themselves as professional social workers and those who, though 
qualified, identify themselves as care managers. 
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The two local managers characterise their role and their relationship with 
practitioners in very different terms. The team manager, who conforms to 
the domination managerialism and street-level bureaucracy 
characterisation of a manager, emphasises his management role and 
describes practitioners as his subordinates, putting into effect his 
instructions (see pages 163-164). However, practitioners have little day-to- 
day contact with him, and their main management relationship is with the 
assistant manager, who is their direct line manager and provides them with 
supervision. 
The picture of supervision presented by practitioners in the CMHT is 
consistent: as a space for accountability and professional discussion. 
However, they evaluate the supervisory relationship in quite different 
ways. The assistant manager questions the value of care management in a 
mental health setting, emphasising the role of more traditional social work 
skills in building relationships and delivering services. She also portrays the 
staff management process more as a consultative, supportive, professional 
exercise, but in which she is reluctant to direct their practice. This reflects 
the continuation of a bureau-professional form of supervision identified by 
Harris in his study of social work managers (Harris 1998: 849). As 
discussed above, professional discretion is recognised by the organisation 
as the appropriate mode of operation for practitioners within the team. 
However, within supervision the assistant manager encourages a wider 
sense of discretion-for instance, in a critical stance towards policy (see 
pages 164-165). The two groups of practitioners respond differently to this 
situation. One group, whose members characterise themselves as 
professional social workers first and foremost, portrays supervision as a 
meeting of equals, where professionals (manager and practitioner) meet on 
the basis of pre-existing trust (because of their professional status), 
emphasising the consultation element and a shared concern with the 
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assistant manager. The assistant manager and the practitioners see 
supervision as a place where they are also accountable to the 
organisation-for instance for major expenditure and safe practice-but, 
like the practitioners observed by Pithouse when he returned to his 
research site (Pithouse 1998: im), these practitioners are also wary about 
the possible management intrusion mito practice. A contrasting view of 
supervision and the role of managers and practitioners is presented by 
those practitioners who characterise themselves as care managers. These 
practitioners are antagonistic towards 'professional social work', which 
they characterise as old-fashioned and unsuited to contemporary practice. 
They are critical of the assistant manager, whom they see as imprecise and 
ineffectual, for not taking control of the team and directing workers' 
practice (see pageS2I9-220). For these practitioners, social work and its 
management are insufficiently managerial. This minority group of 
practitioners represents the intrusion of managerialism into practitioners' 
view of their work-a phenomenon also found in a smala number of the 
respondents in Lapsley and Llewellyn's study (. 1998: 150). These 
practitioners, in Clarke and Newman's terms, seem to have accepted 
subordination of professionalism to the realities and responsibilities of the 
organisation in a way that disciplines 'the "irresponsible" exercise of 
professional judgement' (Clarke and Newman: 76). The conflict between 
these practitioners and the assistant managers is a mirror image of that 
portrayed in the substantial body of the research literature reviewed in 
Chapter III: instead of practitioners seeking to resist management control 
to defend professional autonomy, these practitioners go beyond accepting 
organisational priorities; they actively seek a more managerialised work 
environment and a managerialised mode of practice and are in conflict 
with the assistant manager, who operates within a more bureau- 
professional conception of her role and that of practitioners. 
In this context the issue of use of the asymmetry of information to deceive 
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or misguide managers, identified by Lipsky as a key element in the 
discretion achieved by practitioners, plays a more interesting role than his 
analysis would suggest. The assistant manager characterises herself as 
'nosy', and aware of the progression of most cases--a claim that is not 
implausible in the small team which she manages. However, the two groups 
of practitioners use the idea of asymmetry of information to defend or 
challenge supervision, suggesting very different expectations of their 
relationship with managers. Within the professional social work group, the 
potential for control of information is evident in the assertion of special 
expertise and comments about commitment to particular values (see pages 
222-223); this is not extensively used but is a resource available to 
practitioners in case managers move to a more directive supervision. The 
assistant manager seems receptive to this argument, and sees it as a 
potential limit on the degree of enquiry she can make about a 
practitioner's Professional practice (see pageS223-224). This resource-the 
claim of expert judgement-is not used by the care management group of 
practitioners. Their characterisation of their role in a sense excludes this 
claim, because they call for managers to take a more active role in directing 
their work. Their strategy is more straightforward, and more closely 
resembles Lipsky's account of creating discretion in the face of hostile 
management through the selective presentation of information (see page 
224). They seek to control the effect of supervision on their practice by 
being careful about the information presented in order to limit scrutiny of 
their cases and their freedom of action-often to close cases they feel no 
longer require intervention. In turn, the assistant manager identifies 
'unprofessional' practice, including the premature closure of cases, as a 
source of conflict between her and some of her supervisees. 
In summary, the evidence from the fieldwork discussed in this section has 
explored the nature of the relationship between local managers and 
practitioners. It suggests that this relationship is different from that 
outlined by domination managerialism and the street-level bureaucracy 
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perspective. The significant finding is the continuation of bureau- 
professionalism as a key structuring principle in the relationship between 
local managers and practitioners in both teams. Discursive managerialism 
presents local settings as sites for the interaction of discourses, and this is 
particularly the case in the CMHT, where one of the managers and two 
practitioners criticise the prevailing bureau-professional culture from a 
managerial perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined discretion, which is understood as freedom 
within a work context, and its extent and basis for social workers within 
the context of a Social Services Department. Through the use of a case 
study, it has sought to examine different accounts of practitioners' 
discretion within a managerialised work context of increasingly prevalent 
policies, procedures and supervision. In this chapter these accounts of 
discretion have been discussed in relation to the case study context and 
the findings from the case study, outlined in the two preceding chapters. 
The idea of managerial omnipotence put forward by the domination 
managerialist perspective characterises practitioner discretion as its 
mirror image. There is some support for its idea of the extensive nature of 
managerial forms of control within the teams, particularly in the OPT, in 
terms of systems of resource allocation and control. However, the fiffl 
picture that emerges from the evidence is more complex, and calls into 
question managers' ability and willingness to control practitioner 
discretion, and the effectiveness of tools of control such as eligibility 
criteria and procedures to control street-level practice as well as 
highlighting practitioners' ability at street level to circumvent Procedures 
and play a sign1ficant role in interpreting policy. On 
balance the evidence 
suggests, as Lipsky argues, that, despite the introduction 
by senior 
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managers of increasingly structured and prescribed approaches to practice 
and service provision, there is still significant freedom of movement within 
these constraints, and practitioners retain extensive informal discretion in 
their day-to-day work. However, the study also raises questions about the 
limited nature of Lipsky's account of discretion in street-level 
bureaucracies, in relation to his characterisation of the nature and role of 
management and the insufficient attention given to the impact of 
professional ideas and practices on the construction of discretion. 
In the street-level bureaucracy perspective's account of discretion, Lipsky 
casts managers in a particular role, according to which they seek to control 
street-level practice and policy implementation and to limit discretion; but 
recognising the complex work context of street-level bureaucracies, they 
reluctantly collude in allowing street-level discretionary practices, in order 
to get the job done. Lipsky is not alone in tending to present managers as 
an homogeneous group. This can also be seen in the domination 
managerialist approach. However, in line with a consistent body of 
research in Social Services, the data from this study point to local 
managers distinguishing themselves from more senior layers of 
management within the organisation. This distinction is not only in terms 
of hierarchical structure but also-in the view of local managers-in terms 
of their commitments. Local managers characterise senior managers as 
committed to cutting funds and rationing services and not to the 
professional dimension of social care. In contrast, they characterise 
themselves, and are characterised by the practitioners they manage, as 
concerned with service users and professional issues and practices. 
In contrast to Lipsky's focus on practitioners as the discretionary agents 
of public organisations, the data from this study show local managers using 
their discretion to adapt, change and subvert policy. Furthermore, as is 
mentioned below, these managers also encourage their staff to see 
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themselves as professionals, and acknowledge their claims to discretion 
(while at the same time requiring accountability). Within the CMHT this 
view of staff as professionals is more in line with official policy than in the 
OPT, where it leads to a'shadow professionalism', alongside the official 
care management role-in terms of a continuing element of traditional 
social work practice, sponsored by local managers, and a recognition of 
practitioners' discretion within the limits characterised by professional 
concerns and good professional practice. 
The data on management in Newunit show that managers are under severe 
pressure, with an insufficient number of managers at all levels to manage 
effectively. This supports Lipsky's suggestion that management is a scarce 
resource and questions the picture of the powerful management cadre 
suggested by critics of Lipsky, such as Howe. However, in contrast to the 
firm line that Lipsky (and others) tend to draw between managers and 
workers, at street level the lack of sufficient resources has impacted not 
only on street-level workers but also on line managers, who are drawn into 
direct provision. Overall, the picture of managers in this study is of an 
internally fragmented group-divided hierarchically and in terms of their 
commitments. Furthermore, at street level the distinction between 
manager and street-level bureaucrat becomes increasingly difficult to 
sustain, as local managers are themselves obliged to operate in the 
corrupted world of work as street-level bureaucrats. 
In both teams the discourse of professionalism plays an important role in 
establishing a claim to discretion, but it does so in very different ways. 
While there is some organisational acknowledgement that the OPT 
practitioners are social workers with a degree of professional 
autonomy-for instance, in determining need and specifying risk in 
decisions about resource allocation, and in complex cases involving 
vulnerable adults--this officially recognised discretion is more 
limited 
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than in the CMHT. This is seen particularly in the definition of the OPT 
practitioners' role, which emphasises an administrative care management 
function, reinforced by a level of funding for staff and recent cuts in the 
number of professional staff, restricting the possibility of extending care 
management interventions in the light of broader social work concerns. 
However, this managerialised context has been set primarily by senior 
managers; local managers express disagreement with many of the policy 
objectives of the organisation and talk about their commitment to service 
users and professionalism within their team, which they contrast with the 
concerns of senior managers. Practitioners and local managers see 
professional discretion as curtailed, but through a range of tactics they are 
able to reclaim some of its aspects. This discretion is largely constructed in 
negotiations between practitioners and local managers, as a cooperative 
enterprise. 
In the CMHT, the official approach to practitioner discretion is quite 
different. There is a greater recognition of the social work role in official 
(senior management) accounts of the team and this role is wide-ranging, 
including the provision of services. This wider role is also recognised in 
relatively generous (compared to the OPT) provision for staffmg. Within 
the CMHT there are two groups of practitioners. One group, whose 
members identify themselves as professional social workers, is largely 
content with existing discretion, but wary of the intrusion of management 
control. The other group, whose members see themselves as care managers, 
expresses frustration with the vagueness of the social work role and the 
very limited care management budget. This group is critical of confusion 
in the local manager's role between professional practice and management 
and calls for a clearer and more proactive style of management within the 
team. 
The picture of discretion that emerges from the case study does not fit 
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easily into either the domination managerialist or the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective. While each is useful in focusing on particular 
aspects of discretion, this focus seems to be achieved by bracketing off 
other significant elements of discretion and factors that explain its extent 
and variation. The discursive managerialist perspective is better able to 
analyse the topography of social work discretion in the two teams. This is, 
in part, because it can incorporate recognition of the growing influence of 
managerialist control and scepticism about its effectiveness, with a 
tentative analysis which recognises the continuing influence of other 
organising principles within Social Services-the focus being, in this case, 
on the continuing but varied influence of bureau-professionalism. In this 
context, while management is still a significant player (as domination 
managerialism argues), but limited in its capacity to control (as Lipsky 
argues), it is also influenced by a continuing professional discourse, in 
different ways at different management levels, in the shaping of 
practitioner discretion. The ability of senior managers to control and 
direct street-level practice is curtailed not only by practical limitations, 
but also by the resistance of local managers, who promote street-level 
discretionary practices, largely in alliance with local practitioners. 
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CHAPTERVIII 
CONCLUSION 
In this closing chapter of the thesis I will review the argument presented in 
the main body of the thesis; identify the contribution made to current 
knowledge by the thesis; and, finally, identify key areas for finther research. 
REVIEWOF THE ARGUMENT 
The aim of the thesis has been to examine the extent and nature of 
discretion of qualified social workers within statutory adult Social 
Services. The approach to discretion has been to identify it as a topic for 
exploration, focusing on the key questions of: the extent of freedom which 
practitioners have continued to exercise and how far this is controlled 
within their employing organisation; what form this freedom takes; and by 
what means it is structured. These questions have been explored through a 
review of existing perspectives and empirical research about practitioner 
discretion and through a case study involving qualified social workers 
employed in two adult social work teams in a Social Services Department. 
As a starting point in this investigation, the thesis considers Xhchael 
Lipsky's work on street-level bureaucracy, which has received growing 
interest in social work literature. In using Lipsky's work the approach has 
been to employ it as a stimulus to thought about the extent and nature of 
social work discretion. His work challenges a significant strand in the 
contemporary analysis of social work discretion in that he points to the 
continuation of extensive dayý-to-day discretion of street-level bureaucrats 
such as social workers. 
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In Chapter II the thesis sets out Lipsky's analysis of discretion and 
identifies two key issues that arise from it. The first is that Lipsky's 
account of professional discretion, while emphasising the contextual 
factors of street-level bureaucracy-policy imprecision and the mismatch 
of resources and policy: --as central, also seems to assume (without 
acknowledgement) that professional status can sometimes be significant. 
The second issue is that Lipsky presents managers in a way that seems to 
bracket them off from the analysis of discretion. These issues receive little 
critical attention within the street-level bureaucracy literature, although 
there is some work which points to managers as discretionary agents and 
to the influence of professional status on levels of discretion. 
The next chapter considers applying Lipsky's analysis to social work 
discretion in Social Services. Within this context I consider the debate 
about the relevance of Lipsky's work and argue that, contrary to the 
assumptions of his critics, the street-level bureaucracy perspective was 
developed in and is directly applicable to public services dominated by 
managerial concerns and strategies. Through exploration of the literature 
on the impact of managerialism on Social Services, I identify two different 
elements of analysis: the 'domination'perspective, which emphasises 
management control by managers who are committed to organisational 
objectives and able to employ powerful and effective techniques to control 
day-to-day practice and minimise discretion; and the 'discursive' strand, 
which-while indicating the growing significance of managerialism within 
Social Services-is more questioning of its effectiveness and domination 
and which identifies the continuing influence of the previous bureau- 
professional culture in Social Services. Alongside Lipsky's analysis of 
discretion, these two strands are considered as alternative accounts of the 
nature of managerial control and of practitioner discretion. The picture 
emerging from the research literature is complex, pointing to the intrusion 
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of management controls on practice, but also to the limitations of these 
controls and resistance to them. Furthermore, the idea of professionalism 
is identified as playing a continuing role in the nature of social work 
discretion. 
This discussion identifies four key questions arising from the analysis for 
investigation through empirical research. These are considered in a case 
study, comparing and contrasting the extent and nature of discretion in 
two adult social work teams-one older persons team and one community 
mental health team-within the same authority. 
The first question--explored in Chapter V through a description of the 
authority and teams-considers how far the conditions identified by 
Lipsky as central to street-level bureaucracies (vague goals and insufficient 
resources) characterise the case study site. These factors are found to be 
present, but do not capture the full complexity of the context of discretion. 
Professionalism is stiff an important dimension, both as an officially 
recognised factor in structuring discretion (particularly in the different 
levels of discretion between the OPT and the CMHT) and as a factor in 
the relationship between managers and practitioners. This seems to 
influence fractures within the management hierarchy, particularly between 
senior and local managers and in the goals and purposes assumed by local 
managers and practitioners. 
In Chapter VI the remaining three research questions are explored, 
concerning: the nature of management within the authority; the 
effectiveness of management techniques of control-such as procedures 
and resource control; and the nature of the relationship between local 
managers and practitioners. Management within Newunit is explored 
through the accounts of local team members, both practitioners and 
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managers. From their perspectives, the managerial hierarchy is portrayed 
as fractured by different sets of loyalties and commitments. Senior 
managers are portrayed as concerned with imposing organisational 
priorities, while local managers are concerned with commitments to 
service users and professional workers. This is not to say that there is no 
constructive connection between levels of the hierarchy; there is clear 
cooperation, for instance, in presentmg the work of the authority to 
external bodies. 
The relationship between local managers and practitioners is explored in 
terms of its impact on practitioners themselves and their discretion. 
Control of resources and the use of procedures are ways in which the 
centre can exercise remote control of the periphery. Resource levels are a 
particularly significant means of management control of local teams, not 
only in expenditure but also in relation to its effect on discretion over role 
definition due to staffing levels. Resource control, like procedures, are 
more significant in the OPT than in the CMHT. In the OPT local 
managers seek to mitigate some of the impact on practice through local 
management of the resources allocated to them. Procedures offer scope for 
interpretation and with the support of local managers, practitioners are 
able to exercise substantial discretion. This in part arises from a 
continuing professional dimension to procedures-for instance, in the 
centrality of notions of need and risk. Professionalism, as a resource for 
discretion, is acknowledged within the organisation in the mental health 
service. This is less the case in the OPT; however, it continues to be 
significant through its tacit acceptance in the Procedures and the active 
support of local managers. 
The final question explores the nature of this relationship between local 
line managers and practitioners. While there is evidence that local 
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management support for discretion is a pragmatic strategy to make 
systems work, within both teams the supervisory relationship is 
characterised by a significant professional dimension, which encourages 
continuing discretion. This, however, does not entail an entirely 
cooperative relationship. From the point of view of local managers, 
particularly, there is conflict arising from their view that practitioners 
ought to engage in a more proactive idea of professional practice. 
These findings are discussed in Chapter VII. The research design has 
focused on testing ideas about discretion and does not claim that its 
findings can be generalised to apply to all Social Services. However, while 
all Social Services are different, key aspects of Newunit's experience 
resonate with more general accounts of the challenges and pressures faced 
by contemporary Social Services. The findings can, therefore, be offered as 
a tentative indication of the wider experience of discretion. They provide 
some support for the domination managerial analysis, especially in relation 
to the role of financial management in restricting practice options. 
However, they also suggest that the use of procedures and policies by 
senior managers to refine, this mode of control is open to resistance at local 
level, as the street-level bureaucracy perspective suggests. In line with 
earlier research, the study finds that management is internally fractured. 
Local managers often identify themselves with professional commitments 
and local practitioners and concerns and are suspicious of senior managers' 
motives and concerns. Both approaches seem limited in their ability to 
accommodate this and to account for the level and nature of discretion 
within both teams, and here the discursive managerial analysis offers a 
more nuanced account, which, while subsuming elements of the idea of 
managerial control and the ability of workers to resist this, also includes a 
recognition of the impact of professionalism as a commitment and a claim 
in structuring discretion. 
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CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis has sought to contribute to the understanding of discretion of 
social workers in contemporary Social Services in three interrelated areas: 
critical analysis and application of Lispky's work to the British context; 
analysis of the characterisation of discretion within the literature on 
contemporary social work; and an empmcal study of discretion, which 
analyses the conjunction of factors that influence the nature and extent of 
discretion in particular settings. 
The application of Lipsky's work to the British context is not new. I have 
argued that, while Hudson (1993) identifies it as a valuable but underused 
perspective, there has been a recent growth of interest in applying it to the 
understanding of social work discretion. However, this use of Lipsky's 
work has tended not to analyse his account of discretion or consider the 
literature which has developed (mainly in North America) on the 
application of street-level bureaucracy theory. The debate discussed in 
Chapter III about the value of Lipsky's contribution to an understanding 
of contemporary social work has a narrow focus on whether or not his 
work applies in a context of increasing managerial control (Howe iggia, C7 4W 
Cheetham 
-1993, 
Baldwin][998,2000,2004, Ellis etal 1999). 1 have offered 
a critique of this debate which identifies a managerial environment as part 
of the context of street-level bureaucracy assumed by Lipsky and evident 
throughout his analysis of street-level bureaucracies. This, I have argued, 
points to the direct relevance of his work to understanding contemporary 
social work. However, the analysis of Street-leve/ Bureaucracy and of the 
subsequent literature developing Lipsky's work, I contend, indicates two 
key areas raising questions about his account of discretion. The first is 
Lipsky's account of managers, which brackets off their discretion and 
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assumes certain behaviours and motivations and which requires further 
investigation. Linked to this observation, Lipsky's account of street-level 
practitioners' discretion seeks to apply to all street-level bureaucrats, but 
within this broad category, I have argued that he gives insufficient 
attention to the role of professional status and claims to discretion and 
how these might influence the dynamic of the relationship between 
managers and street-level bureaucrats. This analysis of Lipsky's work has 
led me to approach it in a different way from that adopted by its 
proponents and critics. Accordingly, rather than approaching his 
perspective as something to be proved or disproved, I have used it as a 
starting point for analysis to explore discretion. 
Using Lipsky and the criticisms of his theory, I have explored the 
literature on social work discretion and, through this analysis, identified 
three broad approaches to the characterisation of discretion. I have used 
this analysis to contribute to the debate about the continuation or 
curtailment of social work discretion in a direction which moves from a 
view of discretion as an 'either/or' property of practice to consideration of 
it as a range of freedoms which are constructed, promoted and controlled 
in different ways in different settings, informed by a multidimensional 
conceptualisation of power (Foucault 19811: 92-93). This, I have argued, 
suggests the need for an analysis which recognises variation of discretion 
and moves the key questions about discretion from the binary question 'do 
social workers have it or not? ' to a more nuanced and fine-grained 
consideration of the extent of freedom enjoyed by particular groups in 
particular settings, and the factors that contribute to this and help expl 
the variation. 
The final area in which this thesis has contributed to understanding is 
through its use of an empirical study based on this analysis. The analysis 
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presented of discretion has questioned the value of considering it in terms 
of understanding practitioners as passive (domination managerialism e. g. 
Howe iggia ) or as able to negotiate organisational constraints (street-level 
perspective e. g. Ellis et al. 1999). The analysis has sought to recognise the 
influence of factors structuring practice of action, such as the level of 
resources, and discursive formations such as managerialism and 
professionalism; while, at the same time recognising that actors retain 
significant freedom at the intersection of forces such as managerialism and 
professionalism to operate in ways which play upon the potentialities and 
freedoms within the situation to resist top-down control. Accordingly I 
have sought to demonstrate that a productive direction for research on 
social workers' discretion is conjunctural analysis, which examines the 
contexts, circumstances and statuses of practitioners and how these 
factors shape the specific form of freedom and control that operates in 
particular organisational settings. 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the analysis of Lipsky's work and the examination of literature on 
discretion I have focused on the key question which animates much of the 
current debate about the extent of social work discretion: that is, the 
impact of managerialism on professional freedom (Evans and HarriS2004). 
In reviewing the research, an area that emerges as important for further 
exploration is that of the impact of social divisions, particularly gender, on 
these factors. The NISW workforce study, for instance, reviewing the 
literature on gender and management, points out that some studies 
suggest that women managers tend to identify with the work group while 
men tend to identify with the organisation (Balloch et al. 1995: 150) 
However, in relation to their analysis of the survey the authors suggest that 
male and female managers are similar in 'their views about the 
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management of the department and the relationship between management 
and staff' (ibid. . 15.1). As explained in the case profile, Newunit does not 
provide a particularly conducive setting for exploration of these issues. 
Oldshire and Newunit have a strong history-unusual in Social Services 
departments (Ginn and Fisher iggg: 130)--Of senior women managers. It 
would be valuable to compare the research findings in this authority with 
those of another which has a more traditional, male-dominated 
management structure, to see how and whether this affects the dynamics 
of the relationship between practitioners and managers and the 
commitments of managers within the organisation. 
Another area for investigation would be to develop the tentative idea of 
regimes of discretion discussed in Chapter III and to examine its value in 
elucidating discretion across Social Services. While some of the empirical 
research acknowledges that discretion may be different in different 
settings (Ellis et al. -1999), this aspect is not developed and, in other 
research findings, discretion tends to be aggregated across settings to draw 
general conclusions about discretion in Social Services (Baldwin 1998, 
2000, Carey2oo3). The findings from this study suggest that the extent 
and nature of discretion is significantly different in two social work sites 
within the same Social Services Department and point to the need for a 
fine-grained and localised analysis of discretion. This would involve 
examining not only regimes of discretion operating across social work in 
terms of different service user group settings, which has been the focus of 
this study, but also the experience of discretion of other staff within Social 
Services-for instance, unqualified fieldwork staff such as those being 
recruited within the Older Persons Team to undertake basic care 
management, in line with the Audit Commission% recommendations to 
Newunit, and administrative staff running and operating systems which 
have a key influence on practice and service delivery. 
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Part of the criticism in the thesis of Lipsky's work has involved identi6ing 
managers as actors with significant discretion, who use it to adapt and 
alter policy-. managers, that is, acting in the same way as street-level 
bureaucrats (in Lipsky's terms). This observation, supported by findings 
from this study, points to the problem of seeing discretion as a purely 
street-level phenomenon. Rather, it suggests that it should be seen as 
operating throughout the organisation implementing policy. Studies in the 
wider Social Services literature, though, have tended to focus on certain 
actors within organisations as significant players-such as senior managers 
(Lewis and Glennerster 1999) or local teams (Baldwin 1998, Zooo Ellis etal. 
1999) in studies of the implementation of community care-rather than 
considering the whole gamut of actors and their various impacts on the 
development of policy into practice. However, an implication of the 
analysis in this thesis is that discretion operates at all levels of the 
organisation and that a study of the policy implementation process needs 
to follow the flow of policy through the organisation in terms of its 
interpretation and the way it is passed on and reinterpreted through these 
layers. This can be an iterative process, with different layers referring to 
other layers in their interpretations of policy, for instance, in the way in 
which practitioners in the Older Persons Team challenged the policy of 
covert eligibility criteria in terms of national policy statements about the 
transparency of such criteria. 
P-"l 
I he final area for fijrther research relates to examination of the way 
discretion is used, and how this should be assessed. In the introduction I 
discuss the understanding of the existence of discretion as a precondition 
for the analysis and evaluation of its use. I have examined the extent of 
discretion and its differing natures within two social work teams and 
regard this as the groundwork for ffirther research exploring the way the 
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use of discretion could be evaluated. One way suggested by the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective is to assess discretion against policy; this is done, 
for instance, by Baldwin (11998,20oo). Another approach is to criticise 
practice using the researcher's own idea of appropriate use of discretion 
(e. g. Ellis etatiggg). Both approaches are problematic. The argument 
about discretion operating throughout the organisation underlines the 
problem of identifying the policy by which practice should be evaluated 
and where it is located. Lewis and Glennerster (ir996), for instance, use 
Sabatier's idea of core and peripheral policy goals to distinguish the overt 
and covert policy in the new community care, but also point to how local 
authorities often look to the overt policy to frame their responses. The 
other approach-re searchers asserting a standard against which practice is 
to be assessed-raises questions about what justifies the application of 
these standards to the situation. An alternative approach would be to 
examine the evaluation of discretion in the same way as this thesis has 
sought to examine its extent and basis: by identifying and speci4ring the 
commitments cited by the actors involved as central to understanding and 
judging the exercise of discretion. This would be in line with forms of 
analysis that emphasise an understanding of actors' own commitments in 
assessing their actions (Williams 1993: 194 and Bauman 1995: 43). How do 
citizens and service users expect discretion to be used? What are the 
expectations of practitioners? How do the latter understand, when their 
claim is to exercise professional discretion, what the professional 
requirements are? How do managers at different levels of the organisation 
understand appropriate uses of discretion? Rather than seeking to impose 
external criteria of evaluation, this research would first seek to identify the 
values, commitments and aims of the different actors involved. 
Research inevitably involves a subjective understanding (Gadamer 1975) 
that reflects the starting point and the development of a particular 
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perspective. This thesis represents my analysis of the literature and case 
study data of social work discretion in adult teams, using Lipsky's work on 
street-level bureaucracy as a starting point. As such it traces the 
development of my thinking about discretion and the roles of 
managerialism and professionalism. In reviewing and presenting this 
material I have also identified areas for further exploration and research 
within a field of interest which still gives rise to many questions regarding 
discretion, the relationships between different levels within organisational 
hierarchies, and the varying perspectives employed by a range of actors in 
evaluating the use of discretion. 
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Appendix x 
biscretion in Social Work Practice 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to take part, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information. 
My name is Tony Evans. I work at Oxford Brookes University. I am doing a 
research degree at Warwick University looking at social work practitioners' 
understanding of professional approaches to and use of discretion. 
My study involves: looking at policy and procedure documents within the 
department, looking at some case materiat and talking to social workers and 
managers. I want to interview individual social workers/managers within 
the team to hear about their experiences and views. The interviews, which 
would each usually take about an hour, would take place in private and would 
be confidential. If you wanted to stop the interview at any time you could do 
so without having to give a reason. 
I would like to tape-record the interviews rather than take notes. The tape 
will be erased after it has been transcribed. The tape transcripts will be 
anonymous and kept in a locked drawer. They will only be used for research 
and any information used will be anonymised. 
I hope that the research will help us achieve a better understanding of 
discretion and its significance in social work practice. 
If you would like to speak to me about the research you can contact me by e- 
mail-tevans@brookes. ac. uk - or phone me on 01865 484209. 
Thank you, 
Tony Evans, Department of Social Work, Oxf ord Brookes University. 
Appendix2 
Codeletter Number 
Name or 
initials: 
Contact telephone number/e- 
Mai 1: 
I have received a copy of the research information sheet; I 
am aware of the purpose of the research. I understand that 
the i nf ormation I wi II give wi II be treated in conf idence. I am 
also aware that I can withdraw from the interview if I choose 
to do so. 
-I agree to participate in the research 
signature 
-I agree to interviews being tape-recorded 
signature 
Appendix 3 
Code -- Letter Number 
Sender M/F 
Ethnicity 
How long have you yrs: 
been a manager? mnths: 
How long have you yrs: 
been qualif ied as a mnths: 
social worker? 
How long have you yrs: 
worked for mnths: 
[Newunit/Oldshire] 
How long have you yrs: 
worked with this mnths: 
team? 
Appendix 
Sender M/F 
Ethnicity 
Code - Letter Number 
How long have you 
been qual if ied as a yrs: 
social worker? mnths: 
How long have you yrs: 
worked for mnths: 
[Newunit/Oldshire] 
How long have you 
worked with this 
team? 
yrs: 
mnths: 
Appendix 4 
[TABLE 
1: GENDER AND ETHNICITY BY TEAM AND ROLE 
2 
0 
CMHT Man. OPT Man. CMHT Soc. Wrks OPT Soc. Wrks 
OWhite OBlack El Female DMale 
TABLE 2: INTERVIEWEES WORK EXPERIENCE BY TEAM AND ROLE 
--------------- ----------------- - -------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- -- -------------- --------------- ................... 
------------- -- --------------- -- - --- --- --- .1- 
E 
R 
s 
! 'I - I"'Y- I-- IIF- -1 - -1 -7= 
CMHT Man. OPT Man. CMHT Soc. Wrks. 
Management Experience 
Period as a qualified worker 
D Period working for Newunit/Oldshire 
Appendix 5 
Manager Interview Aide Memoire 
o What organisation expects of social workers? What's 
your understanding of your role? How is this 
communicated to you? How do social workers 
understand their role? 
o How would you def ine prof essional 
discretion/autonomy? Do social workers have 
discretion/autonomy? 
o becisions about receipt of service? [Eligibility 
Criteria] 
oHow do social workers organise their work? 
What rules/policies are relevant? 
How clear are these rules/policies? 
Do you have an example? 
i: i How is the work of social workers managed in the 
department? 
i: j What is the impact of this on their work and how they 
do it? 
[: i Impact of resource levels on practice? 
o Impact of the organisation of resources [budgets]? 
a On social work practice? On services? 
c3 Any other points/issues? 
Appendix 6 
Social Worker Interview Aide Memoire 
How do you understand your role as a social worker? 
o What does the Organisation expect of you as a social 
worker? How is this communicated to you? 
13 How would you def ine professional 
discretion/autonomy? Do you have 
discretion/autonomy? 
o Decisions about receipt of service? [Eligibility 
Criteria] 
o How you organise your work? 
What rules/policies are relevant? 
How clear are these rules/policies? 
Do you have an example? 
o How is the work of social workers managed in the 
department? 
i: j What is the impact of this on your work and how you do 
it? 
[: I Impact of resource levels on practice? 
c3jmpact of the organisation of resources [budgets]? 
[: j On your time? On services? 
Any other points/issues? 
